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 The concept of luck is important to a wide range of philosophical areas including ethics 
(moral luck), epistemology (epistemic luck), political philosophy (issues of distributive justice 
and just deserts), and metaphysics (causation and the notion of coincidence).  However, until 
recently, many of these discussions appealed to the concept of luck (and intuitions surrounding 
the role of luck) only as an undefined primitive.  This dissertation is directed at providing a 
theory of luck from a different vantage than contemporary philosophical accounts (such as those 
developed by Duncan Pritchard, Wayne Riggs, and Nicholas Rescher). 
 My first two chapters explore the existing treatments of luck in contemporary philosophy 
and a selection of psychological research is order to distinguish the philosophically relevant 
notion of luck from the popular superstitious ideas of luck.  I propose that luck can be roughly 
described as involving a sense of significance (instances of luck matter to the affected parties) 
and a sense of unreliability (we cannot count on luck).  I also identify two important trends in 
contemporary treatments of luck; 1) contemporary accounts have a much more detailed focus on 
the unreliability criterion than on the significance criterion, and 2) many discussions of luck treat 
luck as an intrinsic feature of the world such that instances of luck can be identified as matters of 
luck apart from any consideration of their significance. 
 In my third chapter, I argue that significance deserves as careful and detailed a treatment 
as unreliability, and I argue against the idea that the relevant notion of significance can be 
understood merely in terms of an affected subject's actual or potential beliefs about what is 
 
 
significant to her.  In giving a more nuanced account of significance, I propose a distinction 
between impersonal luck (luck that involves an advantage for any subject in the same situation) 
and personal luck (luck that involves an advantage for the subject only because of that subject's 
particular characteristics). 
 In my fourth chapter, I criticize accounts that treat luck as an intrinsic property that can 
be identified apart from a consideration of the significance for an affected subject (what I have 
called matter of luck accounts).  I propose that luck is a property dependent on a practice of 
adopting modified attitudes (what I call luck attitudes) and that we can understand the 
unreliability of luck in terms of this practice; an advantage is ordinarily acquired if it is 
appropriate to adopt normal attitudes towards someone's possession of it, and an advantage is 
extraordinarily acquired, and therefore lucky, if it is appropriate to adopt the modified luck 
attitudes towards it. 
 My final chapter contains my theory of luck.  Following the discussions in my third and 
fourth chapters, I propose an account where significance plays a central role in distinguishing 
instances of luck.  I propose a framework on which advantages are ordinarily or extraordinarily 
obtained according to their significance to the possessor, and I propose that a lucky state of 
affairs be understood as a state of affairs that involves an advantage for a subject who has 
obtained that advantage in an extraordinary way.  The conditions under which an advantage is 
ordinarily obtained are sensitive to the nature and degree of the advantage.  In line with the 
discussion in my fourth chapter, I conclude by proposing some conditions which lead us to adopt 
normal attitudes (that is, conditions under which having an advantage would be considered 
ordinary) but leave it open to modification in light of changing social practices of, and standards 
for, adopting luck attitudes.
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1. Mind the Gap: Everyday and Theoretical Understanding of Luck 
 In everyday life, it is natural to devote little thought to luck.  Apart from some carefully 
sequestered domains (board and card games, athletic competitions, and casino gambling) 
saturated with the paraphernalia of luck (dice, cards, roulette wheels and the like) the presence of 
luck in ordinary life is largely hidden from view.  Yet, its influence is considerable.  The largest 
and most significant parts of life, where we are raised, who we love, where we work, who our 
friends are, and the natural talents we have, are, on reflection, all largely matters of luck.  When 
we do take the time to reflect on the luck in our lives, it may present itself in various ways.  On 
one hand, the superstitious tendency is to view luck as a force to be cajoled, appeased, or 
bargained with.  The rabbit's foot is brought along to curry the favor of Lady Luck.  On the other 
hand, luck colors the attitudes we take as our lives progress well or poorly.  The triumphant 
athlete deflects praise by emphasizing luck's role in her victory; the unfortunate lottery player 
bemoans the unfairness of it all watching the winner interviewed on television. 
 So, why do we devote so little thought to luck?  Perhaps the psychological burden is too 
high.  Daniel Statman has suggested that: 
 This widespread and profound effect of luck on human life hangs over us like a threat, 
 generating the feeling that we have no real control over our lives.  It undermines our 
 sense of security and stability, promoting a sense of uncertainty with regard to our 
 projects, relationships and aims.  It makes our lives seem weak and fragile, always at the 




The fear is that, if luck is given its due, then our accomplishments diminish to mere coincidence 
and our futures present themselves as a terrifying, unavoidable minefield of randomness.  A 
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bleak picture, to be sure, but it is not the only explanation.  Perhaps luck is simply a difficult 
notion, poorly understood.  The natural hesitation may simply be a hesitation to frame things in 
terms of a concept where our intuitions are confused.  In this hopeful light, perhaps a nuanced 
understanding of luck can lead to a more generous spirit in our relationships with others and a 
healthier evaluation of ourselves. 
 While it is clear that the concept 'luck' is relevant to a variety of fields in philosophy 
(appearing in discussions on epistemology, ethics, distributive justice), the scope and force of 
this relevance is far from clear.  Pre-reflective intuitions regarding the role of luck often present 
it as something pernicious to be ruled out.  We want to distinguish actual knowledge from a 
lucky guess, we think moral status is immune to luck, and we have different ideas about 
suffering due to free choice and suffering from brute luck.  However, it was only relatively 
recently that philosophers moved beyond treating luck as a primitive notion and even more 
recently that we have seen developed treatments of luck that offer more than rough conceptual 
equivalences.  Inspired by and in response to seminal work by Bertrand Russel, Bernard 
Williams, Thomas Nagel, and Edmund Gettier, leading general accounts of luck have been 
offered by Nicholas Rescher, Duncan Pritchard, and Wayne Riggs.  
 The philosophical discussion of luck has largely focused on two issues.  In 
epistemological discussions, there is a widely held intuition that knowledge is incompatible with 
luck; luck cannot play an essential or constitutive role in the acquisition of knowledge.  When 
someone is, in a certain sense, lucky that her belief is true, this true belief cannot count as 
knowledge.  This intuition has led some to develop specifically anti-luck epistemologies.  The 
anti-luck epistemologist presumes that a careful investigation of the kind of luck that undermines 
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knowledge will reveal an important condition on knowledge that can improve on or replace the 
classic tripartite account of knowledge (as justified true belief). 
 In the study of ethics, there is a tension between the intuition (sometimes attributed to a 
Kantian understanding of morality) that moral standing is immune to the influence of luck and 
the standard practice of moral evaluation in light of things that are subject to luck.  Prima facie, 
there are morally relevant features of people, actions, and consequences that are due to luck, but 
there is something uncomfortable about letting luck make any moral difference at all.  For 
instance, if we consider two similar drunk drivers one of whom arrives home safely and one of 
whom hits and kills a pedestrian, then our condemnation of the lethal driver will be far greater 
than that of the fortunate one.  And yet, it is hard to argue against the idea that the only 
difference between the two is due to luck.  There is something uncomfortable about letting luck 
play such a moral role, but the alternative seems to be to radically revise our practice of moral 
assessment. 
 There seems to be a gap between the intuitive, pre-reflective understanding and use of the 
luck concept in everyday life and the treatment of the luck concept in contemporary philosophy.  
Outside the academic discussion, luck presents itself mostly in our reactions to and evaluations 
of significant and unusual features of our lives (and, on occasion, in our anticipation of 
significant and unusual developments).  Luck is most often acknowledged when things are (or 
would be) most significant to us.  Inside the academic discussion, philosophers have paid 
relatively little attention to this kind of significance.  Many theories have approached the concept 
by first trying to distinguish a class of matters of luck that can be identified as potentially lucky 
apart from any reference to their significance for anyone.  Then, a significance criterion is added 
which, if satisfied, promotes the matter of luck to a genuine case of luck.  Some have gone so far 
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as to suggest that such an addition is ad hoc and unnecessary for understanding the relevant 
notion of luck. 
 The aim of my project, then, is to close this gap with a theory that plays careful attention 
to the role of significance involved in cases of luck and that accounts for the distinctive reactions 
and evaluations that make up much of our everyday experience with luck.  I do not intend to take 
the strong position that such an account is necessarily needed to understand the related concerns 
in philosophy except to offer the following: if it turns out that a fully descriptive account of our 
intuitive, pre-reflective understanding of luck is at odds with the theoretically relevant notion of 
luck, such a discovery might help us diagnose the conflict of intuitions involved in epistemic 
luck and the paradox of moral luck.
2
 
2. Outline and General Structure 
 The structure of this project is motivated directly by my concern with what I have 
described as our everyday experience with luck. I begin by considering the pre-reflective 
attitudes and intuitions ever-present in philosophical discussions of luck and a small sample of 
psychological research on luck. The numerous conflicts and tensions will make it difficult to say 
anything uncontroversial, so I will stipulate some important language to move the discussion 
forward.  I treat good luck and bad luck as the basic luck concepts, treating the neutral luck term 
as shorthand for  the disjunction 'good luck or bad luck.'  I also describe a class of luck attitudes; 
modified attitudes that we adopt or endorse in light of having characterized something (or 
someone) as lucky or unlucky.  A precise description of the particular modifications that do 
occur or that should occur in light of characterizing a case as lucky or unlucky is beyond the 
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luck and the fact that almost all of the moral assessments that we make are based on things that are subject to luck. 
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scope of this project.  It is enough for me to identify them as attitudes that are different from the 
attitudes that we adopt if the case were not treated as lucky. 
 Following this stage setting, I offer a summary of the existing philosophical literature on 
luck and more detailed descriptions of three leading accounts of luck offered by Duncan 
Pritchard, Wayne Riggs, and Nicholas Rescher.  I identify two important trends in these 
contemporary treatments of luck; 1) contemporary accounts pay relatively little attention to the 
nuances of how cases of luck are significant for the agents involved, and 2) discussions of luck 
often treat luck as an intrinsic feature of the world such that instances of luck can be identified as 
matters of luck apart from any consideration of their significance for particular agents.  While 
these trends are not necessarily problematic for the intended application of these theories 
(primarily in epistemology), they are the source of the gap between everyday and theoretical 
treatments of luck. 
 So, I next turn my attention to an account of the so far neglected idea that any case of 
luck is significant for some subject.  I propose that there are a number of prima facie difficulties 
that arise from leaving the relevant notion of significance undefined, and propose an account of 
significance in terms of the advantage involved for a particular subject.  In order to refrain from 
limiting my theory to any particular ethical or meta-ethical position, I describe advantages as 
anything that can be properly said to be good for a subject, however understood.  This general 
approach still allows me to make a distinction between impersonal advantages (things that are 
good for a subject that would be equally good for another subject in the same situation) and 
personal advantages (things that are good for a subject only in light of something particular to 
that subject) which allows me to offer a less conflicted analysis of the prima facie difficulties that 
arose from leaving significance undefined. 
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 Following this discussion, I address the common approach to theorizing about luck that I 
call the matter of luck approach.  Roughly, the matter of luck approach involves trying to 
distinguish a class of potentially lucky cases (matters of luck) apart from a consideration of an 
affected subject.  Matters of luck are then promoted to genuine cases of luck if they happen to 
satisfy an additional significance criterion, often described in terms of an affected subject's 
beliefs (or potential beliefs).  I suggest that this approach might stem from thinking of luck as an 
intrinsic property, but the observations about pre-reflective understanding and use of the luck 
concept in terms of luck attitudes suggests that we might do better treating luck as a property that 
is dependent on an existing set of practices and attitudes. 
 I conclude by offering my own theory of luck.  Following these observations, I propose 
an account where significance plays a central role in distinguishing instances of luck.  I propose 
a framework on which advantages are ordinarily or extraordinarily obtained according to their 
significance to the possessor, and I propose that a lucky state of affairs be understood as a state 
of affairs that involves an advantage for a subject who has obtained that advantage in an 
extraordinary way.  The conditions under which an advantage is ordinarily obtained are sensitive 
to the nature and degree of the advantage.  For illustrative purposes, I close by proposing some 
conditions which seem to lead us to adopt normal reactive attitudes (that is, conditions under 
which having an advantage would be considered ordinary), but I leave it open to modification in 




Chapter I: A Difficult Notion 
 
1. Introduction 
 The difficulty involved in developing a satisfactory account of luck becomes obvious 
from the moment we recognize that there is no single clear and consistent, commonsense, or 
‘folk’ understanding to rely on.  Often the luck claims and attributions that we are most confident 
in lead to conflicting or even outright contradictory intuitions about the luck concept itself.  As 
psychologist John Cohen writes:  
The idea of luck is ubiquitous but by no means simple, in the sense that it means 
precisely the same to everyone, everywhere.  Expressions for ‘luck’ in different 
languages introduce nuances that are difficult, if not impossible, to capture in any 
particular tongue.  And even those who speak the same language do not necessarily use 




Philosophers writing about luck often treat it as a primitive notion or depend on a loose 
conceptual relation to chance, accidents, predictability, or control.  Similarly, in the 
psychological literature, we can see a clear absence of consensus; attribution, comparison 
process, and belief-based research all study participant beliefs about luck differently, both 
relying on and revealing different intuitive notions about the concept of luck itself. 
In this chapter, I would like to introduce my approach to developing a theory of luck by 
first describing these intuitions and showing the tensions they create.  As Pritchard and Smith 
write, “Our everyday intuitions about luck may license contradictory elucidations of this 
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  So, I begin by laying out what I see as the core ideas involved in luck, the intuitive 
ideas suggested by findings in and approaches to psychological research, and the intuitive ideas 
seemingly behind the partial accounts historically used in philosophical writing.  Following this 
somewhat quick and loose discussion, I will present the motivations for the basic assumptions 
that my developed theory is based on, and I address some concerns raised by this way of thinking 
about luck. 
2. Core Notions 
 As I see it, there are two core ideas involved in luck.  These core ideas are intentionally 
broad; they are only meant to situate the discussion in terms of what minimum features we need 
to include if we can be said to be talking about the concept ‘luck’ at all.  First, luck involves the 
idea that a person is somehow better or worse off (for good luck and bad luck, respectively).  
There is no luck, either good or bad, if no person is positively or negatively affected.  I’ll call this 
the significance criterion.  Second, luck involves the idea that something is unusual, abnormal, 
or unexpected.  Luck may be pervasive and ubiquitous in the sense that we get lucky or unlucky 
more often than not or in the sense that more of our lives are influenced by luck than not, but 
every individual case of luck must be abnormal in some way.  Luck is unreliable; it is an 
interruption in the way we can reasonably expect things to go.  We cannot, or at least should not, 
count on getting lucky.
5
  There is no luck when things ‘go according to plan.’  I’ll call this the 
unreliability criterion.  Importantly, this does not necessarily need to be interpreted in terms of 
probability, predictability, or chance.  The ordinary
6
 course of events is not necessarily the most 
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 There may be a complication here; for example, in some game situations, the best play may be to play as if we will 
get lucky in a particular way.  However, the general point is that we cannot reasonably expect to be lucky. 
  
6
 Ordinariness will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, pp. 146-156. 
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likely course of events.  So, it is my claim that any account that does not somehow accommodate 
the significance and unreliability criteria is not properly an account of luck. 
 Along with these core ideas involved in luck, I also want to present a handful of 
intuitively uncontroversial luck cases.  If a proposed account of luck conflicts with one or more 
of these examples, I take this as a reason for seeing the account as problematic or inadequate: 
1. Lucky guess: Suppose someone is taking a multiple choice test and does not understand 
one of the questions.  They choose to fill in a circle anyway.  If this ends up being the 
correct answer, this counts as a lucky guess and the guesser is lucky.  Similar examples 
could be constructed where a person somehow gets credit for providing a correct answer 
when he or she does not have sufficient reasons for giving that answer. 
2. Lottery Win: If a player in a fair lottery wins, that player is lucky to have won that 
lottery. 
3. Found Treasure: If someone goes for a hike through the woods and discovers a box of 
treasure, then that person is lucky to have found that treasure. 
Obviously, these examples can all be made controversial with small alterations.  However, I am 
presenting them here in their simplest form to show the types of cases that are central to the idea 
of luck. 
3. Basic Intuitions: Psychology 
 It is not my intention, in this section, to give a complete or even detailed survey of the 
psychological research on luck.  Instead, I only mean to introduce some brief findings in this 
field as a way of introducing some common intuitions about luck.  Psychological research on 
luck has approached the concept in at least three distinct ways.  Here, I want to look at some of 
the findings of this kind of psychological research to educe the intuitions that are suggested by 
10 
 
these findings and the intuitions that influenced how the research is framed.  First, there is 
attribution research
7
 which focuses on how people construct causal explanations.  These studies 
focus on explanations of why a person acted as they did and on why a person succeeded or failed 
in what they attempted to do.  Within the psychological research on achievement (why a person 
succeeded or failed in their attempts), psychologists have looked at when people attribute success 
or failure to luck and how people feel about such attributions.   
 One way this kind of research has been framed separates the way people explain actions 
and events between those which propose stable causes from those which propose variable 
causes.
8
  Additionally, there is a division between when people attribute an action or event to an 
internal (to the actor or actors) cause and when they attribute it to an external cause.  Heider 
proposed that "When success is attributed to luck... environmental conditions, rather than the 
person, are primarily responsible for the outcome, and second, that these environmental 
conditions are the product of chance."
9
  So, Heider suggests that luck attributions come up most 
often when the attributer sees an outcome as having a variable (since it is due to chance), 
external (that is, environmental) cause.  Weiner elaborates on Heider's work and suggests that 
luck attributions involve seeing an external, unstable, and uncontrollable cause.
10
  
 What does this tell us about the intuitions at play, here?  Immediately, we can see an 
intuitive connection with the unreliability criterion, here described in terms of variability or 
instability.  Intuitive relationships with chance and control also emerge.  The way the research is 
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 See, for example, Heider, Fritz. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley, 1958. 
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set up treats luck as a property of events, depending on the causes of those events.  I'll call this 
the events-based conception of luck: 
I1.  Luckiness is a property of events. 
Additionally, we can see the unreliability criterion expressed in a number of smaller intuitions: 
I2.  Lucky events have unstable causes. 
I3.  Lucky events have external (rather than internal) causes. 
I4.  Lucky events are uncontrollable. 
I5. Lucky events are the result of chance. 
While the relevant interpretation of chance is not obvious, here, further attribution research has 
been directed at the relationship between luck and chance.  For example, Wagenaar and Keren
11
 
had one group of participants write descriptions of events that were lucky while another group 
wrote descriptions of events that happened by chance.  A third group was instructed to rate the 
applicability of twelve different dimensions to these stories.  The researchers found that luck and 
chance stories differed along several dimensions, such as surprise and coincidence (which were 
more closely tied to chance stories) and level of accomplishment and important consequences 
(which were more closely tied to luck stories).  Probability was not indicative of luck or chance.   
I6.  Luck and chance are distinct.  The relevant notion of chance is distinct from 
 probability. 
In an earlier study, Keren and Wagenaar
12
 found that, in gambling situations, participants 
identified luck and chance as different causes of events.  Participants agreed that some players 
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may be luckier than others, while chance remains the same for everyone.  So, in contrast to the 
events-based conception of luck (I1), we get: 
I7.  Luckiness is a property of persons. 
I'll call this the persons-based conception of luck.  Also in contrast to the findings of Heider and 
Weiner, Keren and Wagenaar
13
 found that, in gambling situations, participants identified luck in 
situations where an expected variability was not observed:  "Lack of sufficient variability (in 
wins and losses) within short runs is apparently expressed in terms of luck."
14
  
I8. When variability is expected, stability can be attributed to luck. 
 A second area of psychological research that has been concerned with luck is focused on 
the role of comparison processes.  This research focuses on the role of counterfactual thinking.  
This kind of research is partially motivated by the observation that often, in clearly negative 
situations such as car or plane crashes, survivors will perceive themselves as lucky to only suffer 
small pains (being injured rather than killed, for example) because they can easily imagine a 
worse outcome.  In one study
15
 participants were given a description of a day that ended in a 
major positive outcome, a major negative outcome, a major positive outcome that almost 
happened but did not, a major negative outcome that almost happened but did not, or no major 
outcome, positive or negative.  When participants were asked to rate these scenarios on how 
happy, satisfied, and lucky they would feel, those who nearly experienced a major negative event 
reported feeling luckier than those who experienced no major outcome, and those who nearly 
experienced a major positive event reported feeling less lucky than those who experienced no 
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major outcome.  However, measures of happiness and satisfaction were not significantly 
different between these groups. 
 This research seems to suggest that counterfactual thinking plays an important role in 
luck attributions, and it leads to an attractive way of making sense of the unreliability criterion 
since counterfactuals might be imagined as a way of identifying a normal case: 
I9.  Counterfactual thinking significantly impacts our perception of luck. 
Additionally, by asking participants to rate how lucky they feel, this study treats luck as a 
personally subjective feeling. 
I10.  Luck is a personally subjective feeling. 
We can also weaken this intuition to get: 
I11.  There are distinct personally subjective feelings associated with being lucky or 
 unlucky. 
Or, we can strengthen it.  If luck is only a subjective feeling, we might get: 
I12.  Luck claims are not truth-apt. 
Counterfactual thinking also seems to play a significant role when people attribute more 
permanent aspects of their lives to good luck.  Imagine claims such as, "I am lucky to have such 
a wonderful family" or "I am lucky to enjoy my career."  Tiegen
16
 has suggested that this kind of 
luck claim implies an awareness of and comparison to an alternative state of affairs. 
I13.  Luck is a property of states of affairs. 
Finally, we can also see the common notion of luck as a comparative emerge: 
I14.  Luckiness admits of degrees; one person or event can be less lucky than another, but 
 nonetheless still actually lucky. 
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There is some question about the comparative aspect of luck.  For example, winning a raffle with 
several hundred participants seems obviously luckier than winning a raffle with only a few 
dozen.  Those who believe in a very tight connection between luck and probability might 
propose that luck is comparable because of its connection to comparable probabilities. 
I15.  A lucky event can be more or less lucky than another lucky event by being more or 
 less probable than the other event. 
However, Tiegen
17
 found that success was also perceived as luckier when it was physically close 
to a failure (and failure was perceived as involving greater bad luck if it was physically close to 
success) than when it was physically distant even if the probabilities were acknowledged as 
being the same.  For example, if a roulette ball lands in a losing chamber neighboring a winning 
chamber, participants perceived this as involving greater bad luck than if the ball lands in a 
losing chamber on the opposite side of the wheel.  This perception persisted even when 
participants acknowledged that the probability of the ball landing in any one of the losing 
chambers was the same. 
I16.  A lucky event can be more or less lucky than another lucky event based on factors 
 other than relative probabilities. 
This may be explained by Kahneman and Varey's
18
 findings that counterfactual thinking is more 
common when the alternative outcome is perceived as being temporally or physically close. 
 The third and final area of psychological research on luck I would like to consider is 
focused on directly questioning individual participant beliefs about luck.  Darke and Freedman 
found reliable individual differences in beliefs about luck: "Some individuals maintain an 
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irrational view of luck as a somewhat stable force that tends to influence events in their own 
favor, while others seem to hold the more rational belief that luck is random and unreliable."
19
  
Simply describing the distinction in this ways reveals a significant intuition held by the 
researchers: 
I17.  Beliefs about luck are subject to norms of rationality. 
And, since our beliefs about luck strongly inform our tendency to make luck claims and 
attributions, we can extrapolate: 
I18.  Luck claims and attributions are subject to norms of rationality. 
Holders of the irrational view of luck tend to treat luck as a sort of invisible skill or agent that 
can be controlled or bargained with.  For example, Hayano
20
 found that poker players tended to 
treat luck as an agent that was responsible for the pattern of the cards. 
I19.  An individual's luck can be controlled or manipulated. 
This intuition relies on I7 (luckiness is a property of persons) and lies beneath the popular 
conceptions of lucky charms, rituals, and the personification of Lady Luck.  Some psychologists 
have suggested that this so-called irrational belief in luck stems from a confusion "when factors 
from skill situations (such as competition, choice, familiarity, and involvement) are introduced 
into chance situations."
21
  It is also interesting to observe how this contrasts with earlier external 
descriptions of luck as involving primarily external causes found in attribution research.  In fact, 
I think there is a strong, more specific intuition regarding the relationship between luck and skill: 
I20.  Luck and skill form a dichotomy. 
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In many competitive situations, success is explained as a zero-sum combination of luck and skill; 
the more responsible a player's skill is for their success, the less it is due to luck, and vice versa.  
For example, when an Olympic runner beats an amateur in a footrace, the success is attributed 
entirely or nearly entirely to skill.  If the amateur won, the success would be attributed almost 
entirely to luck.  We would claim that the amateur was lucky as a way of emphasizing that the 
amateur runner's skill as not responsible for his win. 
4. Basic Intuitions: Philosophy 
 In addition to the intuitive notions of luck found in psychological literature, there are also 
some common intuitions to be found in philosophical writing on luck.  A careful analysis of 
philosophical accounts of luck will be presented in the next chapter, including discussion of the 
three developed accounts of luck, presented by Duncan Pritchard, Wayne Riggs, and Nicholas 
Rescher.  Here, I only aim to describe some general trends in philosophical writing on luck to 
add to the list of basic intuitions developed in the previous section. 
 Historically, philosophical writing about luck can be found predominately in discussion 
on two topics, moral luck and epistemic luck, and there are similar anti-luck intuitions appealed 
to in each case.  In the case of moral luck, the basic anti-luck intuition, often attributed to Kant, 
can be described in the following way: 
I21.  We should not be morally assessed positively for being lucky or negatively for being 
 unlucky. 
In other words, the intuition is that what matters to us, morally, is not susceptible to luck; if the 
only difference between two cases is due to luck, then there is no morally relevant difference 
between the two cases.  The discussion then focuses on those cases where something seemingly 
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morally relevant is intuitively due to luck, and considerable work has been dedicated to 
explaining this apparent conflict. 
 Writing about epistemic luck has relied on a similar intuition about the incompatibility of 
luck and knowledge: 
I22.  True beliefs (even justified true beliefs) do not count as knowledge if their truth is a 
 matter of luck. 
Peter Unger describes one version of this intuition when he writes that knowledge requires that it 
is "not at all an accident that the man is right about it being the case that p."
22
  Discussions then 
center on the best way to cash out this intuition.  The attractiveness of this intuition is described 
by Pritchard: "Knowledge does appear to be a cognitive achievement of some sort, and luck 
seems to militate against genuine achievements."
23
  This kind of claim echoes I20  (luck and skill 
form a dichotomy) from the previous section. 
 In all these areas, however, developed accounts of luck itself are rare.  For the most part, 
writers either treat luck as an undefined primitive, depend on having the reader extrapolate a 
concept of luck from some simple examples or, most often, rely on a rough conceptual 
equivalence.  For example, Nagel
24
 will develop his discussion in terms of things that are not in 
an agent's control (similar to I4: lucky events are uncontrollable).  However, with even a little 
reflection, this can be, at most, a necessary condition for luckiness.  Many things are out of my 
control but of no significance to me (such as my neighbor finding a penny on the sidewalk), and 
many things are outside of my control but regular and predictable in such a way as to be outside 
the domain of luck (such as the sun rising in the morning). 
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 have both tied the concepts of luck and accident very closely.  Again, it 
takes very little reflection to see why this characterization is incomplete.  If someone enters a 
lottery and wins, it is very strange to say that this was an accident.  After all, they entered the 




 have drawn 
parallels between luck and chance (similar to I5 :lucky events are the result of chance ) and 
Anders Schinkel has described the unreliability of luck in terms of what "we had no reason to 
expect."
29
  When we resort to these vague conceptual equivalences, it is not clear that the 
motivating intuitions about luck still apply.  This is the area where I think that a careful general 
account of luck can be most philosophically fruitful.   
 For convenience, I reproduce this list of basic intuitions from the previous two sections 
here: 
I1.  Luckiness is a property of events. 
I2.  Lucky events have unstable causes. 
I3.  Lucky events have external (rather than internal) causes. 
I4.  Lucky events are uncontrollable. 
I5.  Lucky events are the result of chance. 
I6.  Luck and chance are distinct.  The relevant notion of chance is distinct from   
 probability. 
I7.  Luckiness is a property of persons. 
I8. When variability is expected, stability can be attributed to luck. 
I9.  Counterfactual thinking significantly impacts our perception of luck. 
I10.  Luck is a personally subjective feeling. 
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I11.  There are distinct personally subjective feelings associated with being lucky or  
 unlucky. 
I12.  Luck claims are not truth-apt. 
I13.  Luck is a property of states of affairs. 
I14.  Luckiness admits of degrees; one person or event can be less lucky than another, but 
 nonetheless still actually lucky. 
I15.  A lucky event can be more or less lucky than another lucky event by being more or  
 less probable than the other event. 
I16.  A lucky event can be more or less lucky than another lucky event based on factors  
 other than relative probabilities. 
I17.  Beliefs about luck are subject to norms of rationality. 
I18.  Luck claims and attributions are subject to norms of rationality. 
I19.  An individual's luck can be controlled or manipulated. 
I20.  Luck and skill form a dichotomy. 
I21.  We should not be morally assessed positively for being lucky or negatively for being 
 unlucky. 
I22.  True beliefs (even justified true beliefs) do not count as knowledge if their truth is a 
 matter of luck. 
 
5. Starting Point: Luck Attitudes 
 Acknowledging the variety and inconsistency of the intuitions surrounding luck just 
described, where should we turn to develop a more unified account of luck?  One important 
question that has been left unaddressed so far is, why do we care about luck in everyday life?  
Or, more precisely, why do we care about the distinction between lucky and non-lucky, in 
everyday life?  One way to approach an answer is to consider what is at stake when everyday 
disagreements about luck happen.  Very broadly, I think there are two distinct kinds of everyday 
disagreements about luck.  First, we have disagreements about whether something is good or bad 
for a person.  For example, if a friend is involved in a destructive romantic relationship, then we 
might disagree on whether or not he is lucky to be unexpectedly broken up with.  Second, we 
have disagreements about the way a gain or loss is acquired.  For example, when playing sports 
or games, there are often disagreements over whether or not a player's success is due to luck.   
 As Pritchard has noted, there seems to be some tension between luck and achievement, 
and, as captured by I20 (luck and skill form a dichotomy), luck and skill seem opposed to the 
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extent that luck might, in a sense, undermine skill.  Now, achievement and skill are somewhat 
vague concepts, and I am not in a position to present any specific definitions for them here.  
However, if we ask what is at stake in everyday disagreements about luck and we try to find 
something in common in the stakes of the two kinds of everyday disagreements described above, 
I think these intuitions are illuminating.  What seems to hinge on classifying a case as lucky or 
non-lucky is a matter of attitudes. 
 When playing sports and games, whether or not a win or loss is lucky does not affect the 
raw value of that win or loss (after all, 'a point is a point'), but it does affect how we do (and 
ought to) view and react to that win or loss.  Lucky wins are less indicative of skill and are less 
of an achievement.  Whether or not we think of some part of our lives as being due to luck 
impacts the attitudes we take toward that part of our lives, and whether or not we think of some 
parts of other people's lives as being due to luck impacts the attitudes we take toward those parts 
of their lives.   
 When our attitudes toward a person and his or her gain or loss are modified because of a 
recognition that the gain or loss was lucky or unlucky for that person, the modified attitudes are 
what I am calling luck attitudes.  I do not know that it is possible or desirable to give a complete 
and exhaustive list of all the modifications that result in luck attitudes, but they will include, at 
least, limiting praise in the presence of good luck and limiting blame in the presence of bad luck, 
expecting greater humility and gratitude from lucky winners, offering consolation and support to 
unlucky sufferers, being envious or even resentful of a lucky opponent's victory, and seeing 
lucky wins and unlucky losses as less indicative of the winner's or loser's skills and talents. 
 Given that the basic intuitions about luck identified in the previous two sections cannot 
all be accommodated into a single starting point (as observed, some of these intuitions are, at 
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least prima facie, contradictory), I want to start, instead, with the following goal.  I aim to 
develop an account of luck that is focused on our pre-reflective use and concern with the concept 
of luck rather than focusing on an account developed for a particular theoretical end.  That is, 
rather than providing an account of luck as a tool for discussing particular philosophical concerns 
(such as those surrounding moral luck or epistemic luck), I aim to provide an account focused on 
the way the concept is used in everyday life and the practices surrounding its use.   
 By adopting a theory of this kind, I think that we are left on more solid ground to begin 
theorizing about more specific philosophical issues with a clearer picture of how and why we 
might want to appeal to certain intuitions about luck while setting aside others.  To this end, my 
approach takes the luck attitudes as a starting point; I take for granted that there is a distinct set 
of modified attitudes, the luck attitudes, that are adopted when a person recognizes that 
something is lucky or unlucky.  The principal practice surrounding the use of the concept luck is 
the practice of adopting luck attitudes toward people, events, and states of affairs.  Very roughly, 
then, I will approach my theory of luck as an attempt to pick out just those cases where adopting 
these modified attitudes is appropriate.   
6. Stage Setting: The Language of Luck 
 The rough sketch of my approach is, of course, quite rough; the language I have been 
using so far is incredibly loose.  The purpose of this section, then, is to introduce some more 
precise language and to make the motivations for certain assumptions and commitments in my 
account clear in order to properly set the stage for the discussions in the following chapters.  I’ll 
begin by offering the following, I think plausible, but not entirely uncontroversial picture of the 
language of luck. 
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 When we consider luck, as a concept, it cannot appear apart from the evaluative concepts 
‘good luck’ and ‘bad luck.’  If we take the two core ideas of luck seriously, as identified in 
section 2, there are two ways we might perceive a hierarchy between the neutral term ‘luck’ and 
the evaluative terms ‘good luck’ and ‘bad luck.’  First, we might think that the unreliability 
criterion is the distinguishing feature of luck and that the addition of significance gets us to good 
luck and bad luck.  We can think of luck as distinguished by a certain kind of unreliability, and 
all cases of that kind of reliability can be cases of either good luck or bad luck when saturated 
with positive or negative significance for someone.  This will be discussed as the matter of luck 
approach and my detailed criticism will appear in Chapter IV.
30
  Second, we can think of good 
luck and bad luck as the basic concepts and use the neutral term ‘luck’ as shorthand for the 
disjunction ‘good luck or bad luck.’  This is my preferred approach. 
For now, I will simply say that the matter of luck approach seems to miss an important 
concern we might have in giving an account of luck.  Some cases that might appear as matters of 
luck seem less open to saturation with one kind of significance than the other.  Consider the case 
of a reckless driver; when he chooses to drive home recklessly, there is unreliability in how this 
will turn out for him.  The positive outcome might be that he arrives home safely and enjoys 
doing so.  The negative outcome might be that he hits and kills a pedestrian and suffers the 
sanctions and penalties that go along with doing so.  However, it seems, intuitively, that the 
reckless driver has good luck is he arrives home safely but does not have bad luck if he hits a 
pedestrian.  In a sense, although the driver should not count on hitting a pedestrian every time he 
drives recklessly, he is not unlucky to do so; he is merelysuffering the consequences of his 
recklessness.  Examples like these encourage me to think about luck in terms of when something 
good or something bad is unreliably obtained, rather than in terms of when unreliable situations 
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lead to positive or negative consequences.  I will reserve a more extended discussion of this topic 
for later. 
Another reason to prefer seeing good luck and bad luck as basic concepts will emerge 
from a terminological distinction I want to make.  As far as we are concerned with the everyday 
practice of adopting modified attitudes in light of good luck and bad luck, the everyday language 
that we should be most concerned with are expressions that attribute luckiness to particular 
people in light of some particular part of the world.  This happens in a variety of ways, in 
everyday language; luck appears as a simple predicate of several things like agents (e.g. 'John is 
so lucky'), actions (e.g. 'That was a lucky shot'), events (e.g. 'Winning that lottery was lucky'), 
and states of affairs (e.g. 'That he won the lottery is lucky').  Luck also appears as a relation 
between (or as a property of the relation between) subjects and other entities.  For example, in 
the claims 'Winning the lottery was lucky for John,' 'John is lucky that he won the lottery,' and 
'John is lucky to be so tall,' luck appears to relate a subject (John) and an event, a state of affairs, 
and a personal trait, respectively.  I’ll call these expressions ‘luck claims.’ 
I want to distinguish this kind of expression (luck claims), which attribute luckiness to 
something or things, from expressions about luck that do not attribute luckiness to any particular.  
I’ll call these ‘meta-luck claims,’ and they are expressions such as, ‘luck is a complicated 
concept,’ ‘lotteries involve a lot of luck,’ and ‘whether or not I win is just a matter of luck.’  So, 
we can notice that luck claims, being expressions of our prima facie recognition of luck in the 
world, always attribute either good luck or bad luck.  Someone or something is always 
specifically lucky or unlucky.  In contrast, expressions about luck as a neutral concept will be 
meta-luck claims; these claims are not about recognizing luck in the world but rather reflective 
thoughts about luck or anticipations of luck to come.  This provides another reason for me to see 
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good luck and bad luck as the basic concepts and to use the neutral term ‘luck’ as shorthand for 
their disjunction.  Simple recognition of luckiness seems to be recognition of good luck and bad 
luck and not of some neutral form. 
Since everyday luck claims attribute luckiness as a property, my next task is to articulate 
exactly how to think of luck, as a property.  When we attribute luckiness to something, we 
usually do so with the terms ‘lucky’ and ‘unlucky.’  Their relations to the terms ‘good luck’ and 
‘bad luck’ are easy enough.  When a person is lucky, it means that they have good luck, and 
when a person is unlucky it means that they have bad luck.  When we say that something other 
than a person is lucky, it means that it is something in light of which a salient person is lucky; 
when we say that something other than a person is unlucky, it means that it is something in light 
of which a salient person is unlucky. 
Everyday luck claims also seem to rely on a large amount of implicit information.  When 
I say ‘that was a lucky shot’ or ‘he was lucky to win the lottery’ there is a person who I am, 
implicitly, saying is lucky.  Even when no interested subject appears in the expression, such as in 
‘that was a lucky shot,’ a beneficiary is implied.  Similarly, an expression like ‘John is so lucky’ 
leaves out what it is in light of which John is so lucky, but it is assumed to be clear in the context 
the utterance was made.  So, I will assume that all luck claims express propositions and that 
these propositions (luck propositions) take the following canonical forms: ‘S is lucky that P’ and 




Some might question why I have presented this in terms of subjects rather than agents.  
The explanation is simple and straightforward.  As I take ‘subject’ to be the broader term, I use it 
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to leave open the possibility that persons who have lost some or all of their agency (perhaps due 
to a neurological impairment) can be lucky and unlucky.  I also want to write in terms of subjects 
because I want to allow for the possibility that certain collective entities (such as companies or 
teams) can be lucky and unlucky, whatever we think about their status as agents or non-agents. 
More importantly, we want to consider the way I’ve set up luck propositions to relate 
subjects and propositions, rather than subjects and events.  After all, there is some temptation to 
think of luck primarily as it relates to events; some of the cleanest cases of luck such as winning 
the lottery, finding buried treasure, or making a lucky guess, are seemingly things that happen, 
i.e. events.  I prefer to approach theorizing about luck in terms of propositions (and the states-of-
affairs described by those propositions) for two reasons, one practical and one theoretical.  First, 
the practical reason is that thinking in terms of propositions is more open and allows for more 
possible sources of luckiness than events; any event, E, that we are interested in can be captured 
by the state-of-affairs of that event having occurred. 
The theoretical reason for my preference for thinking in terms of propositions is based on 
the observation that states-of-affairs are, in a sense, more fine-grained than events.  For example, 
if I ran into Barack Obama on the bus and he were to give me a handkerchief, my being given a 
handkerchief from a friendly stranger and my being given a handkerchief from the president of 
the United States might be indistinguishable as events, but they are importantly different as 
states-of-affairs.  I think want to distinguish the way that I am lucky that I received a 
handkerchief from the president of the United States and the way that I am lucky that I received a 
handkerchief from a friendly stranger.  This distinction will play a significant role when I 
develop the idea of propositions involving advantages and disadvantages, in Chapter V.
32
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So, taking ‘S is lucky that P’ and ‘S is unlucky that P’ as the canonical forms of luck 
propositions, I want to stipulate some language for discussing luck as a property.  First, I want to 
recognize that we might want to talk about ‘being lucky’ and ‘being unlucky’ as properties of 
subjects as well as properties of states-of-affairs.  So, I will stipulate that, a subject S has the 
property of ‘being lucky’ if and only if there is a true proposition of the form ‘S is lucky that P’ 
for some relevant P. Similarly, a state-of-affairs described by P has the property of ‘being lucky’ 
if and only if there is a true proposition of the form ‘S is lucky that P’ for some relevant S.  I will 
also sometimes use the language of a state-of-affairs being lucky for a subject; a state-of-affairs 
described by P is lucky for a subject if and only if that subject is lucky that P.  The cases of bad 
luck can be generated by substituting ‘unlucky’ for ‘lucky,’ ceteris paribus.  As is often done in 
natural language, throughout my discussion I will be using luckiness as a broad term to refer to 
the property of being lucky or unlucky.  So, when I propose to evaluate the luckiness of a subject 
or state-of-affairs in a certain case, I am evaluating the truth of one or more luck propositions 
relevant to that case in which the subject or state-of-affairs appears. 
To summarize, I take the following claims as my starting point for developing an account of 
luck: 
1. Good luck and bad luck are the basic concepts I am interested in; the neutral term ‘luck’ 
can be understood as shorthand for the disjunction ‘good luck or bad luck.’ 
2. There is a distinction between luck claims, expressions of prima facie recognition of good 
luck or bad luck in the world, and meta-luck claims, expressions of reflective thoughts 
about luck including anticipations of good luck or bad luck to come. 
3. For any subject S, ‘S is lucky’ means that S has good luck, and ‘S is unlucky’ means that 
S has bad luck.  For any states-of-affairs described by proposition P, ‘P is lucky’ means 
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that some relevant subject is lucky relative to that state-of-affairs and ‘P is unlucky’ 
means that some relevant subject is unlucky relative to that state-of-affairs. 
4. Luck claims express propositions; the propositions expressed by luck claims take the 
following canonical forms: ‘S is lucky that P’ and ‘S is unlucky that P’ where S is a 
subject and P is a proposition.   
5. A state-of-affairs described by P is lucky for a subject if and only if that subject is lucky 
that P. 
7. Luck Cognitivism, Luck Superstition, and Two Luck Skeptics 
 I want to conclude this chapter by addressing a few issues that arise from the way that I 
have framed my approach to developing a theory of luck.  First, from my assertion that luck 
claims express propositions, there is an implicit commitment to a sort of luck cognitivism; luck 
claims can be true or false.
33
  I think that this is a strong position to take and a defensible one.  I 
argue that luck claims have truth conditions that are independent of any individual person’s 
beliefs based on examples of the following kind.   
Consider the confident lottery player.  The confident lottery player buys a ticket fully 
expecting to win.  This expectation might be explained in a number of ways.  Perhaps the 
confident lottery player believes that he has some fool-proof method of picking winning numbers 
(that is not, in fact, effective).  Or, perhaps, due to a recent string of misfortunes in his life, the 
confident lottery player believes that the universe somehow owes him a win.  Or, perhaps, the 
confident lottery player might be confident because he has, in fact, rigged the lottery to ensure 
that his numbers will be selected.  In the first two descriptions, the lottery player’s confidence is 
based on some flawed belief; in the third, the lottery player’s confidence is justified.   
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 Now, suppose that the confident lottery player does win.  In no case will he believe that 
he is lucky for having won; after all, for him, winning the lottery is the expected or ordinary
34
 
outcome.  The unreliability criterion does not seem, to him, to be met.  Also, in every case, a 
typical observer will believe that the confident lottery player is lucky to win, as losing the lottery 
is the expected or normal case for any particular fair lottery player.  If the confident lottery 
player loses, he may even believe that he is unlucky, while an observer will believe that he is not 
unlucky.  However, whether or not the confident lottery player is actually lucky has nothing to 
do with these beliefs (his or the observer’s) about his luckiness.  What matters is whether or not 
the confident lottery player rigged the lottery and whether or not he wins the lottery.  If he rigs 
the lottery he is not actually lucky to win, although he may be unlucky to lose (perhaps, some 
rare malfunction of the device he used to rig the lottery). If he does not rig the lottery, then he is 
actually lucky to win regardless of his own expectations and beliefs. 
 A non-cognitivist about luck would think of luck more as a personally subjective feeling; 
we saw hints of this in the setup of some psychological research on comparison processes.  The 
luck non-cognitivist might think that feeling lucky (or thinking that oneself is lucky) is both 
necessary and sufficient for actually being lucky.  They might explain examples like the 
confident lottery player by saying that it is merely more or less appropriate for the lottery player 
to feel lucky depending on the facts of the case, in the same way that certain circumstances make 
it more or less appropriate to feel angry or jealous.
 35
  On this view, luck claims are only true or 
false to the extent that they report the empirical fact of how a person actually feels. 
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 It may be odd to feel angry when something good happens, but it makes no sense to say that I am mistaken in 
thinking that I am angry when something good happens and that I am not actually angry.  In contrast, the luck 
cognitivist thinks that sometimes it does make sense to say that someone is mistaken in thinking that they are lucky. 
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If there is any appeal to this kind of position, it is that it seems well equipped to deal with 
the mess of conflicting intuitions presented in sections 3 and 4.  However, I think the luck non-
cognitivist runs into difficulty accounting for the way we usually treat second and third person 
luck attributions.  When I claim that my opponent was lucky, this is clearly not a claim about 
how she actually feels.  The luck non-cognitivist might interpret it as a claim expressing my 
personal feelings about the relationship between my opponent and her victory, but I think even 
this interpretation misses the point.  When I claim that my opponent was lucky, I am pointing to 
certain features of the circumstances of my loss, independent of how I or my opponent feels 
about it, that excuses my losing or at least indicates that the loss should not be treated as 
indicative of future outcomes.  It is difficult to imagine what the luck non-cognitivist could say 
about cases like these, without claiming that a large part of what we take ourselves to be doing in 
making these attributions is error-laden.  Because of this, I am more confident in basing my 
account on cognitivist assumptions. 
 Although I do want to develop a view that avoids writing off large swaths of our pre-
reflective beliefs and practices as error-laden, there is a popular practice surrounding luck that I 
would like to set aside.  Superstitious luck claims might be the most familiar kind in popular 
media.  These claims treat a person or an object as having some sort of ‘luck power’ to cause 
lucky outcomes.  This idea shows up in lucky charms like rabbit’s feet and horseshoes (we also 
get the negative in hexes and casino employed ‘coolers’).  As can be seen in some of the 
psychological literature on luck, we also employ a less obvious, but similarly superstitious 
treatment of luck when we treat luck as some kind of invisible skill (a stable feature of the person 
responsible for the outcomes that are lucky for them). 
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 The problem with the superstitious version of luck is that it cannot be maintained along 
with the unreliability criterion.  Suppose that I am gambling in a casino where the house has a 
slight edge.  If I win, and am lucky to have won, then this implies that I have not done anything 
to ensure that I would win and that whatever I did to try to win (such as playing basic strategy in 
blackjack) was insufficient to ensure that I would win.  If I had done something that would make 
it normal for me to win, then I would not be lucky to win.  Now consider how something like a 
lucky charm is supposed to fit in.  When someone claims that a rabbit’s foot is lucky, they are 
claiming that having the rabbit’s foot with me (or rubbing it on my scalp or some other ritual) 
will cause lucky things to happen to me.  But if the rabbit’s foot can actually cause me to win, 
then I am not lucky to have won!  If the rabbit’s foot actually improves my chances of winning, 
then it is not affecting how lucky I am, it merely affects events according to its causal power like 
any other cause.  When I am lucky to win it is precisely because nothing I did was enough to 
cause me to win normally; if the rabbit’s foot can, in fact, cause such a win, then the win ceases 
to be a lucky one.  This argument against the idea of lucky charms applies to the invisible skill 
notion of luck as well.  No skill I have can cause wins and losses if those wins and losses are 
actually lucky or unlucky.  If my invisible luck skill or my lucky charm is actually efficacious, 
this may make me seem lucky to those unaware of this additional cause, but it will not affect 
when I am actually lucky.  Strictly speaking, nothing can straightforwardly cause good or bad 
luck.
36
   
Following up on the discussion of superstitious and non-superstitious concepts of luck 
from the previous section, there is a certain kind of skeptic that might argue that all luck talk is, 
to an extent, superstitious.  She would note that, oftentimes, luck claims are typically presented 
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as a sort of causal explanation.  For example, when I say that someone is lucky to be dealt a 
blackjack, to have won the lottery, or to have found a buried treasure this stops any further 
inquiry into why or how these events came about.  “How did you find that treasure?”  “I just got 
lucky.”  The skeptic sees these claims as playing some role in causal explanation—but this 
would make them contradictory in the same manner as the luckiness of a rabbit’s foot.  After all, 
if my luck explains the cause of my finding a hidden treasure, say, then my luck (as a skill, 
power, disposition, or some other quality) causes me to find the treasure.  But if my finding the 
treasure is caused by my luck in this way then I am not really lucky to have found the treasure.  I 
merely possessed the quality needed to find the treasure. 
 I think that this kind of skeptic is mistaken to think of luck attributions as playing the role 
of causal explanations.  There is a complete causal explanation for each case that does not need 
to appeal to any concept of luck.  However, these explanations are usually unsatisfactory in 
certain ways that lead us to ask for something beyond causal explanation.  If I find buried 
treasure in the woods, there may be a complete causal explanation along the lines of ‘I walked 
through the woods and stumbled across a box of buried treasure.’  When someone presses the 
question of how I found the treasure, they are not asking for further causal explanation, they are 
looking for me to justify having found the treasure (such that they would adopt normal attitudes 
toward my possession of it).  When I offer ‘I just got lucky’ in response to this inquiry, then, I 
am not proposing that luck is a cause or takes the place of a cause.  Rather, I am conceding that 
modified attitudes are appropriate, relative to my finding the treasure.  I claim that I am lucky 
because I am aware that the causal story does not provide reasons to adopt normal attitudes 
rather than luck attitudes. 
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 However, the skeptic may very well reply that, having conceded that luck does not play a 
causal role (and in this sense is not metaphysically real), I am making a mistake in trying to 
develop a unified account of luck.  This skeptic contends that, since luck is not metaphysically 
real, we should not think that there is (or ought to be) a unifying core to everyday luck claims.  
After all, the observations in sections 3 and 4 seemed to suggest precisely this; ways of talking 
about luck are so varied and inconsistent, that it doesn't really make sense to treat luck 
propositions as objectively true or false.  To do so would be to artificially promote only one way 
of talking about luck.  To this skeptic, leaving luck undefined or appealing to the concept in only 
a very loose way is precisely the right thing to do.   
 Unfortunately, I cannot offer a direct answer to this concern, other than to relocate the 
burden of proof.  I intend to offer an account of luck that does not suppose metaphysical reality, 
in the sense identified by the skeptic.  Seemingly then, the reason that a unified account of luck 
on such grounds would be undesirable, to such a skeptic, is that it would artificially privilege one 
way of talking about luck over another without any secure basis.  However, I propose that my 
theory seeks to pick out what is common to these various ways of talking about luck (except for 
those ways that are excluded for independent reasons, such as the superstitious luck claims just 
discussed), and that, in light of the practice of adopting luck attitudes that exists as a matter of 
fact, such an account will still be informative.  I suggest that the burden of proof should lie with 
the skeptic to show that my account is either, 1) unsuccessful in identifying something common 
to all ways of talking about luck that are not excluded for independent reasons, or 2) unhelpful 
for understanding the existing practice of adopting luck attitudes. 
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 A second kind of skeptic might insist that all luck disappears from a fully-informed point 
of view; nothing satisfies the unreliability criterion if we have access to enough information.
37
  
Let me introduce this skeptical worry through the following, somewhat controversial, example:  
Suppose that a person has a secret benefactor who, unknown to the beneficiary, has been 
planning (for a long time) to send the beneficiary a large amount of money (today).
38
  It is 
obvious that, from the point of view of the beneficiary, it appears lucky to suddenly be given a 
large amount of money, but there is some question about whether or not the beneficiary in this 
case is actually lucky.  Some might contend that the beneficiary was merely fortunate because 
the benefactor had planned to send the money for a long time.  Duncan Pritchard writes: 
it is far from clear that this is a case of luck… In order to see this, one need only note that 
if the agent were to discover that this event had been carefully planned all along, then he 
would plausibly no longer regard it as a lucky event.  Indeed, once he discovered that this 
event was always due to occur, it seems plausible to suppose that he would regard 
himself as no more lucky than a favored son is lucky to have received a vast inheritance 




What I think Pritchard leaves out of this objection is that, even if the beneficiary came to see this 
monetary windfall as something that was always due to occur, he could (and I would argue, 
should) still consider himself lucky to have been selected by the secret benefactor in the first 
place.  It is strange to claim that the beneficiary in this case is not actually lucky because there is 
information
40
 that, if he had it, would lead him to see his current seemingly lucky situation as the 
necessary consequence of some earlier actually lucky event.  It is not at all obvious that the 
beneficiary would not consider himself lucky to receive the money simply because the 
benefactor had planned to give it to him for a long time.  In fact, it is similarly not clear that it 
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would be mistaken for an eldest son, who always knew he would inherit his father’s fortune, to 
consider himself lucky to inherit it (in light of being lucky to be his father’s son, being lucky to 
have been born his father’s son, being lucky to live in a society that endorses primogeniture, or 
something of the like).
41
 
 Now, if we take Pritchard’s position with respect to this particular example and 
generalize it, we get to get my second skeptical worry.  Simply put, the concern is that, if we had 
complete knowledge of the causes of every event, then no events would seem lucky.  The skeptic 
will push this and claim that, since nothing appears lucky from this fully informed point of view 
(since nothing seems to satisfy the unreliability criterion from the fully informed point of view), 
then there is no actual luck.  I want reply by carefully distinguishing which of a subject’s beliefs 
are relevant when considering whether the subject is lucky.  As I’ve already mentioned, whether 
or not the agent believes himself to be lucky is immaterial.  However, it seems obvious that some 
elements of a subject’s point of view and epistemic state are relevant.  If two players enter a 
rigged lottery with the same winning numbers, and one is an innocent player with no knowledge 
of how the game is rigged, and the other player is the one who rigged the lottery, then it seems 
that the innocent player is actually lucky to have won, while the player who rigged the lottery is 
not lucky to have won.  What is relevant here is that one player knew which numbers were going 
to be selected (and hence, which numbers to choose) while the other player did not have this 
knowledge.  The skeptic would insist that both players are only seemingly lucky (the innocent 
player seems lucky to everyone, while the other player seems lucky to everyone but himself), 
since with greater knowledge they would realize that these particular numbers were always due 
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to be selected.  In fact, the skeptic might also say that, even in a fair lottery the winner in not 
actually lucky to win, since the numbers were always
42
 bound to come up. 
Still, even if we accept a fully-determined picture of the universe, it might be the case 
that, from a fully informed point of view, nothing appears lucky.  However, given that we are 
actually quite limited, in terms of the information available to us when we plan and act, it seems 
far too strong to develop a version of the unreliability criterion that leads to nothing being 
categorized as abnormal, unusual, or out of the ordinary simply because of the supposed 
existence of an inaccessible point of view from which everything can be predicted.  I am not able 
to meet this skeptic’s challenge directly, here, other than to offer the following.  Even if the 
skeptic is correct and there are not, in fact, any metaphysically real cases of luck, I do not think 
that it is really the task of a theory of luck to answer this challenge.  Instead, so long as the 
appearance and possibility of luck persists, a theory of luck should produce, as Duncan Pritchard 
has nicely put it, “[conditions] relative to which the question of whether there are lucky events 
potentially has an answer.”
43
  In short, the existence of (potentially unattainable) point of view 
from which the unreliability criterion cannot be satisfied does not diminish my interest in 
accounting for the practice of adopting luck attitudes that does in fact exist, even if such a 
practice would disappear were we able to adopt an omniscient point of view. 
8. Conclusion 
 To conclude, I think it is worthwhile to spend a moment considering the type of account I 
am interested in developing in the following chapters.  First, it is important for any account of 
luck to maintain both of the core notions identified at the beginning of this chapter, in some 
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form, if the account can be said to be an account of luck at all.  Second, none of the 
uncontroversial luck cases I identified should turn out to not actually be cases of luck. On any 
complete account, we should still be lucky to win lotteries, to make correct guesses, and to find 
hidden treasure.  As far as possible, I would also like to avoid begging the question against any 
of the non-superstitious luck claims we find it natural to make.  While it can be tempting to write 
off certain common luck claims as cases of widespread conceptual confusion
44
 due to some 
significant difference between these claims and the more paradigmatic ones, I think it will count 
as a mark in an account's favor if it can accommodate the fullest range of luck claims. 
 Along these lines I will want to avoid forwarding any kind of widespread error theory 
about luck claims.  I will reject any account that leads to the conclusion that we are always, or 
nearly always, wrong when we identify cases that agree with the core notions of luck as being 
actually lucky.  However, this is not to say that do not want to allow that we can be mistaken 
about our luck claims.  We can always be mistaken about matters of fact.  In addition to avoiding 
an error theory about luck, I also want to avoid forwarding an account that characterizes too 
many cases as lucky or unlucky.  If the unreliability criterion has any teeth, then there must be 
cases where it is not met. 
I think this approach does the best job of making sense of some common behavior 
involving luck claims.  We often use luck claims derisively, distinguishing lucky gains from a 
person’s earned gains implying that they are less (or that someone else is more) deserving of the 
benefit.  In these situations, it is natural to argue whether the case in question really was or was 
not lucky.  This disagreement only makes sense if we acknowledge a distinction between 
believing that someone is lucky and someone’s actually being lucky.  In fact, the reasons we 
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offer during such disagreements can provide a good basis for understanding the unreliability 
criterion. We often try to show that our seeming good luck was actually due to planning and 
effort on our part or that the case in question was not as unreliable as it may have seemed.  On 
the other side, we also deny that others are unlucky when their loss comes from a situation that 
they could have foreseen and prevented or if the loss seems due to their own negligence or 
recklessness. 
 Importantly, I do not think it is necessary for a successful account of luck to maintain all 
of the basic intuitions identified in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.  It also is not necessary to 
resolve all of the conflicts between these intuitions.  However, it will be beneficial if my account 
can at least explain the attractiveness of these basic intuitions, as well as the attractiveness of the 
vague conceptual equivalences used so often as a substitute for a more complete general account.  
In the following chapter, I discuss existing philosophical accounts of luck in detail, including the 





Chapter II: Treatments of Luck in Contemporary Philosophy 
 
1. Introduction 
 Much of the philosophical literature on luck has been focused on particular theoretical 
problems arising in ethics and epistemology.  The prevailing discussion of moral luck can be 
traced back to essays written by Bernard Williams
45
 and Thomas Nagel,
46
 in which a troubling 
tension is identified between the platitude that luck undermines moral responsibility and the 
observation that, in a sense, everything that practically grounds moral responsibility seems to be 
a matter of luck.  The discussion of epistemic luck has focused on a similar platitude that luck is, 
in some sense, incompatible with knowledge.  This has often led to a desire for a full-blown anti-
luck epistemology.  For example, Duncan Pritchard writes: “If the anti-luck platitude does reveal 
something deep and important about knowledge, then by undertaking the anti-luck 
epistemological project one should determine a core epistemic condition on knowledge.”
47
  This 
anti-luck intuition in epistemology has been highlighted by the Gettier counterexamples to the 
classic tripartite account of knowledge (as justified true belief). 
 The relevance of luck for an account of knowledge is fairly clear; after all, one of the 
more obvious ways a true belief might not count as knowledge would be by being the result of a 
lucky guess.  On this level, a nuanced account of the luck involved might not seem necessary; 
perhaps we can rule out lucky guesses via other considerations, such as a restriction to justified 
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true beliefs.  However, the enduring importance of understanding luck for understanding 
knowledge has been highlighted with the following kind of case: 
Stopped clock: Alice sees a clock that reads two o’clock. She believes it is two o’clock, 
and that is true. However, unknown to Alice, the clock she’s looking at stopped twelve 




This kind of example is meant to show that Alice does not really possess knowledge of the time 
because an unacceptable amount of luck led to her true belief.  Similar examples have been 
offered by others, the most notorious perhaps by Edmund Gettier.
49
  As some have noted, these 
types of cases typically involve some kind of double luck,
50
 with one stroke (e.g. the bad luck of 
the clock stopping) being cancelled out by an equally strong stroke of luck in the opposite 
direction (the coincidence of the clock stopping exactly twelve hours prior). 
 It is important to note that, for my present purposes, I want to avoid leaning to heavily on 
difficult cases like these where pre-reflective intuitions cannot be a particularly useful guide.  If 
one general theory of luck leads to counterintuitive implications for knowledge ascriptions in 
cases like these, this could as easily be due to a misunderstanding of knowledge as to a 
misunderstanding of luck.  With that in mind, I will try to limit my discussion to examples where 
the stakes are more mundane, and the non-luck concepts invoked are relatively less complicated.  
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However, after presenting my advantage-based account of luck in Chapter V, I will return to 
these cases and suggest how my account might inform our approach to tackling them.  
 Despite my aim in developing a general account of luck in the expectation that it will 
ground a stronger way of approaching these specific philosophical questions, at this stage, it is 
not my intention to engage with these questions at length.  I will be looking at existing treatments 
of luck as a general concept only; I will not address how each account discussed is or is not 
adequate to address specific problems in ethics and epistemology.  Rather, I am interested in the 
ways that these treatments of luck are useful for developing the kind of account I outlined in 
Chapter I; I seek a broad account that accommodates or explains all of the everyday luck claims 
that we make while also providing a way of explaining the everyday practice of adopting and 
justifying a special class of luck attitudes. 
To this end, section 2 is dedicated to addressing one of the most common ways luck is 
described in philosophical writing, via some very general characterizations in terms of closely 
related concepts of accident, indeterminacy, low probability, and lack of control.  My aim in this 
section is to illustrate the prima facie difficulties associated with each characterization that make 
me hesitant to ground any robust account of luck in terms of these related concepts.  The next 
three sections of this chapter are dedicated to a discussion of three more developed accounts of 
luck, presented by Duncan Pritchard, Wayne Riggs, and Nicholas Rescher.  While I will 
ultimately disagree with each of these accounts, discussion of them will help show the rationale 
behind certain features of my account.  The criticisms offered in this chapter are not meant to be 
taken as full-blown conclusive arguments against the positions described; rather, I offer these 
criticisms as a way of picking out the difficulties raised by such accounts that have inspired the 
details of the advantage-based account I propose in Chapter V. 
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I will make one final caveat before moving on to the main sections of this chapter; the 
majority of the accounts I will engage with in this chapter have tended to focus on luck primarily 
as a feature of events.  The most common form of a luck statement analyzed in contemporary 
philosophical writing is ‘An event, E, is lucky for a subject, S.’ As I have discussed in the 
preceding chapter,
51
 my account will focus on the relation between subjects and states of affairs 
instead and will offer ‘A subject S is lucky that P’ as the canonical form of a luck statement.  
Therefore, in order to engage directly with the accounts presented in this chapter, I will generally 
follow along and discuss these accounts and various cases raised by them in terms of the relevant 
events, rather than in terms of states-of-affairs. 
2. Undeveloped Treatments of Luck: Accidents, Low Probability, and Lack of Control  
 I want to begin this section by considering the possibility of accounting for luck by 
appealing to the concept of an accident.  Peter Unger describes his anti-luck epistemology in 
terms of accidents: “For any sentential value of p, a man's belief that p is an instance of 
knowledge only if it is not an accident that the man's belief is true.”
52
  More dramatically, 
Carolyn Morillo seems to treat the terms ‘luck’ and ‘accident’ as interchangeable.  She poses the 
question, “How much luck or accident is involved in knowing?” and moves freely between the 
concept of a “lucky guess” and an “accidentally true belief.”
 53
  How plausible is it that we 
understand luck in terms of accidents? 
 I think that there are a few different ways we might want to go about explicating the 
connection between luck and accidents.  First, there is a sense of accident that is understood as a 
complement to deliberateness or intentionality.  On one understanding, those things that I do 
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accidentally are just those things that I do but do not do intentionally.  However, this 
understanding of accident does not seem to line up with common intuitions about basic cases of 
luck, cutting too closely and too broadly at the same time. 
 Consider the case of an ordinary lottery player.  If she wins, this is a canonical case of 
good luck.  However, do we want to say that this is because she does not win the lottery 
intentionally?  Presumably, she entered with the express intention to win; the reason for buying 
the ticket to enter the lottery was for the sake of winning the lottery.  As Pritchard and Smith 
have noted, “if one deliberately bought the ticket in question and, say, one self-consciously 
choose [sic] the winning numbers, then to call the resulting outcome an ‘accident’ appears 
conceptually confused.”
54
  In addition to this kind of example, the notion of luck as accident 
(where accident is understood in terms of deliberateness) also falls short in explaining cases of 
recklessness and negligence.  If a driver fails to take certain ordinary precautions and ends up 
crashing his vehicle, it seems clear that this was unintentional; the classic case of an automobile 
accident.  However, do we really want to say that the reckless driver is unlucky to crash?  If 
anything, I think we would want to say that what happened to the driver was, in a sense, the 
expected result of his recklessness.  Even if we want to say that the reckless driver is unlucky to 
crash (perhaps because this kind of recklessness often does not result in a crash), what do we say 
about the reckless driver who makes it home safely?  Surely he is lucky to avoid suffering in 
light of his recklessness.  But just as clearly, the driver intended to get home safely; even if he 
fails to take the appropriate precautions this does not amount to his intending to crash. 
 So, let us consider another understanding of accident that might better align with 
common intuitions about luck.  For example, we might consider accident as another way of 
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expressing something about the chanciness or indeterminacy of a case.  William Harper, for 
example, observed that the concept of luck “overlaps with both ‘accident’ and ‘chance’ ”
55
 and 
has moved freely between describing cases of epistemic luck in terms of “a matter of chance that 
their belief is true”
56
 and “the truth of the belief in question is a matter of luck.”
57
  Harper is 
interested in establishing knowledge in terms of a “certain connection between justification and 
truth.”
58
  So, we can see some reason to interpret the idea of accident in terms of indeterminacy 
or contingency, in contrast to those events that happen necessarily.  
 There is quick a lot of intuitive appeal to thinking of luck in terms of indeterminacy; after 
all, the paraphernalia of luck is all about the creation of (or at least the appearance of) 
indeterminate outcomes.  Playing cards, dice, and roulette wheels all signal that there is luck to 
experience and that outcomes are uncertain.  However, there are difficulties for this 
interpretation of luck as well, as the presence of certainty will too often be an all or nothing 
affair.  Even setting aside metaphysical concerns concerning widespread causal determinism and 
the possibility of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy, the idea that luck is involved whenever 
there is indeterminacy (merely from the point of view of a particular subject or more deeply) 
does not hold up to closer examination because it leaves far too much in the domain of luck. 
 From a limited, human point of view, much of life is uncertain.  Consider something as 
simple as crossing the street.  While I have a very reasonable expectation to make it to the other 
side safely, I must admit to some degree of uncertainty when I do attempt to cross.  I could easily 
imagine tripping and falling, being hit by a car, or even having a meteor land on my head.  
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However, it seems far too extreme to say that every time I cross the street safely that I am lucky 
to do so.  Intuitively, I would be unlucky to experience any of the imagined hardships (except for 
falling, perhaps, if I am a particularly uncoordinated individual).  We should not infer that my 
crossing safely, as I tend to do several times a day, is lucky because of the intuitive bad luck that 
would be involved in these extreme, but possible, counterfactual situations. 
 As Pritchard and Smith have noted, “it ought to be uncontroversial that at least some 
lucky events are not brought about by indeterminate factors.”
59
  Although they do not elaborate 
on this point, I believe a simple example can be constructed by imaging a physical system too 
complicated for an average person to make confident predictions.  Consider a billiard ball falling 
off of a roof onto a pile of miscellaneous garbage, such that it bounces around and ends up 
striking a pedestrian.  Even though the path of the ball is completely determined, according to 
physical laws, the pedestrian still seems unlucky that he is struck.  After all, the pedestrian was 
not in any position to anticipate the ball hurtling at him, and, even if he were to observe the 
entire process, he would not be able to compute the speed and angles involved in a way that 
would allow him to predict and avoid the path of the ball.  This bad luck on the part of the 
pedestrian does not seem to emerge from an indeterminate process so much as from the 
coincidence of his being in the path of the billiard ball. 
 There is room to bite the bullet here, of course, and to say something like, in a very strict 
sense, there is some luck whenever there is indeterminacy and significance.  On this view, likely 
situations involve only a very small amount of luck such that we tend not to acknowledge it, 
while less likely situations involve such a large amount of luck that the luck becomes salient to 
us.  The case of the pedestrian being struck by a billiard ball can be taken care of by claiming 
that, from the point of view of the pedestrian, the path of the ball might as well have been 
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indeterminate.  Running along these lines, this kind of account could also explain why the stakes 
involved in a putatively lucky case matter to us; for example, if I am playing a game of Russian 
Roulette, it does not really matter that I am more likely than not to survive a given round.  I am 
clearly lucky, not because of the long odds involved, but because I am leaving my survival up to 
chance.  As the stakes go up, the amount of luck needed to make the chanciness involved salient 
goes down.  Of course, I believe that we can develop a more nuanced and useful account if we 
decide not to bite the bullet in this way. 
 Another natural way of thinking about luck is in terms of low probabilities.  For a rough 
characterization of such an account, let’s start with the following: a state of affairs is lucky for a 
person if it is significant for that person and the state of affairs is the result of a low probability 
event.  For the moment, I will set aside the question of whether the probability involved should 
be interpreted as some kind of objective probability or as a subjective probability from some 
subject’s point of view.  My aim here is just to show the prima facie difficulties that lead me 
away from developing a theory of luck along these lines, not to reply to a sophisticated version 
of the account.  My misgivings with the probability based approach will apply regardless of the 
specific way we understand the probabilities involved. 
 This kind of account is intuitively appealing, as canonical cases of luck, such as winning 
lotteries, finding buried treasure, and lucky guesses are all easily thought of in terms of the low 
probabilities involved.  Also, there is an intuitive sense in which probabilities affect degrees of 
luck; the less probable a certain outcome is, the luckier it is.  However, there are a number of 
examples that may cause difficulties: 
1.   Even odds: Adam is lucky to win a flip of a fair coin. 
2.  Constitutive luck: Betsy is lucky to be a citizen of an affluent democratic country. 
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3.  High probability luck: Carl is lucky to survive his turn at Russian Roulette. 
4. High probability constitutive luck: Dana is lucky to not have been born blind. 
5.  No clear probability: Eric is lucky to make it home safely, even though he was driving 
while drunk. 
For each of these cases, the proponent of the probability account (hereafter, 'probability theorist') 
might offer reinterpretations along the following lines: 
1.  Even odds: Although it is not clear that 50% is, intuitively, a low probability, and 
drawing a hard line somewhere between 50% and 51% might seem to lead to a sorites 
paradox, the probability theorist can simply bite the bullet and accept the vagueness of 
'luck' and 'low probability' as concepts.  It may be a virtue that the vagueness of one is 
reflected in the other. 
2.  Constitutive luck: Although it may not appear, on the surface, that Betsy's being a citizen 
of an affluent democratic country is the result of a low probability event, we can offer an 
interpretation in terms of low probability along the following lines: since more people are 
not citizens of affluent-and-democratic countries than are citizens of affluent-and-
democratic countries, there is a low probability that a single, randomly-selected person is 
a citizen of an affluent-and-democratic country.  In this sense, there is a low probability 
of any particular person (Betsy included) being a citizen of an affluent-and-democratic 
country. 
3.  High probability luck: Although Carl is intuitively lucky to survive a round of Russian 
Roulette, this may not actually be in light of the probability of his pulling the trigger on 
an unloaded chamber.  Instead, the probability theorist may argue that the luck involved 
in inherited from the comparative probability of surviving if he engages in a game of 
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Russian Roulette versus the probability of surviving if he does not engage is the game.  
Carl appears lucky because he has engaged in a course of action that causes the 
probability of the advantageous outcome (not dying suddenly) to be dramatically lower 
than otherwise. 
4. High probability constitutive luck:  Dana's case, I think, is the most difficult kind of case 
for the probability theorist to explain.  They can start by comparing Dana to the entire 
global population, as in the case of Betsy's constitutive luck, but most people are not born 
blind.  The explanation offered for Carl's high probability luck will not work here, since 
Dana hasn't done anything to make herself more likely to be born blind.  However, this is 
also the kind of case where I think the probability theorist has the strongest reasons for 
claiming that our intuitive, pre-reflective use of 'luck' is simply in error.  Since not being 
born blind really is the normal case (and doesn't seem to satisfy the unreliability 
criterion),
60
 the probability theorist is probably happy claiming that Dana is not, in fact, 
lucky, and the claim that she is lucky involves confusing 'luckiness' with mere 
'fortunateness' or another similar concept. 
5.  No clear probability: In cases of recklessness where we do not have an intuitive sense of 
the probabilities involved (or how we might go about measuring them), the probability 
theorist can respond in a similar manner as the case of high probability luck.  Eric 
appears lucky because he has engaged in a course of action that causes the probability of 
the advantageous outcome (driving home safely), whatever that probability might be, to 
be dramatically lower than otherwise. 
The explanations offered here seem to be enough to argue that a probability theorist can 
construct a coherent account of luck based on low probabilities, and might even be able to 
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construct an account that matches our intuitions about which cases clearly qualify as lucky or 
unlucky, which cases clearly do not qualify as clearly lucky and unlucky, and which cases are 
vague or too close to call.  For the probability theorist, our intuitions about luck simply rely on a 
sensitivity to the salient low probabilities involved. 
Ultimately, what is missing in an account built on the notion of low probability is an 
explanation of why we employ the machinery to manufacture a salient low probability in some 
cases rather than others.  Why is it that 'high probability' cases like 3 above should be 
reinterpreted as cases of low comparative probability, while cases like a master archer shooting 
against a novice without warming up
61
 do not get this treatment?   Additionally, employing this 
kind of conceptual machinery does not seem to get at what I am most concerned about when 
looking for a unified account of luck.  While accommodating all cases of luck under the heading 
'low probability' might be useful conceptual shorthand, it does not capture what it is about these 
cases that motivates, and typically justifies, the luck attitudes that we adopt.   
 Finally, I want to address the possibility of distinguishing luck loosely
62
 in terms of a 
subject’s lack of control.  Here, I am interested the descriptions of luck that emerge from the 
earliest discussions of moral luck, famously presented by Bernard Williams
63
 and Thomas 
Nagel.
64
  In his writing, Williams deliberately avoids giving any direct definition of luck: 
I shall use the notion of ‘luck’ generously, undefinedly, but, I think, comprehensibly.  It 
will be clear that when I say of something that it is a matter of luck, this is not meant to 
carry any implication that it is uncaused.  My procedure in general will be to invite 
reflection about how to think and feel about some less usual situations, in the light of an 
                                                          
61
 Here, I take it for granted that the master archer is not lucky to win against the novice, even though he has reduced 
his chances by not warming up. 
 
62
 A more developed control-based account, as presented by Wayne Riggs, will be discussed in section 4. 
 
63
 Williams, Bernard. “Moral Luck.” Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, 1981. 20-39. 
 
64









Despite his intentionally leaving the concept undefined, we can see some familiar features in 
what he does say about luck.  For one, the unreliability criterion seems to be acknowledged by 
his focus on ‘less usual situations’ as compared to ‘more usual’ ones.  Following a discussion 
where he briefly distinguishes between constitutive luck (presumably, luck in which capacities 
and dispositions a person has) and incident luck (presumably, luck in the way things turn out 
external to a person), he writes, “Anything which is the product of happy or unhappy 
contingency is no proper object of moral assessment, and no proper determinant of it, either.”
66
  
So, although Williams will not go on to offer a more developed account of what it is to be lucky 
(or unlucky), it is not hard to see the seeds of the control-based treatment that will be given by 
Nagel and others.  The idea that some of what we do is the ‘product of happy or unhappy 
contingency’ will, to some, read as a division between that which is in our control and that which 
is outside of our control. 
Nagel generates the problem of moral luck by appeal to intuitions of the following kind: 
1. We should not be morally assessed positively for being lucky or negatively for being 
unlucky (that is, we should not be positively assessed if our actions turn out well or 
negatively if they turn out poorly if their turning out well or poorly is a matter of luck). 
2. What a person has done provides the grounds for morally assessing that person (that is, 
what a person has done provides the reasons for thinking that that person is a good or bad 
person). 
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3. How a person’s actions turn out (and consequently, what a person has done), on close 
inspection, is (almost) always a matter of luck. 
Nagel’s classic discussion captures 1 as a control principle; “prior to reflection it is intuitively 
plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to 
factors beyond their control.”
67
  To the extent that his discussion can be taken to show a tension 
between moral assessment and luck in general (and not between moral assessment and a specific 
variety of luck), he seems to be defining luck in terms of control, such that anything outside of 
our control is (to that extent) a matter of luck.  A paradox appears when Nagel observes that the 
“things for which people are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at first realize 
by what is beyond their control,”
68
 and because of this, “if the condition of control is consistently 
applied, it threatens to erode most of the moral assessments we find it natural to make.”
69
  The 
problem that Nagel thinks this reveals is that our ordinary practice of moral assessment 
undermines itself; when we ordinarily morally assess a person, we only count ‘what she has 
done’ as evidence if it is not influenced by luck (following 1), but what a person has done is 
unavoidably influenced by luck (following 2 and 3).   
 Setting aside the question of whether or not such a definition is adequate for Nagel’s 
purposes in discussing the problem of moral luck, how useful is thinking of luck in terms of 
control for developing a more general account?  There is considerable intuitive appeal.  Several 
authors besides Nagel have used the notion of control as the basis for their own discussions of 
luck.  Consider, from Anders Shinkel: “I believe a common-sense definition of luck will suffice. 
We call something a matter of (good or bad) luck when 1) it is of interest or importance to us, 2) 
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it was not under our control, and 3) we had no reason to expect its occurrence.”
70
  Or, from 
Daniel Statman: “good luck occurs when something good happens to an agent P, its occurrence 
being beyond P’s control.  Similarly, bad luck occurs when something bad happens to an agent 
P, its occurrence being beyond his control.”
71
  Thinking about luck in terms of control might 
seem to get to the heart of the matter when we are interested in the problems of moral luck and 
responsibility, but how useful is it for thinking about luck in a more general way? 
 The first issue that we run into when thinking about luck in terms of control is that there 
are several candidates for the relevant sense of ‘control’ involved.  On one extreme, we might 
think of an extremely stringent definition of control; if, from a given state of affairs, a person is 
able to choose and bring about any of the possible subsequent states of affairs and is informed 
fully of the consequences of doing so, they are said to be in control.  On the far other extreme we 
might say, if, from a given state of affairs, the person’s actions have any influence on a 
subsequent state of affairs, they are said to be in control.  The relevant notion of control is 
probably found somewhere in the middle, but it is not clear how to cash it out. 
 Michael Zimmerman’s account of the problem of moral luck can help us move toward 
this middle ground.  In contrast to my reading of the problem of moral luck in terms of moral 
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1. A person P is morally responsible for an event e’s occurring only if e’s occurring was 
not a matter of luck. 
2. No event is such that it’s occurring is not a matter of luck. 
  Therefore 
3. No event is such that P is morally responsible for its occurring.73 
He suggests that the premises of this argument appear true, but the conclusion appears false.  
Zimmerman offers two ways of understanding the luck involved in terms of control.  First, “one 
may be said to enjoy restricted control with respect to some event just in case one can bring 
about its occurrence and can also prevent its occurrence.”
74
  Second, he describes another kind of 
control in terms of restricted control:  “One may be said to enjoy unrestricted or complete control 
with respect to some event just in case one enjoys or enjoyed restricted control with respect both 
to it and to all those events on which its occurrence is contingent.”
75
  He goes on to offer a 
reading of the problem in two ways, with luck defined in terms of each type of control.  On the 
first reading, e’s occurring is a matter of luck if and only if P was in restricted control of e.  On 
the second reading, e’s occurring is a matter of luck if and only if P was in unrestricted control of 
e.  Zimmerman’s diagnosis of the problem, then, is that the second premise is plainly false on the 
first reading, while the first premise is plainly false on the second reading. 
 I will avoid discussing Zimmerman’s treatment of moral luck at too much length and 
instead turn to ask if his notions of restricted and unrestricted control are helpful for the task of 
providing a general account of luck, rather than addressing the problem of moral luck 
specifically.  To start, using unrestricted control to identify luck is going to run into some clear 
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difficulties.  If we consider the simplest examples of luck, cases of lotteries won, treasures found, 
and correct guesses, our account of luck should at very minimum be able to explain why a person 
is lucky to win the lottery, but not lucky to earn the same money through hard work.  It should 
explain why a person is lucky to guess correctly, but they are not lucky if they, in some sense, 
really know the answer.  The notion of unrestricted control does not seem to help us make these 
distinctions; as Nagel has observed, whatever we are able to bring about always seems 
contingent on at least some events over which we did not have restricted control. 
 So, let us turn to the idea of restricted control and ask if this is any more helpful in 
accounting for these simple examples.  Looking at a lucky versus non-lucky guess, the idea of 
restricted control does seem to get it right.  If I really know the answer, than my giving a correct 
answer seems in my restricted control (that is, I have the ability to deliberately give the correct 
answer, and I have the ability to deliberately avoid giving the right answer).  If I do not know the 
answer, I do not have this kind of control over whether or not I give a correct answer.  This 
version of control helps us distinguish between money won in a lottery and money earned 
through hard work in the same way.   
However, accounting for luck using restricted control does seem to miss some other 
intuitive luck evaluations.  For example, we would have to say that losing the lottery is bad luck; 
a person’s ability to bring about a win or a loss in a fair lottery is the same.  Also, where does 
this leave our understanding of the case of finding treasure during a walk through the woods?  
Surely I do not have restricted control over whether or not I discover hidden treasure (and am 
therefore lucky), but would we really want to say that every time I walk through the woods, 
lacking the same kind of restricted control over whether or not I find treasure, and I do not find 
treasure, that I am unlucky? 
54 
 
Something that seems missing when we try to account for luck via a loose connection to 
lack of control is an intuitive asymmetry in how we make luck evaluations.  If we identify luck 
merely with lack of control (restricted or otherwise), we will find that the results of an uncertain 
case will only affect whether the luck is good or bad, it will not affect whether there is luck at all.  
For example, if we consider a lottery, we have the same lack of control whether we win or lose; 
the proponent of a control-based account of luck would need to say, then, that we are lucky if we 
win and unlucky if we lose.  However, this does not seem to match the everyday way that we 
identify luck.  When we see an opportunity for luck, such as a lottery, there seems to be an 
understood, non-lucky normal case (losing the lottery).  Similarly, when we walk through the 
woods, we think that finding the treasure is lucky because the normal case is to not find treasure.  
There is not a strong intuition that we are unlucky to fail to find treasure, unless we had some to 
reason to expect that we would. 
 So, it appears that, despite some initial intuitive appeal, there is no straightforward, 
unproblematic way of accounting for luck in terms of accident, indeterminacy, low probability, 
or lack of control.  In the following sections, I will turn to some more developed contemporary 
accounts of luck.  Most of the recent philosophical literature on luck has been directed at 
addressing particular questions; for example, in the previous section we saw Zimmerman’s 
construction of a control-based idea of luck for the express purpose of accounting for the 
apparent problem of moral luck.  The first two accounts I will address are interesting in the way 
that they aim to address particular philosophical problems in epistemology by developing a 
general account of luck itself, which is much closer to the kind of account I described at the end 
of Chapter I.
76
  The final treatment of luck that I will discuss, offered by Nicholas Rescher, is 
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distinguished as a purely general account of luck; it is not presented in a way that indicates its 
application for any subsequent philosophical aim. 
3. The Modal Account 
 The first more developed account of luck that I want to address is presented by Duncan 
Pritchard.  In 2005, he neatly expressed his modal account with the following two conditions: 
(L1)  If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world but which 
does not occur in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where the relevant initial 
conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world.
77
 
(L2) If an event is lucky, then it is an event that is significant to the agent concerned (or 
would be significant, were the agent to be availed of the relevant facts).
78
 
These conditions have sometimes been taken to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient
79
 
for an event to be lucky; however, Pritchard has since clarified his position as a continuum 
picture of the luckiness of an event, such that some further specification would be needed to 
establish exactly where the threshold for luckiness lies: 
More generally, we can say that the degree of luck involved varies in line with the modal 
closeness of the world in which the target event doesn’t obtain (but where the initial 
conditions for that event are kept fixed).  We would thus have a continuum picture of the 
luckiness of an event, from very lucky to not (or hardly) lucky at all.  Once the degree of 
luck falls below a certain level—i.e., once there is not modally close world where the 
target event doesn’t obtain—then we would naturally classify the event as not lucky, 




The continuum view of luck is certainly appealing.  It not only explains the intuitive way we are 
able to compare the relative luckiness of two or more cases, but it also allows captures the 
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vagueness in the way we use the concept in borderline cases (for example, it is not intuitively 
clear whether I am lucky to win something like the toss of a fair coin, where the odds are, 
presumably, fifty-fifty). 
 Thinking of Pritchard’s modal account as a continuum picture of luck with a certain 
degree of deliberate vagueness is helpful in understanding the details of L1.  First, Pritchard’s 
account is focused on the constitution of a lucky event; presumably, claims that a person is lucky 
should be understood as claims that the person is the beneficiary of a lucky event.  Similarly, if a 
state of affairs can be lucky on Pritchard’s account, it will only be through its relationship to a 
relevant lucky event.  If we consider all possible worlds ordered according to their similarity to 
the actual world, an event will be lucky if it does not occur in a sufficient number of the 
sufficiently close possible worlds.  This picture is deliberately vague in two ways; the event gets 
luckier as the quantity of sufficiently nearby possible worlds where it does not occur gets greater, 
and the event gets luckier as the distance (from the actual world) at which a sufficient number of 
possible worlds are ones where the event does not occur gets greater.  This seems to mirror 
common intuitions about how the luck of certain events might be compared.  In a lottery case, 
winning the lottery will be luckier as the number of losing tickets is increased (the possible 
worlds where the event does not occur grows).  Similarly, an event that results from two 
coincidences will be luckier than one that results from a single coincidence (there will be a 
further group of possible worlds where only one of the coincidences occurs, but the event does 
not occur).  For example, if I win an archery contest with a lucky shot because a gust of wind 
blew my arrow into the bulls-eye, this is less lucky than if I win because a gust of wind blew my 
57 
 




Modal distance is distinct from probability, however understood.  While the probability 
of an event occurring might vary with the quantity of nearby possible worlds where the event 
does not occur, it does not correlate to the distance of those worlds.  Pritchard writes: 
The lottery case reminds us that an event can be modally close even when 
probabilistically unlikely.  That is, the possible world in which one wins a lottery, while 
probabilistically far-fetched, is in fact modally close.  The possible world in which one is 
leaping about with joy in one’s room because one is a lottery winner is very alike to the 
possible world in which one is tearing one’s ticket up in disgust—all that needs to change 




When we consider the distance of another possible world, we should be concerned with how 
different that world is from the actual world, i.e. how much would need to change to make the 
actual world into that possible world. 
Next, we need to be careful in the way we identify the event under consideration; 
Pritchard does this by insisting that the relevant initial conditions for the event remain fixed 
across the possible worlds under consideration.  He writes: 
What is meant here by the ‘initial conditions for the event’?  The point of this restriction 
is that we need to keep certain features of the actual world fixed in our evaluation of the 
close worlds.  In particular cases, it is usually pretty clear what needs to remain fixed.  In 
the lottery case, for example, we obviously need to keep fixed that the subject buys a 
lottery ticket and that the lottery retains many of its salient features (i.e., remains free and 
fair, with long odds, and so on).  If, say, one were guaranteed to win the lottery (e.g., it is 
rigged in one’s favour), then clearly this isn’t a lucky event even if, as it happens, there 
are close possible worlds in which one does not win the lottery (e.g., because one is 
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Here, Pritchard is careful to distinguish the event of winning the lottery from the event of buying 
a lottery ticket; depending on the circumstances, one event might be lucky while the other is not.  
However, the way that Pritchard would have us decide which initial conditions to leave fixed is 
not very clear; Pritchard answers, “my suspicion is that we shouldn’t expect anything more 
detailed, in that we shouldn’t require a theory to be any more precise than the phenomenon about 
which we are theorizing.”
84
  I am inclined to agree with Pritchard on this point.  As I will discuss 
in Chapter IV,
85
 in common usage luck is uncodified and there is a desirable flexibility to leaving 
a certain amount of imprecision in our accounts of it, so long as the imprecision of the theory 
mirrors the imprecision in common use. 
 A further concern that Pritchard is sensitive to is whether or not this picture of ordered 
possible worlds makes sense.  He writes:  
Even setting aside concerns about the metaphysics of possible worlds, there are problems 
with the ordering itself.  For example, it has been argued that there is no unique closest 
possible world to the actual world and also that there need be no fact of the matter 
regarding which of any two given possible worlds is closer to the actual world.  Should 




Pritchard’s answer to these concerns is that these concerns would not pose a special difficulty for 
the modal account of luck; any understanding of luck that is as coarse-grained as the modal 
account would face similar challenges.  In fact, it seems desirable to have a coarse-grained 
conception of luck; as Pritchard puts it, this is “in keeping with our normal ways of thinking 
about luck.”
87
  I agree with Pritchard's response to these challenges; a good account of luck need 
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not be more fine-grained than the common usage (which is uncodified and admits considerable 
vagueness) it is meant to capture.  
Since 2005, Pritchard has updated his view to remove L2, his significance condition.  He 
writes: 
I have now come to the conclusion that the very idea of adding a significance condition to 
the modal account of luck is wrongheaded…we shouldn’t expect an account of the 
metaphysics of lucky events to be responsive to such subjective factors as whether an 
event is the kind of thing that people care about enough to regard as lucky.  That’s just 




It is important to note how Pritchard’s general account of luck thus diverges strongly from the 
project I outlined in Chapter I.  I am interested in accounting for the general use of the concept 
employed in claims that are (at least implicitly) of the form, ‘S is lucky that P.’ In contrast, 
Pritchard is accounting for luck directly as an “objective feature of events.”
89
  In Chapter IV, I 
will address this general approach to theorizing about luck; calling it the matter of luck approach, 
I argue that it does not do enough to account for the ordinary practices surrounding our pre-
theoretical use of the concept ‘luck.’ Also, in Chapter III, I will argue that the significance 
condition deserves more careful attention than it has traditionally received, and even criteria like 
L2 do not do enough to capture the nuance of how significance is involved in cases of luck.  
Without going into much greater detail here, I am most interested in engaging with the version of 
Pritchard’s account that does acknowledge significance by including L2.  While there is room to 
define a separate concept (objective matters of luck) from the one I am most interested in (luck 
as a concept that captures a combination of unreliability and significance), accounts that do not 
acknowledge both of the core notions I outlined in Chapter I are, in a sense, ‘talking past’ the 
kind of account I am interested in developing.  That being said, even if our ultimate aims are 
                                                          
88






different, it is interesting to consider whether some version of a modal account that allows for a 
significance criterion (like Pritchard’s earlier account) could be useful for my purposes. 
 Given an understanding of Pritchard’s modal account that includes L2 (or another 
plausible significance criterion), I now want to look at some criticisms that have been levied 
against the modal account, often in the form of supposed counterexamples.  First, I want to 
consider the following case, suggested by Nicholas Rescher: 
 Secret benefactor: Suppose that Seth is an eccentric, wealthy individual who intends to 
send a check for a large sum of money to his nephew, Tobias on his twenty second 
birthday.  However, Seth and Tobias have never met, and Tobias has no way of knowing 
about his wealthy uncle.  When Seth does send the money to Tobias, he does so by 




Rescher suggests that Tobias would be lucky to receive this money due to his inability to predict 
that it will happen.  
a happy or unhappy development can be a matter of luck from the recipient’s point of 
view even if its eventuation is the result of a deliberate contrivance by others. (Your 
secret benefactor’s sending you that big check represents a stroke of good luck for you 
even if it is something that he has been planning for years). Thus even if someone else–
different from the person affected–is able to predict that unexpected development, the 




Rescher is suggesting a kind of subject-sensitivity to luck that is absent from Pritchard’s account.  
Pritchard’s focus on the status of events as ‘objectively lucky’ leads to the following response: 
It is far from clear that this is a case of luck, however, no matter how much the agent may 
regard it as such. Indeed, the example seems more accurately to be an instance of good 
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fortune rather than luck, where fortune relates to those cases where certain events that 
one has no control over count in one’s favour (where fortune smiles on one) rather than 
cases where luck is specifically involved… In order to see this, one need only note that if 
the agent were to discover that this event had been carefully planned all along, then he 
would plausibly no longer regard it as a lucky event.
92
 
Pritchard addresses this example in his own writing to emphasize the irrelevance of the affected 
subject’s epistemic state for his modal account. 
 However, this response from Pritchard strikes me as somewhat strange, as the case of the 
secret benefactor does seem to be covered by his modal account.  While the temporal distance 
between Seth deciding to send money to his unknown nephew and the act of actually sending it 
might mean that the possible worlds where Tobias receives the money are more distant or fewer 
in number,
93
 there does seem to be a lucky event in light of which Tobias is lucky; very little 
would have to change for Seth to decide not to send the money to Tobias.  The lucky event, on 
the modal account, is Seth’s deciding or planning to send the money.  However, Pritchard’s 
claim that “if the agent were to discover that this event had been carefully planned all along, then 
he would plausibly no longer regard it as a lucky event” seems rather counterintuitive.  If Tobias 
were to discover the source of the money, why would he then stop viewing this as a lucky event?  
Moreover, why would we treat his gaining the money in this way any differently from his 
gaining a similar fortune from a lottery?  Even if receiving the money is, as Pritchard says, “a 
long-standing and important feature of the agent’s life,”
94
 it seems like we do, for good reason, 
treat Tobias’s receiving money in this way more like money received in a lottery than money 
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earned through hard work.  Acknowledging the possible competing intuitions here (although 
Pritchard’s intuition does strike me as very strange), it still seems that Tobias would be treated as 
lucky according to our everyday practices and attitudes about luck.   
Pritchard seems to be suggesting that an event caused by a lucky event is not necessarily 
lucky itself.
95
  Tobias may be lucky to be chosen to receive the money from Seth, but, according 
to Pritchard, he is not lucky to receive that money if that event is temporally distant from the 
earlier lucky event.  It is odd to me that Pritchard would want to fix the initial conditions for the 
event of Tobias receiving the money in this way.  Tobias receiving the money only fails to 
satisfy L1 if we hold fixed the fact that Seth has decided to bestow him with that money.  In fact, 
the larger event of Seth deciding to give Tobias the money and then Tobias receiving the money 
at the determined time seems to be the event we really want to evaluate the luckiness of, and this 
seems to be intuitively lucky and to satisfy L1. 
Additionally, despite Pritchard’s efforts to exclude consideration of the affected subject’s 
knowledge from his account, it seems that a person can be intuitively lucky or unlucky precisely 
because of what they do not know.  To take a cartoonish example, imagine that a safe falls off of 
a rooftop as you are walking down the street and lands directly in your path.  You certainly seem 
lucky that you avoided getting hit by the falling safe.  However, if you knew that the safe would 
fall, it seems like you would not be lucky to avoid it.  The luck involved seems to depend 
precisely on the fact that you do not know that the safe is going to fall into your path.  Pritchard’s 
account of luck in terms of objectively lucky events does not seem to allow for this kind of 
subject-sensitivity, unless we treat the subject not knowing that the safe will fall as one of the 
relevant initial conditions of the event.  However, this does not seem compatible with Pritchard’s 
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claims about events having objectively lucky or non-lucky status, according to the features of 
nearby possible worlds, or his direct response to the secret benefactor case.  However, I think 
that the stronger version of a modal account will be one where the subject’s epistemic state can 
be a relevant initial condition.  After all, the space of nearby possible worlds where you do not 
know about the falling safe seems populated with many worlds where you do get hit by the safe 
and many where you avoid it.  However, if we do not keep this fixed, it seems that the nearby 
worlds where you do not get hit by the safe (because of the inclusion of those where you are 
aware of it falling) will grossly outnumber those where you do get hit by the safe. 
 Next, I want to consider a more targeted criticism levied by Jennifer Lackey in the 
following example: 
Buried treasure: Sophie, knowing that she had very little time left to live, wanted to bury 
a chest filled with all of her earthly treasures on the island she inhabited. As she walked 
around trying to determine the best site for proper burial, her central criteria were, first, 
that a suitable location must be on the northwest corner of the island—where she had 
spent many of her fondest moments in life—and, second, that it had to be a spot where 
rose bushes could flourish—since these were her favorite flowers. As it happens, there 
was only one particular patch of land on the northwest corner of the island where the soil 
was rich enough for roses to thrive. Sophie, being excellent at detecting such soil, 
immediately located this patch of land and buried her treasure, along with seeds for future 
roses to bloom, in the one and only spot that fulfilled her two criteria.   One month later, 
Vincent, a distant neighbor of Sophie’s, was driving in the northwest corner of the 
island—which was also his most beloved place to visit—and was looking for a place to 
plant a rose bush in memory of his mother who had died ten years earlier—since these 
were her favorite flowers. Being excellent at detecting the proper soil for rose bushes to 
thrive, he immediately located the same patch of land that Sophie had found one month 
earlier. As he began digging a hole for the bush, he was astonished to discover a buried 




This example is, in some ways, similar to the example of the secret benefactor; it is meant to 
threaten the necessity of Pritchard’s conditions by showing how a paradigmatically lucky event, 
finding buried treasure, could, nonetheless, fail to satisfy L1.  By adding the details about Sophie 
and Vincent’s motivations and the soil quality, Lackey means to ensure that Vincent will find the 
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buried treasure in most, if not all, nearby possible worlds.  Similar to his response to the case of 
the secret benefactor, Pritchard suggests that, with those assurances in place, we would no longer 
think that this is an actual case of luck at all; “I take it that once we make clear that Vincent is 
guaranteed to find the treasure, however, and so form our judgment about whether the event is 




Again, I do not share Pritchard’s intuition that we would stop seeing the case as lucky, 
but, even setting aside that disagreement, I think we can give a stronger reply than the one that 
Pritchard offers.  The initial conditions that seem to ensure that Vincent will find the treasure 
(concerning Sophie’s motivations and the quality of the ground for planting roses) can plausibly 
be regarded as irrelevant because they are not relevant to Vincent.  Even if he is ensured to find 
the treasure, Vincent seems lucky because all the factors that lead to him finding the treasure are 
unrelated to him.  The stronger version of a modal account would not, I think, treat the facts 
about Sophie’s motivations as relevant;
98
 thus, the space of nearby possible worlds under 
consideration would include all those where Sophie’s motivations were slightly different or the 
soil quality was different.  Of those worlds, there does seem to be a wide class where Vincent 
fails to find the treasure.  If the qualifier ‘relevant’ is meant to have any force in ‘relevant initial 
conditions’ from L1, I would think that this must be it. 
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 There is another interesting example to consider, presented by Wayne Riggs.  However, 
unlike the example of Lackey’s buried treasure, this example is meant to challenge the 
sufficiency, rather than the necessity, of Pritchard’s conditions: 
Smarty the valedictorian: Smarty is the valedictorian of her high school class who is 
about to take her computer delivered college entrance exams. Despite her formidable 
intelligence, she decides to prepare for the upcoming exam by studying diligently and 
taking many practice exams. The night before the exam, she gets a good night’s sleep, 
and awakens fresh, sharp, and ready to excel. She takes the exam and scores very highly. 
Unbeknownst to Smarty, however, a fiendishly clever hacker with debilitating test 
anxiety had decided prior to the exam to wreak vengeance on all the clever students about 
to take it. Driven mad by his inability to get into a good college because of his poor test 
scores, he has vowed that all those smarty-pants test-takers will suffer just as he has had 
to suffer. He compiles a list of all the high school valedictorians for that year, and hacks 
into the exam program. For the valedictorians, he replaces the usual questions with 
questions from an advanced college physics exam. As it happens, he accidentally skips 
Smarty’s name on the list (despite being very careful not to miss anybody), and so she 





For this to be a direct challenge to the sufficiency of Pritchard’s conditions, we would want to 
say that Smarty is, intuitively, non-lucky in this case.  However, Riggs himself acknowledges 
that the supposed non-luckiness of this case is not intuitively clear: “was Smarty’s high score on 
the exam a matter of luck? For my own part, I find that I am pulled in two directions here.  I am 
willing to say that Smarty is lucky that her questions were not changed, but that seems to me not 
to amount to saying that she is lucky to have done well on the exam.”
100
  If we remember 
Pritchard’s caution about carefully identifying the event in question, it seems that he has the tools 
to do justice to Riggs’s dual intuition.  The event of Smarty’s questions not being changed is 
separate from the event of her performing well on the exam.  If we consider all the possible 
worlds where the hacker sabotages the valedictorians, then there are many nearby worlds where 
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Smarty’s exam is sabotaged.  If we consider all the possible worlds where Smarty prepares as 
described, then, intuitively, the nearby worlds where she does well on the exam vastly 
outnumber those where she does poorly.   
The potential difficulty for Pritchard’s account comes from considering a space of 
possible worlds where Smarty has prepared for the exam as described and the hacker has 
sabotaged the valedictorians’ exams.  However, I do not think this is a fair way of characterizing 
the modal account; L1 was presented in terms of a wide class of the nearest possible worlds.  
These terms are deliberately vague, I think, in order to mirror our intuitive judgments in cases 
like Smarty the valedictorian.  It also seems too demanding to ask that the theory make a decisive 
judgment on whether or not Smarty is, all-things-considered, lucky to have done well on the 
exam.  It seems better that the theory stops at the same level as pre-reflective intuitions, here; 
Smarty is not lucky that she performed well on the exam, although she is lucky that the hacker 
did not sabotage her exam; by Pritchard’s lights, these should be understood as distinct events 
that deserve distinct evaluations. 
 I believe that these examples have shown how Pritchard’s modal account (or a modified 
version of it) is able to describe a wide range of difficult cases of luck in terms of the modal 
closeness of possible worlds where the putatively lucky events do not occur.  It also has the 
advantage of beginning to account for attitudes and practices surrounding luck in terms of 
sensitivity to events where things could, in some sense, have very easily been otherwise.  For 
example, Pritchard describes the attractiveness of lotteries as being explained by the fact that the 
world where you do win the lottery is extremely similar to the actual world.  We could develop 
this further by trying to justify luck attitudes in light of how easily things could have gone 
differently for the affected subject. 
67 
 
However, despite the promise of developing an account along these lines, it seems that 
we run into one of two difficulties, depending on how we understand the setting of ‘relevant 
initial conditions’ for an event.  Pritchard is focused on distinguishing events as objectively 
lucky apart from what causes us to think of them as lucky: “Remember that our interest is in 
what makes an event lucky, not merely on what prompts subjects to judge that an event is 
lucky.”
101
  So, his treatment of the examples just offered, Rescher’s secret benefactor and 
Lackey’s buried treasure, seems to establish the relevance of initial conditions for an event 
according to a kind of causal or explanatory relevance.  Thus, when we consider a lottery, we 
should exclude those worlds where the lottery has been fixed.  However, this leads to strangely 
counter intuitive evaluations of examples like the secret benefactor.  Pritchard seems happy to 
bite the bullet in these cases. 
Alternatively, we could follow my suggestion and develop the modal account where the 
idea of ‘relevant initial conditions’ does more work.  Although this can lead to more intuitive 
evaluations of the examples presented in this section, I think this leads to the same problem that 
was observed with the low probability account; it seems to cut at the wrong level.  Why am I 
justified in treating one case (such as an when a novice beats an expert marksman) as lucky, 
when I am, intuitively, not so justified in another case (such as Smarty performing well on her 
exam) when, in both cases, we can carefully describe the initial conditions to satisfyL1?  The 
answer would have to start by carefully specifying the initial conditions for those events that our 
judgments should focus on.  However, a way of distinguishing between those different features 
seems to be exactly what the theory is supposed to provide.   
This version of the modal account offers the conceptual machinery to describe any 
intuitively lucky event in terms of the modal closeness of worlds where it does not occur, if we 
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carefully choose the right initial conditions to establish the relevant space of possible worlds; in a 
sense, this is somewhat satisfying as a necessary condition (if an event is lucky, it is describable 
in these terms) and somewhat satisfying as a condition that is jointly sufficient with L2 (any 
event that can be described this way is, in this sense, lucky) if we are concerned, as Pritchard is, 
in specifying a class of objectively lucky events.  However, if we are also concerned, as I am, in 
accounting for the practices and attitudes surrounding the everyday use of the concept ‘luck’ then 
this account falls short.  While describing all cases of luck in modal terms might be useful for 
specific theoretical projects, it does not capture what it is about cases of luck that motivates, and 
in some sense justifies, the luck attitudes we adopt in light of them.  On either understanding of 
how to establish the relevant initial conditions for a putatively lucky event, the modal account is 
lacking a way of spelling out the connection between the interested person and the event, which 
seems needed if we are going to justify the general practice of adopting modified attitudes in 
response to luck. 
4. Riggs’s Developed Lack of Control Account 
 Next, I want to address a developed account of luck that, in contrast to Pritchard’s modal 
account, focuses primarily on the connection between the affected subject and a putatively lucky 
event.  This account is proposed by Wayne Riggs, and is one of the most developed accounts of 
luck based on the idea of control.  Riggs begins by articulating the relevant sense of control: 
One has control over some happening to the extent that the happening is properly 
considered something the agent has done.  As I have already indicated, this imposes two 
separable requirements.  First, the event has to be the product of the agent’s powers, 
abilities or skills.  Second, the event has to be, at least in some attenuated sense, 
something the agent meant to do.  This second requirement does not demand an actual 
conscious intention on the part of the agent, but it does mean that a goal or desire or 
intention must be guiding the exercise of one’s powers, abilities or skills that brings about 
the event in question.
102
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In his take on the relevant version of control, we can see aspects of the idea of intentionality 
raised in my discussion of luck and accidents.  Riggs’s version of control is importantly distinct 
from Zimmerman’s notion of restricted control; for Riggs, control seems to require some causal 
contribution from the agent, while, for Zimmerman, restricted control seems to require that the 
event merely depends on the agent for its happening.  For Zimmerman, it seems that we can be in 
control of events that we merely let happen so long as we have the ability to choose not to let 
them happen, while Riggs’s account will require that we, in some sense, produce (or help to 
produce) the event.   
However, Riggs’s understanding of control also allows for partial causal contribution to 
count as (some degree) of control.  Riggs uses the language of attributably to characterize his 
account: “To say that something is due to luck just is to say that it is not attributable to 
whomever is assumed to be the beneficiary (or victim) of said luck.”
103
  He relies on this notion 
of attributably to develop his credit theory of knowledge,
104
 and is very careful to distinguish 
credit-worthiness from praise-worthiness.  In his discussion of the credit theory of knowledge, he 
writes: 
It may well be true that S deserves little praise for having come to know that p, but it does 
not follow from that that coming to know p is not something that is attributable to S as a 





From this, we can infer that, for Riggs, an agent can be said to be in control of an event even if 
they do not do so much to cause it that they deserve praise (assuming the event is positive) or 
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blame (assuming the event is negative).  He writes: “It would be silly to require that someone do 
more than was necessary to bring about some end in order for it to be attributable to them that 
they did so.”
106
  For example, a member of a winning sports team can be attributed with winning 
the game even if their contribution was not so great that they had the ability to prevent their team 
from winning due the overwhelming influence of their teammates’ contributions.  This would not 
meet Zimmerman’s notion of restricted control. 
Using this understanding of control, Riggs offers the following definition: 
 “E is lucky for S iff 
(a) E is (too far) out of S’s control, and 
(b) S did not successfully exploit E for some purpose, and 





Similar to Pritchard, Riggs is offering a continuum view of luck, with a certain amount of (I 
think desirable) vagueness.  How much is needed to satisfy condition (a)?  Riggs writes: “What 
we have to do to be responsible for some outcome is: enough.  There is not some stable threshold 
of effort or determination or skill that must be superseded on my part before it is reasonable to 
say that I did such-and-such.”
108
  It is odd that Riggs does not say more on what this unstable 
threshold depends on, although we will be able to draw some inferences from his response to 
certain counterexamples levied against his account.   
Riggs adds the second condition (b) to account for a particular kind of counterexample 
that has often been presented to challenge the sufficiency of lack of control as a rough 
description of luck.  The objection is that there are events, such as the sun’s rising each morning, 
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that are clearly out of any person’s control, and yet, due (somehow) to their regularity and 
predictability, cannot reasonably be considered lucky.  He discusses the following, more nuanced 
case to respond: 
Gentleman adventurers: Consider two gentlemen adventurers, Indiana Jones and New 
Jersey Smith.  Suppose that Jones and Smith are adventuring in an exotic locale filled 
with local tribes that engage in some unfamiliar customs.  These tribes all worship the 
sun as a god, and see an eclipse as a sign of the sun god’s disfavor with whatever they are 
doing at that moment.  Jones and Smith are captured by some of these tribe members, but 
then are set free when a solar eclipse happens moments after their capture.  Jones has 
consulted his almanac before starting the expedition and planned in such a way that, if 
they were captured, the eclipse would present an opportunity for them to escape.  Smith 
has not done any such planning, and is completely surprised by the eclipse.
 109 
 
Intuitively, Smith is lucky in a way that Jones is not.  However, this is not captured by Riggs’s 
first condition alone.  After all, the eclipse is not in Jones’s or Smith’s control; it cannot be 
properly described as something that either of them has done.  Further, it is not merely his 
knowing that the eclipse would occur that makes Smith lucky and Jones not; if Smith knew that 
the eclipse would occur but did not plan to use that knowledge to free himself from the local 
tribe members, we should still think that Smith is lucky is a way that Jones is not.  According to 
Riggs, it is specifically because Jones exploited his knowledge; he took the fact that the eclipse 
would occur “into account and planned a course of action that assumed [it] would occur.”
110
   
The idea of exploitation in criterion (b) is not fully defined by Riggs: “there is obviously 
a lot of work that needs to be done in getting clearer on what counts as ‘exploiting’ something in 
this context.  For now, I will have to rely on an intuitive understanding gained from the 
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  However, in order to defend himself against the charge of answering 
counterexamples with ad hoc additions to his theory, Riggs explains the connection between 
control and exploitation in the following way: 
What seems to distinguish Jones from Smith, and makes Smith lucky to be alive but not 
Jones, is not that Jones knew about the eclipse and whatnot, but that he exploited those 
facts to his own advantage. That is to say, he took them into account and planned a 
course of action that assumed that those things would occur. And the outcome that 
resulted, his survival, was a consequence of his having taken account of and exploited 
those facts. Thus, he was in control of his own destiny, even though he was not in control 




Thus, Riggs continues to place lack of control at the center of his account; condition (a) covers 
lack of control over the event, while condition (b) covers lack of control over one’s destiny.  
Jones’s survival is, in this sense, under his control, even though he lacked control over an 
important event that led to his survival.   
 Pritchard offers an expected criticism of Riggs’s treatment of the Gentleman adventurers 
based in his interest in identifying so-called objectively lucky events.  He writes:  
That Riggs is here talking about an event that is lucky for one agent but not for another 
should give us pause for further reflection.  For while it is undeniable that the event will 
seem  lucky to Smith, since he was lacking crucial information about this event, I have 
already noted that we should not conclude from the mere fact that an event seems lucky to 




Here, I think that we can agree with Pritchard that it is not enough that an event merely seems 
lucky to an individual for the event to actually be lucky.  However, Pritchard seems to miss the 
important features of the case Riggs has presented; Smith does not think that he is lucky because 
he misunderstands the inevitability of the eclipse happening as it did.  Instead Smith (and, I 
think, most everyday judges) thinks that he is lucky in a way that Jones is not because he failed 
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to do anything to affect his own escape.  Nothing Smith did contributed to his escaping in the 
way that Jones’s careful planning and preparation did.  I contend that Pritchard’s interpretation 
of the case, that Smith only regards himself as lucky because he lacks certain information about 
how the event transpired (and that an external observer with full possession of the facts would 
not consider Smith lucky), is troublingly counterintuitive. 
It is interesting to note at this point, that, however Riggs’s idea of exploitation is cashed 
out, it will seem to require at least that the subject has real knowledge that the event is going to 
happen.  Otherwise, (b) could easily be shown to not be a necessary condition for an event to be 
lucky in the following way.  Assume that an optimistic lottery player has formed the unjustified 
belief that he will win the lottery, and therefore makes bets with everyone he can that he will win 
that lottery.  It seems that, if the lottery player does win, he will have, in a sense, exploited the 
fact that he would win the lottery.  Yet, he is clearly lucky to have won the lottery and those 
additional bets given the lack of justification for his belief that he would win.  So, I argue, 
however the notion of exploitation is spelled out, it should include that the subject has actual 
knowledge of the event when he exploits it for some purpose.  However, given Riggs’s interest 
in offering a theory of luck in an effort to get clearer on a theory of knowledge, this implication 
should give us pause, as it threatens circularity if one’s theory of knowledge is going to include 
an anti-luck condition. 
So, let’s think of Riggs’s account as identifying lucky events in the following way: if we 
consider all events that are significant to a person, we can identify those that are lucky for that 
person by excluding those events that are (at least partially) produced by that person’s intentional 
use of their powers, skills, and abilities, and all those events that the person has exploited, in the 
sense they have planned for them and used them to generate some advantage.  There is a 
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considerable amount of intuitive appeal to this kind of account, and it does a fair job of 
explaining the connection between luck and achievement (lucky events are, in a way, just those 
events that cannot be construed as a person’s personal accomplishments) and it even allows us to 
account for the motivation for and justification of adopting luck attitudes.  We can compose a 
story about how we adopt normal reactive attitudes because we assume a sort of control (in the 
way that Riggs has described it) behind every person’s gains and losses until we see evidence 
that such control is missing. 
Riggs second condition is very helpful in answering some of the most common criticisms 
of less developed control based accounts, which lean on the idea that control criteria usually lead 
a counterintuitive proliferation of lucky events.
114
  Riggs account also gives a very intuitive 
answer to the case of the secret benefactor; Tobias is lucky because nothing he does contributes 
to his receiving the money.  A case like Lackey’s buried treasure is less obvious; Riggs’s account 
will have a little difficulty identifying exactly what event is out of Vincent’s control.  Digging up 
and acquiring the treasure is certainly something that Vincent has done.  In order to understand 
Riggs’s reading of this example, we need to remember the intentionality constraint folded into 
his understanding of control; Vincent is lucky because finding the treasure was not something 
that he meant to do.  Vincent was guided by the intention to plant a rose bush in a suitable spot, 
not by an intention to unearth Sophie’s treasure. 
However, there are some difficulties for this account that are not covered by the addition 
of criterion (b).  First, Riggs’s control account seems to fail to capture cases where a person has 
the necessary control (by making the typical contribution to bring about the event), but 
nevertheless appear to be lucky due to other background factors.  Consider the following 
example, offered by Jennifer Lackey: 
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Demolition worker: Ramona is a demolition worker, about to press a button that will 
blow up an old abandoned warehouse, thereby completing a project that she and her co-
workers have been working on for several weeks. Unbeknownst to her, however, a mouse 
had chewed through the relevant wires in the construction office an hour earlier, severing 
the connection between the button and the explosives. But as Ramona is about to press 
the button, her co-worker hangs his jacket on a nail in the precise location of the severed 
wires, which radically deviates from his usual routine of hanging his clothes in the office 
closet. As it happens, the hanger on which the jacket is hanging is made of metal, and it 
enables the electrical current to pass through the damaged wires just as Ramona presses 




What this kind of example is meant to show is that, even though a person can have the kind of 
control that Riggs describes, she can still be lucky (i.e., this example is meant to show that 
Riggs’s first condition is not a necessary condition).  In this case, Ramona seems to have control 
in Riggs’s sense; Ramona meant to demolish the building, and the building’s demolition was 
certainly (at least partially) the product of her power, abilities, and skills.  In such a case, Riggs 
might respond in a way similar to his analysis of Smarty the valedictorian, by carefully 
identifying separate events.
116
  Ramona lacked control over the mouse chewing through the wire, 
and she lacked control over her coworker’s reconnecting the wire by hanging his jacket.  She is 
unlucky and lucky, respectively, with regard to those two events.   
Why not just stop at these two evaluations, as we did in the analysis of the case of Smarty 
the valedictorian through the lens of Pritchard’s modal account?  The additional difficulty 
Lackey’s demolition worker poses for Riggs is that there is a third event that is separate of the 
two more clearly evaluated events.  In the case of Smarty the valedictorian, we were able to say 
that Smarty was, ultimately, not lucky to do well on the exam even though she was lucky that the 
hacker did not sabotage her exam.  In the case of the demolition worker, even if we say that 
Ramona is unlucky that the mouse bit through the wire and that Ramona is lucky that her 
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coworker reconnected the wire by hanging his jacket, it is not clear how this contributes to an 
ultimate evaluation of the event of Ramona blowing up the building. 
Lackey takes this be a serious counterexample to Riggs’s account because, although 
condition (a) is satisfied, “by virtue of the fortuitous combination of events leading to Ramona’s 
control over the explosion, that she succeeded in demolishing the warehouse is also clearly 
riddled with luck.”
117
  Lackey observes that it seems to be obvious that Ramona is lucky that she 
is in control of the demolition (rather, Ramona is lucky to gain control over the demolition) and 
that this make the demolition itself ‘riddled with luck.’  However, is it really so clear that the 
presence of luck leading up to the demolition must make the demolition itself lucky?  What 
seems to happen here is that Riggs’s account seems to allow for bad and good luck to, in a sense, 
‘cancel out.’  How counterintuitive is this possibility?  What is striking about Lackey’s 
demolition worker case is that the bad luck of the mouse chewing through the wire is perfectly 
cancelled out by the good luck of Ramona’s coworker reconnecting the wire by hanging his 
jacket.  However, in some everyday use we do treat bad and good luck as weighing against each 
other.  If we consider a lottery winner who ultimately is abandoned by her friends and falls in a 
life of excess and ruin due to her sudden wealth, we might comfortably say that, although she 
seemed lucky to win the lottery, at first, she was ultimately unlucky to win the lottery because all 
the bad consequences outweighed the good ones.  While the view I want to endorse later will not 
be one on which luck can, in this sense, cancel out, at the very least, I do not think we can say 
that such a picture of luck is obviously wrong without further argument. 
Riggs’s control-based account of luck shares some virtues with Pritchard’s modal 
account.  Both accounts present luck as a continuum by including certain vague thresholds in the 
language of their definitions.  I think that this kind of vagueness is a virtue if it mirrors everyday 
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use and uncertainty about luck.  Also like Pritchard, Riggs has a completely separate significance 
criterion, and would prefer to exclude it from his account.
118
  Unlike Pritchard, Riggs’s control-
based account builds in subject-sensitivity at the ground floor, and this is very promising for 
explaining how luck would motivate and justify adopting modified attitudes to the subjects that 
benefit or suffer from it.  In light of these virtues, I see the Riggs’s account as a very interesting 
starting point for theorizing about luck.  The account I develop in Chapter V is, in some ways, a 
spiritual successor and refinement of a proposal like Riggs’s. 
5. Rescher’s Treatment 
 The final contemporary account of luck that I want to consider is presented by Nicholas 
Rescher.  He offers one of the longer contemporary treatments of luck in Luck: the Brilliant 
Randomness of Everyday Life.
 119
  This account is importantly different from Pritchard and 
Rescher’s in a couple ways.  First, Rescher does not offer his treatment of luck for an explicit, 
more specific theoretical use.  Pritchard’s and Riggs’s definitions were offered in the interest of 
cashing out their anti-luck epistemologies while the more gestural accounts given by Williams, 
Nagel, Statman, and Zimmerman were presented to illustrate specific problems surrounding 
moral luck.  In this way, Rescher’s interest in giving a very general account is much like my 
own.  Second, unlike Pritchard’s modal account and Riggs’s control-based account, Rescher 
does not present a definitional list of conditions that are, theoretically, individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for an event’s being lucky.  In light of this, some work needs to be done to 
isolate the particulars of Rescher’s position and criticism of Rescher’s account will rely less on 
targeted counterexamples. 
                                                          
118
 See Riggs, 2009a, p. 219, for Riggs’s lengthy protest to including such a condition. 
 
119
 Rescher, Nicholas. Luck: The Brilliant Randomness of Everyday Life. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 
78 
 
 Rescher broadly situates his idea of luck as one of three things that shape the “condition 
of people.”
120
  He describes ‘fate’ as covering the features of a person’s condition that are so by 
nature, ‘fortune’ as covering the features of a person’s condition that are so due to their own 
effort, and ‘luck’ as covering the features of a person’s condition that are due to chance.  More 
specifically, he claims that luck “is a matter of those goods and bads that befall us purely by 
chance, in a way that is unforeseen, unplanned for, and unexpected—at any rate by the agent 
herself.”
121
  Rescher has also described the unreliability of luck in a variety of ways, with the 
following three being some of the most direct:  




2) “There has to be something impredictable about luck.” 123 




Rescher’s broad and varied treatment of luck has led to other writers
125
 characterizing his view in 
a variety of ways according to their focus on different parts.  The task at hand is to try to 
accommodate all these threads into a single understanding of luck. 
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 Let’s start by considering the idea that we can understand luck by appealing to the idea of 
accidents.  As we saw in section 1, Rescher is far from the only theorist to describe luck in terms 
of accidents.  However, as already noted, there are non-accidental events that are prima facie 
lucky.  Seemingly simple cases like winning the lottery or a lucky shot do not seem to involve 
accidents.  As Pritchard has argued, “it is a matter of luck (given the odds) that one wins the 
lottery, but it need not thereby be an accident that one wins (at least absent some further details 
about the scenario).  If one deliberately bought the ticket in question and, say, one self-
consciously chose the winning numbers, then it would be odd to refer to the resulting outcome as 
being accidental.”
126
  Similarly, if a novice dart player throws a dart at a bulls-eye deliberately, 
and aims for the center, it may be a matter of luck that he or she actually hits the center (given 
his or her lack of skill and consequent tendency to miss targets by at least some small amount).  
Yet, it would be odd to describe this as an accident – the throw turned out exactly as the thrower 
intended. 
 Still, thinking in terms of accidents is informative; it seems that being brought about 
accidentally may be sufficient for an event being lucky if the significance condition is also met.  
In other words, it seems lucky if an accident results in a significant gain for me.  However, it 
seems that there can be accidents that result in significant losses for me that are not unlucky.  For 
example, if I am negligent or reckless while driving a car I may accidentally crash into a tree, but 
in virtue of my recklessness and negligence, I am not unlucky to crash into the tree.   
 The second way that Rescher characterizes luck is in terms of impredictability.  For 
Rescher, there are two (non-exclusive) kinds of impredictability: chance impredictability and 
ignorance impredictability.  An event may be impredictable because it involves the outcome of 
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 process, or it can be impredictable because it proceeds from a set of 
known conditions in such a way that a reasonable person could not infer the consequence  
(due to chaos,
128
 unknown choices made by others, or a simple lack of relevant information).  
Chance impredictability relies on the reality of indeterminism while ignorance impredictability 
relies on inadequate information or cognitive limitations.  So, there are two ways that ignorance 
impredictabilty presents itself: 1) the person interested in the event may not have access to a 
piece of information needed to predict the event (for example, I might inherit a fortune when my 
uncle passes away, but I was not aware that I was named his benefactor), or 2) the person 
interested in the event may be unable to predict the event because of cognitive or computational 
limitations.  However, if Rescher is wrong to assume that there are actual metaphysically 
indeterminate events, the distinction would dissolve and the apparently indeterminate events will 
still be captured under ignorance impredictability instead: “With luck pure chance is involved.  
No doubt nothing whatever is unplanned by an unforeseeable to a God who tracks more than the 




But how well does the notion of impredictability really line up with the notion of luck?  
Rescher presents impredictability as a necessary condition of an event’s luckiness: “The positive 
and negative events one can (appropriately) foresee are not matters of luck.”
130
  The qualifier of 
                                                          
127
 For Rescher, chance impredictability requires seeing the world as undetermined, such that “one and the same 
(literally identical) set of initial conditions (i.e., one selfsame circumstantial state of affairs) can eventuate in 
different results” (Rescher, 1995, p. 47, emphasis removed).  See Rescher, 1995, pp. 44-45 for his argument against 
determinism.  I will make no similar commitment to indeterminism.  
 
128
 Rescher defines chaos as follows: “a process is chaotic if minutely different, observationally indistinguishable 
initial conditions can eventuate in different results, irrespective of how sophisticatedly we make the observations 
(short of unrealizable idealizations)” Rescher, 1995, p. 47, emphasis removed. 
 
129
 Rescher, 2015, p. 170. 
 
130
 Rescher, 1995, p. 41.  Throughout Rescher’s account ‘predict,’ ‘foresee,’ and ‘expect’ are used interchangeably. 
81 
 
‘appropriately’ will do considerable work and is included to capture cases where someone has a 
baseless expectation that is nevertheless satisfied.
131
  Also, it is important to note that Rescher is 
thinking in terms of what the subject can expect, not what the subject actually does (as a matter 
of fact) expect.  So, Rescher will say that winning a fair lottery is impredictable (and lucky), 
even if the winner expected to win beforehand.  It is inappropriate to expect to win a fair lottery.  
Rescher goes on to claim that an event is lucky so long as it is impredictable when it happens: “If 
yesterday I won the raffle whose prize I will collect tomorrow, then I am of course very lucky.  
That event is lucky for me because it was unforeseeable at the time, though not, of course, 
thereafter.”
132
  One example that Rescher presents as a “particularly striking form of good 
luck”
133
 is the case of the secret benefactor, already discussed in my treatment of Pritchard’s 
modal account: 
a happy or unhappy development can be a matter of luck from the recipient’s point of 
view even if its eventuation is the result of a deliberate contrivance by others. (Your 
secret benefactor’s sending you that big check represents a stroke of good luck for you 
even if it is something that he has been planning for years). Thus even if someone else–
different from the person affected–is able to predict that unexpected development, the 
eventuation at issue may still be lucky for those who are involved.
134
  
   
On Recher’s account, even though one does not have the money yet, the gain counts as 
unforeseen (and unforeseeable) because it could not be appropriately foreseen at the relevant 
time (in this case, the relevant time would seemingly be any point prior to finding out about the 
death of the relative).  Rescher is suggesting that an important part of what make this a lucky 
inheritance is that it takes the beneficiary by surprise.  But, should we deny that a person who 
stands to inherit a fortune from their parents, even knowing that this will happen at some point 
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(perhaps due to living with a legal system of primogeniture), is not lucky?  It seems to me that 
both Rescher and Pritchard get something wrong in cases like these.  Intuitively, it seems like the 
subject is lucky whether or not he knows about the upcoming windfall.  What really seems to 
matter is that the subject has done nothing to earn the money.  This is an enduring problem with 
Rescher’s treatment; there seem to be predictable events that are nevertheless intuitively lucky.  
The case of the secret benefactor seems to be one, and we can easily generate more by simply 
positing an advantage for the concerned subject that is largely out of proportion to the work the 
subject has done to secure it.   
Rescher also offers a formula for measuring luck: 
λ (E) = Δ (E) ⨯ [1-pr(E)] = Δ (E) ⨯ pr(not-E)135 
Let E represent some event, let Δ (E) represent the significance of that outcome for the relevant 
agent (positive values when the event is good for the agent and negative values when the event is 
bad for the agent), and let pr(E) represent the probability of E's occurring.  The λ measure is a 
measure of the degree of luck, with positive values being lucky and negative values being 
unlucky.   
Some have taken this formula as a reason for constructing Rescher’s view in terms of 
chance.  From Andrew Latus: 
As the formula indicates, Rescher views luck as a property of events that varies inversely 
with the likelihood of the event and proportionally to the value of the event (so long as 
we leave aside the issue of whether the value is positive or negative).  This seems 
plausible as an initial account of luck.  How lucky an event is does seem to be tied to the 
chance of the event occurring. A person is luckier to win a lottery when her chance is one 
in a million than she is when her chance is one in a thousand. So, too, it seems the degree 
of luck in any given occurrence is tied to the value of that occurrence.  A person is 
luckier to win a million dollars than a thousand. Finally, this account gives us a plausible 
way of saying when an event is good luck and when it is bad luck. That depends on 
whether the value of the event is positive or negative. Nonetheless, there are plenty of 
things that need clarifying here. What sort of chance are we talking about: objective or 
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subjective? What sets the value of the event: what you think of it, what you ought to think 





However, given Rescher’s focus on impredictabilty, I do not think that the relevant notion of 
chance is completely unspecified; the most plausible reading seems to be that the probability in 
question is the subjective probability of the events occurring from the concerned subject’s 
epistemic position.  In some sense, the relevant probability is determined by what the subject 
rationally ought to believe the probability is, given the information they have access to.
137
 
Regardless of how the probability involved for Rescher’s account of measuring luck is to 
be understood, however, he is careful to distinguish the condition of impredictability from an 
account based on low probability.  He proposes that the survivor of a round of Russian Roulette 
“was lucky—even though only one of the six chambers of his revolver was loaded and the 
probabilities favored survival.  For it was only ‘by chance’ that things turned out well.”
138
  So, to 
take the formula that he offers for measuring luck seriously, luck merely requires that the chance 
of the event be neither zero nor one; any other probability can ground luck given the right kind of 
significance for the subject.  While I agree with Rescher’s intuition in this case, this is not an 
uncontroversial position.  For example, E. J. Coffman offers an error theory of such intuitions,
139
 
claiming a distinction between luck and fortune based precisely on the probabilities involved. 
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So, my evaluation of Rescher’s treatment of luck is going to focus on whether or not we 
can reasonably draw the various threads of his discussion into a single account.  In summary, 
Rescher has suggested that: 1) luck is distinct from fate and fortune; luck arises from pure 
chance, not from effort or nature, 2) luck is sensitive to the subject’s epistemic position, but there 
is a distinction between what the subject actually believes and what the subject ought to believe, 
3) chance should be understood in terms of impredictability; that is, an event is a matter of 
chance to the extent that the affected subject was not in a position to predict it, and 4) we can 
measure luck according to how unlikely it was (from the subject’s epistemic position) and how 
significant it was for the affected subject.  So, keeping in mind Rescher’s λ (E) = Δ (E) ⨯ [1-
pr(E)] measure of the luckiness of an event, we can fairly see 1 as a restriction that pr(E) is 
neither zero nor one, and 2 and 3 as an explanation of subjective epistemic position from which 
we should establihs the probability of the event.  Finally, 4 completes the view as a continuum 
picture (similar to Rescher and Riggs) where we have a desirable vagueness in just how high the 
measure needs to be before we would classify an event as lucky; for high significance and low 
probailities the judgment is quite clear while for low levels of significance and higher probailities 
our judgments get less clear. 
The main deficiency I see in Rescher’s account, however, depends on the larger picture 
he sets up, rather than the specifics of his implicit definition.  He proposes a triad of fate, fortune, 
and luck, by assumption, which seems to rule out too much from an account of luck.  While what 
Rescher describes as fortune results from a person’s efforts and skills and lies clearly outside the 
domain of luck, fate, those matters that he describes as being due to the subject by nature, are 
often treated very similar to cases of chance-based luck.  Do we think that winning a great 
fortune from a literal physical lottery is so different from receiving the same fortune through the 
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natural lottery of being born into a family with great wealth you will stand to inherit?  In short, it 
is difficult for me to see any rationale for holding different attitudes toward advantages that are 
due to (Rescher’s version of ) chance than toward those that are due to nature.  In either case, it 
seems like my attitude is going to primarily be sensitive to what the subject has done to earn their 
advantage, and not to Rescher's version of chanciness. 
6. Conclusion 
 Despite some fundamental differences in motivation and purpose, the commonalities 
between the theories just discussed are very instructive for developing my own account of luck.  
First, every account seems to allow for a similar kind of vagueness; however luck is measured 
(in terms of modal closeness, degree of control, or as a function of the stakes and probability), 
there seems to be a gray area where it is not clear whether or not the case is question is really 
lucky or non-lucky.  As Pritchard writes, “we shouldn’t expect anything more detailed, in that we 
shouldn’t require a theory to be any more precise than the phenomena about which we are 
theorizing.”
140
  This continuum picture of luck is very attractive as it accounts for the gray area 
intuitions about very low levels of luck as well as the intuitive idea that cases of luck can be 
measured and compared in degree. 
 In developing this continuum picture, however, there appears to be at least two ways that 
an account of luck should be subject-sensitive.  First, we want to allow that certain situations are 
lucky for some but not for others due to their epistemic position or the way that they’ve 
contributed to bringing the situation about; this was illustrated with Riggs’s case of the 
Gentleman adventurers.  Second, there seems to be a need for sensitivity to how and whether a 
situation is significant for a subject.  Something can be lucky for one subject but not another 
                                                          
140
 Pritchard, 2015, p. 148. 
86 
 
because it matters to the first and does not make a difference to the second.  These two 
sensitivities align nicely with the core ideas of luck I introduced in Chapter I. 
 Another common trend in the theories discussed is a focus on luck as a feature of events; 
however, I think leads to a few tensions that a different focus could improve on.  First, although 
every theorist was clear about the need to carefully specify the event in question (for example, 
pulling apart the event of Smarty’s doing well on the exam from Smarty’s name being missed by 
the saboteur), there is a sense in which events might not be fine-grained enough to capture the 
complexity of how we would want to think about luck in complicated cases.  We might not want 
to render a summative judgment of the luckiness of an entire event (such as Smarty the 
valedictorian or Lackey’s demolition worker) when there are aspects of the event that are 
distinctly lucky (such as Smarty’s test not being sabotaged) and aspects that are distinctly non-
lucky (such as Smarty’s answering correctly due to her intelligence and preparation).   
 Additionally, the focus on events seems to have led theorists like Pritchard and Riggs to 
abandon the significance criterion, or, at least, to give it a subordinate position in their treatment 
of luck.  Pritchard is explicitly searching for objectively lucky events while Riggs only 
begrudgingly allows it into his account.  As Riggs writes: 
The two conditions, [lack of control] and significance, seem unrelated except insofar as 
our intuitions about what is ‘lucky’ force them to coincide.  There is a strong nagging 
suspicion that if we just got the other condition right, the solution to the significance 
problem would simply fall out of it.  Otherwise, why would two otherwise apparently 




I agree with Riggs’s concern here; however, I do not agree with Pritchard that we can therefore 
do away with the significance criterion and capture what is important about luck only in terms of 
the objectively lucky event.  I will address that approach in greater detail in Chapter IV.  Instead, 
I have developed my theory to take on significance at the ground floor and I will show how 
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significance and unreliability intertwine in the advantage-based account I present in Chapter V.  
In this spirit, my next chapter focuses on unpacking the relevant idea of significance, arguing for 




Chapter III: The Significance of Significance 
 
1. Introduction 
 In recent philosophical discussions about luck, the significance criterion has taken a back 
seat to a variety of characterizations of the unreliability criterion.  While luck theorists often 
mention significance in their accounts, they tend not to offer a very detailed analysis of 
significance.  Some have gone so far as to suggest that tying significance to luck is an ad hoc 
addition that is not needed for the strictest accounts of luck.  From Wayne Riggs: 
There are all kinds of events that... seem not to be a matter of luck because they do not 
impinge on my life in any way—the movements of the stars in a distant galaxy, for 
example. The response I’d like to make here is to bite the bullet and insist that the 
intuitions give way to the theory in this case. There is a sense of “luck” that is entwined 
with our concept of “fortune,” as in one’s fate, or what befalls one in life. It is the 
pressure of this sense of luck that makes us uneasy calling something that is completely 
irrelevant to our fortunes a matter of luck. Yet this sense of luck is completely separable 
from the sense of luck I am trying to get clear on.... The sell-out alternative, then, is to 




Recall the condition that Riggs has in mind, Pritchard's L2: "If an event is lucky, then it is an 
event that is significant to the subject concerned (or would be significant, were the subject to be 
availed of the relevant facts)."
143
  In more recent work, Pritchard has given up this condition: "I 
have now come to the conclusion that the very idea of adding a significance condition to the 
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In contrast to this trend, I argue that the significance criterion deserves a much more detailed and 
careful treatment, and I will give it a prominent place in my own account. 
 In his earlier work, Pritchard presents some examples to show the force of L2, such as the 
example of a spontaneous landslide that does not affect any person or any person's property and 
is therefore neither lucky nor unlucky.  Pritchard also acknowledges that we cannot base 
significance on what the concerned subject actually believes; to use his example,
145
 if someone 
narrowly avoids getting hit by a thunderbolt, they are actually lucky even if they are unaware of 
the near miss.   
 Taken at face value, L2 identifies a significant event or state of affairs with what the 
concerned subject does or would consider significant.  However, this account is troubling; as we 
will see in my treatment of some instructive examples, I believe we should be more interested in 
what the subject ought to find significant (that is, what is actually significant for the subject), 
regardless of what they would, as a matter of fact, believe was significant.  As we will see in the 
next section, there are some examples where the concerned subject, even given access to all the 
relevant information, is not the appropriate judge of significance.  In general, when making a 
second or third person luck attribution (such as 'You are lucky' or 'He was lucky'), there is a 
claim that the case is, in a sense, actually significant for the affected subject, apart from the 
affected subject's beliefs.  I might (rightly) claim that my friend is lucky to win a hand of poker, 
even if my friend is indifferent to the outcome of the game. 
 Rescher excludes any extended discussion of the significance criterion, but his various 
characterizations may be instructive.  At times, he uses the same bare significance language as 
Pritchard, but more often he adds small qualifications: "For an outcome to involve luck, two 
things are required: (1) that it be significant -- that we have a stake in it in that it makes a 
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difference, that it matters to us one way or the other, and (2) that it be fortuitous and involve the 
element of unforeseeability, unpredictability, or chance."
146
  Here, it is not clear how we are 
supposed to understand his idea of significance, but it sounds similar to what Pritchard has in 
mind.  'What matters to us' clearly overlaps with 'what we do, or would, consider significant,' but 
it might also be a way of appealing to what is important to people, in general, or what is 
important to people collectively.   
 In other places, Rescher's characterizations of luck suggest a different interpretation of 
the significance criterion: "Luck accordingly involves three things: (1) a beneficiary or 
maleficiary, (2) a state of affairs that is benign (positive) or malign (negative) from the 
standpoint of the interests of the affected individual, and that, moreover, (3) is fortuitous 
(unexpected, chancy, unforeseeable)."
147
  Here, Rescher identifies the interests of the affected 
individual as the relevant determinant of significance.  This diverges from Pritchard's description 
at least as far as a person's actual interests might not coincide with the interests that they do or 
would recognize themselves.  On occasion, Rescher will also characterize significance in terms 
of a person's well-being,
148
 which again may separate what the affected subject does or would 
believe is significant to her from what is actually significant to her. 
 There are other accounts that separate the significance of an event from the concerned 
subject's perception of that event, similar to Rescher.  For example, Daniel Statman writes, 
"Good luck occurs when something good happens to a subject P, its occurrence being beyond P's 
control.  Similarly, bad luck occurs when something bad happens to a subject P, its occurrence 
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being beyond his control."
149
  This seems to anchor significance to something other than the 
concerned subject's beliefs.  Andrew Latus provides an instructive example: "We sometimes 
speak of people as lucky even though they would deny they are lucky.  Someone who is 
miserable because of the ending of a destructive romantic relationship may well be described as 
not knowing how lucky he is."
150
  Perhaps this person would consider himself lucky if he were 
'availed of the relevant facts,' to use Pritchard's language, but, as we will see in the next section, 
there are other examples more difficult for Pritchard's characterization of significance. 
 My aim in this chapter is two-fold.  First, I aim to show that the significance involved in 
luck is an interesting and complicated concept, as deserving of a detailed account as the 
unreliability criterion that has played the central role in many accounts of luck.  Second, I aim to 
improve on accounts of significance (such as Pritchard's L2) that define significance in terms of 
the affected subject's (actual or potential) beliefs.  In order to do this, I will start by introducing 
some complicated examples that both show a need for a nuanced account of the significance 
involved and show how luck might depend on a version of significance that does not depend on 
the affected subject's beliefs.  Next, I will discuss how accounting for significance may be 
limited by our other ethical and meta-ethical commitments and that it is desirable to have a 
certain amount of ethical and meta-ethical flexibility in an account of luck.  I will present my 
approach, which involves a division between impersonal and personal luck; roughly, a division 
between significance that applies generally to all persons and significance that is anchored to 
individuals' idiosyncratic interests.  Finally, I will return to the leading, complicated examples to 
show how my approach allows for a fuller account of the significance involved. 
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2. Leading Examples 
 In this section, I will discuss a group of interesting examples.  The purpose of this is 1) to 
show that significance is a complicated feature of luck that deserves close attention, and 2) to 
show how we might find sparse treatments of the significance criterion, such as Pritchard's L2, 
unsatisfying.  Let's consider: 
 
1.  Unwilling Lottery Winner: Due to certain religious, moral, or philosophical 
commitments,
151
 Ursula is opposed to possessing a large amount of money.  For some 
reason, she is entered into a fair lottery with a substantial monetary prize, and she wins.  
Because of these commitments, she is at best indifferent to winning this money, and at 
worst bothered that she now has to dispose of it. She considers herself unlucky. 
 
2. Wealthy Gambler: Wallace is a multi-billionaire, who does not consider a gain or loss of 
$50 to make any difference to him, whatsoever.  Wallace bets $50 on the roll of a six-
sided die.  The terms of the bet are that Wallace will win unless the die roll comes up as a 
six, leaving him to win on any roll from one to five.  When the die is rolled, it does in fact 
comes up as a six, so Wallace loses the bet and the $50.  Because he is indifferent to the 
loss, Wallace does not consider himself unlucky. 
 
3. Beneficial Breakup: Barry is involved in an emotionally destructive romantic 
relationship.  Nonetheless, he is deeply committed to the relationship, and does not notice 
anything out of the ordinary between him and his partner when his partner suddenly 
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breaks up with him.  Barry sees the ending of this relationship as a significant loss, but all 
of Barry's friends think that he doesn't know how lucky he is. 
 
4. Cab Breakdown: Cecile is on her way to the train station when her cab breaks down, 
costing her several minutes and causing her to miss her train.  She is upset, and forced to 
board a later train.  Unknown to Cecile, her original train is wrecked and several 
passengers are injured while she is waiting for the next train.  Cecile believes she is 




5. Suffering Lottery Winner: Sally is a normal lottery player who buys a ticket hoping to 
win.  When she does in fact win, she does not fare very well.  As a result of winning the 
lottery, she loses friends, succumbs to destructive excess, and become lethargic and 
unproductive.  
 
6. Trivial Game Player: Ty is playing a game of Monopoly, recreationally.  The game is not 
being played for any particular stakes, and Ty's interest in the game is mild at best.  He 
does not consider the game very skill testing and does not attach any value to winning or 
losing.  At one point, Ty is sure to lose unless he rolls exactly two ones on the dice.  He 
does, and he goes on to win the game. 
 
7. Failed Suicide: Faris is deeply depressed and jumps off of a tall building in an effort to 
kill himself.  He lands on a hay cart that is driving past the building that he jumped off of.  
The cart breaks his falls and saves his life. 
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 The first two examples, the Apathetic Lottery Winner and the Wealthy Gambler, are 
cases where, intuitively, the subject is lucky (in the first case) or unlucky (in the second case) 
despite the fact that neither subject consciously values their gain or loss.  Moreover, there are no 
additional facts that could be introduced to these subjects to make them value the gain or loss.  If 
this is unconvincing, we can always strengthen the examples by stipulating that the subject 
would not come to value the gain or loss under any circumstances (perhaps due to some 
psychological abnormality).  Pritchard's L2 does not seem to get things right in this case.  At 
least on the surface, it appears that neither subject finds their gain or loss significant, and neither 
subject would come to find the gain or loss significant if exposed to the relevant facts; 
nonetheless, intuitively they appear to be actually lucky and actually unlucky.  Examples like 
these lead me to want to separate what its actually significant for the subject from what the 
subject, as a matter of fact, does or would believe is significant. 
 The Cab Breakdown example is a case where the concerned subject thinks that a certain 
state of affairs (that her cab broke down) is significantly bad for her even though, due to what 
would have been a different stroke of bad luck (the train being wrecked), it ends up being good 
for her that her cab breaks down.  This seems to be the kind of example that fits neatly into 
Pritchard's L2.  After all, even though Cecile considers herself to be unlucky, if she were availed 
of the relevant fact that the train she initially intended to board was later wrecked, she would 
probably consider herself lucky.  However, the situation is not this simple.  While it is correct to 
say that Cecile is lucky in light of missing the train that was wrecked, what should we say about 
her luckiness relative to her cab breaking down?  Does the luckiness of missing the train cancel 
out the unluckiness of her cab breaking down?  Can we even evaluate good or bad luck involved 
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in her cab breaking down without taking the train wreck into consideration? I do not think we 
can account for luck without some answer to these questions.   
 The Suffering Lottery Winner case is meant to be a variation of the Cab Breakdown case, 
but the positive features and negative features are not connected by coincidence (as in the Cab 
Breakdown case); Sally's fall is due to her winning the lottery.  The main question that needs to 
be resolved for this example is, is Sally lucky, unlucky, both,  or neither?  Lottery wins are 
paradigmatic examples of luck, and it is hard to give up the intuition that Sally was lucky to win, 
even though she ended up worse off for having won.  On the other hand, this seems to be a case 
where an incredibly unlikely event led to very negative consequences; on this description, it is 
tempting to characterize the case as unlucky.  How should this combination be resolved?  
Pritchard's L2 is satisfied; Sally certainly thinks the event is significant, but L2 does nothing to 
unravel whether this case is good or bad luck. 
 A further issue is raised by the example of the Trivial Game Player.  Board and card 
games, sporting events, and other trivial contests are some of the paradigmatic situations where 
luck (or at least, luck claims) abounds, but in many cases it is difficult to describe in what way 
the outcomes of these games are significant.  Certainly, in some cases, such as games for large 
stakes of money or the performance of an athlete at the Olympics, the significance to the subject 
is apparent.  However, in many more cases, the outcome of the game is inconsequential.  If we 
are tempted by accounts that describe significance as what is good or bad for a subject, aside 
from what the subject does or would believe is good or bad for him or her, then we need to find a 
way to account for cases where the seeming gain or loss is not actually good or actually bad for 
the subject from an all-things-considered perspective.  One approach would be to bite the bullet 
in these cases and claim that there is no real luck involved in trivial games; perhaps we only treat 
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them as lucky because of a resemblance to cases of actual luck.  We pre-reflectively recognize 
that they would be lucky if the stakes were increased, but may be willing to concede that the 
state of affairs is not really lucky because the outcome does not really matter to anyone.  This 
strikes me as intuitively unsatisfying; Ty's win seems to be a paradigmatic case of luck, and it is 
to a theory's credit that it is able to account for this as real luck.   
 A final complicated but instructional example is the case of the Failed Suicide.  In this 
case, Faris clearly wants to kill himself, and we can further stipulate that he wants to because, in 
some sense, he thinks death will be good for him.  Is Faris lucky to survive the fall?  I think we 
can press our intuitions in a number of different directions by fleshing out the example in various 
ways.  For example, if Faris's depression is chronic, and this attempt is merely one of many 
before Faris ultimately succeeds in killing himself, then his surviving may not be clearly lucky or 
unlucky.  However, if Faris's depression is temporary and he later comes to regret his suicide 
attempt, we will probably say that he is lucky to have survived.  On the other hand, if Faris was 
attempting to avoid capture by a group intent on torturing him to death, and he is captured due to 
his survival, he seems clearly unlucky to have survived his fall.  In each case, considering what 
kind of information would influence our intuitions about Faris's luck in this example can be 
revealing. 
3. Ethical and Meta-Ethical Considerations: the Limits of Theorizing About Significance 
 In this section, I propose that we can best understand the significance involved in cases of 
luck as something that is parasitic on our other ethical and meta-ethical commitments.  From an 
initial look at the leading examples in this chapter, it should be clear that an interpretation of 
significance in terms of what is actually good or bad for a subject is more promising than a 
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reading of significance in terms of what the affected subject does or would believe is significant 
to them.  Consider: 
S: If a subject, S, is lucky that P, then P is good for S. 
 
There will be some obvious disagreement over what counts as good for a subject, but I think it is 
uncontroversial to say that states of affairs that promote a subject's physical or psychological 
health, provide for the subject's social or financial security, provide comfort, or improve the 
subject's skills, talents, and abilities are, in general, good for the subject.  Further specifying what 
it means for a state of affairs to be good for a subject is difficult, and an extended discussion on 
these topics will not be appropriate here.  It may be an open question whether something like 
learning to play a musical instrument is good for a child, and so it may be an open question 
whether a particular child is lucky to be taking violin lessons.  In this way, there is a desirable 
ambiguity in the language of what is good or bad for a subject.  As far as our ethical and 
metaethical commitments vary, our evaluations of states of affairs as lucky or unlucky should 
vary as well.  It should not be surprising that certain utilitarian versus rights based conceptions of 
'good' will lead to different evaluations of the luckiness of living under a benevolent but fascist 
government, for example.  However, this does not get us past the main questions raised by the 
leading examples in this chapter.  
 The reason that theorists like Pritchard might think that the subject's perception of the 
positive or negative value of an event seems like the right way to fix the luckiness of the event is 
because of a very plausible background intuition that, absent unusual complications, it is actually 
good for subjects to pursue what they see as beneficial and actually bad for them to avoid what 
they see as detrimental, for the psychological effect on the subject if nothing else.  Similar 
considerations apply when we might think that a reasonable person's, a fully informed person's, 
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or the subject's later evaluation would be an appropriate indicator of the significance of a state of 
affairs.  These are just a variety of ways of determining what is actually good or bad for a 
subject, and our ethical and metaethical commitments need to guide when each is appropriate.  
The significance at play in cases of luck is parasitic on this larger ethical framework. 
 Whatever our ethical and meta-ethical commitments are, there are a number of different 
positions from which we might want to evaluate what is good for a subject.  As Andrew Latus 
writes, 
As for the value of the event, again it is overly simplistic to speak of the value of an 
event.  Do we mean the value the person does place on the event, the value a reasonable 
person would place on the event, the value a person will (but does not yet) place on the 
event, or the objective value of the event quite aside from what the person might think 
about it?  It is possible to imagine cases in which each of these is the right way of 




Rather than follow Latus in discussing significance in terms of value, I will try to capture 
significance more generally in terms of what is actually good for a subject.   
S2: If a subject, S, is lucky that P, then P is actually good for S. 
 
I use the phrase "actually good for the subject" because, in those cases where what a subject 
thinks is good for him is different from what is actually good for him, whatever is actually in the 
subject's interest seems more important than what the subject believes about the situation, when 
making luck evaluations. Latus offers the example of a rare bottle collector finding a case of 
stubby beer bottles on the side of the road.  Although the collector is the only one who cares 
about these beer bottles, he thinks that finding them is good for him, so he is lucky to find them.  
For Latus, this is supposed to be a case where finding the beer bottles is not, in some unspecified 
sense, objectively good for the subject, but the subject believes it is good for him.  I would argue 
that, even if no one else cares about these particular beer bottles, the subject is lucky to find them 
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because, to some extent, it is actually good for any subject to be happy and to pursue and succeed 
in his hobbies and projects.  However, if someone disagreed on this ethical point (that it is 
actually good for any subject to pursue their hobbies), a sufficiently strong argument for why 
finding these bottles is not good for the collector could also be presented as a strong argument 
that the collector is not lucky to find them.  In this way, facts about luck depend on certain 
ethical facts; specifically, they depend on facts about what is actually good or bad for a subject. 
 We can modify the example so that finding the bottles seems actually bad for the subject; 
suppose that the bottles have been irradiated and the subject will now die prematurely, then the 
subject is no longer clearly lucky to find the bottles.  Intuitively, the bad luck of finding 
irradiated bottles might override the good luck of finding rare bottles that interest the subject as a 
collector; this state of affairs seems unlucky for the subject because it is actually bad for the 
subject to have found the bottles.  However, this leads to an open meta-ethical question.  On the 
one hand, we might think that this benefit of finding rare bottles to the collector is overridden by 
the detriment of being exposed to radiation such that it is not actually good for the subject to 
have found the bottles.  On the other hand, we might think that it is actually both good for the 
subject to have found the bottles and bad for the agent to have been irradiated and therefore all-
things-considered bad for the agent to have found the bottles, without undermining the fact that it 
is good for the collector to have found the bottles. 
 Now, it would be far too little to simply leave the appropriate sense of "actually good for 
the subject" completely open.  Here, I would like to offer a few comments on helpful ways to 
approach these question when we are concerned with luck, specifically.  As I established in 
Chapter I,
154
 I am treating the form 'S is lucky that P' as the canonical form implicit in all luck 
claims.  By relativizing luck to a particular proposition, we have a ready answer to some of these 
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concerns.  By focusing on the luckiness of a particular proposition for a subject, we can develop 
a more nuanced understanding of significance.  First, since subjects are lucky in light of specific 
propositions, we can think about these propositions as describing sets of possible worlds: W is 
the set of possible worlds described by P.  Now, for a subject to be lucky in light of the 
proposition itself, there needs to be a relation that holds between the subject and all of the 
possible worlds described by the proposition such that, if S is lucky that P, there is something 
about all the worlds described by P that is good for S.  For the sake of grammatical clarity, I will 
employ the following language: 
 Advantage: If some part of a world is good for a subject, I will say that the subject gains 
or possesses that part of the world as an advantage.  'X is good for S' and 'S has advantage 
X' are interchangeable terminology. 
 Disadvantage: If some part of a world is bad for a subject, I will say that the subject 
suffers or possesses that part of the world as a disadvantage.  'X is bad for S' and 'S has 
disadvantage X' are interchangeable terminology. 
 Involves:  I will say that a proposition, P, involves an advantage, A, for a subject, S,  if 
and only if in every world described by P, S has advantage A. 
I will also note that the avoidance of an advantage will count as a disadvantage, and the 
avoidance of a disadvantage will count as an advantage. 
 Using this terminology, I offer the following understanding of the significance involved 
in cases of luck.  First, when we think about simple cases of luck, such as 'John is lucky that he 
won the lottery,' the analysis is easy.  John is lucky that he won the lottery because, whatever the 
advantage he gains from winning the lottery, he will have this advantage in all the relevant 
possible worlds (described by 'he, John, won the lottery'). The proposition 'John won the lottery' 
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involves an advantage for John, and so he is lucky that he won the lottery.  As we turn to more 
complicated examples, like those at the beginning of this chapter, relativizing luck claims to 
propositions will become increasingly useful. 
 While some concerns regarding which point of view is relevant for determining whether 
something is an advantage or disadvantage for a subject will have to depend on specific ethical 
and metaethical commitments beyond the scope of this project, I can address two significant 
concerns.  I will address how to evaluate mixed luck cases by proposing an analysis on which a 
subject can be both lucky and unlucky relative to the same proposition.  This approach will also 
address the question of how to understand the temporal point of view needed to evaluate 
significance; in many cases, a subject might seem lucky at one point in time, but, upon seeing 
further consequences, seem to be non-lucky, less lucky, or unlucky.  On my proposal, all of these 
evaluations can be accurate. 
 So, how do we account for situations where a subject is intuitively both lucky and non-
lucky (or lucky and unlucky)?  The clearest example of this kind of situation (and the example of 
which my account will give the clearest diagnosis) is the Suffering Lottery Winner.  There are a 
couple of reasonable luck evaluations that can be made in this case.  It seems lucky that Sally 
wins the lottery.  However, she also seems unlucky that this leads her to personal ruin; she is 
unlucky to lose friends, unlucky to become idle, and so forth.  This plurality of intuitive luck 
evaluations can be easily dealt with by relativizing the claim to a specific proposition.  For 
example, Sally is clearly lucky to win the lottery because 'Sally won the lottery' involves an 
advantage for Sally; whatever advantage Sally gets by winning the lottery, in every possible 
world where Sally won the lottery, Sally has this advantage.  It is less clear if Sally is lucky 
relative to 'Sally won the lottery and subsequently, fell into ruin.'  In all of the worlds described 
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by this proposition, I suggest that Sally has both a significant advantage and a significant 
disadvantage.  On my account, she is both lucky and unlucky to have won the lottery and fallen 
into ruin; the advantage and disadvantage do not cancel each other out.   
 On this approach, it is possible for a single proposition to involve multiple advantages 
and disadvantages for a subject.  If Sally is lucky that she won the lottery and fell into ruin and 
Sally is unlucky that she won the lottery and fell into ruin, this will be because the proposition 
'Sally won the lottery and fell into ruin' involves both an advantage and a disadvantage for Sally.  
Using the same conceptual machinery, seemingly contradictory luck claims made at different 
times can all be correct.  Consider this sequence: 
1.  Sally wins the lottery and she is evaluated as being lucky that she won the lottery. 
2.  Sally falls into ruin as a consequence of winning the lottery and is evaluated as unlucky 
to have won the lottery. 
3.  Sally discovers a robust and meaningful spiritual life that she could not have without first 
winning the lottery and falling into ruin.  She is evaluated, ultimately, as lucky to have 
won the lottery. 
All these claims seem correct, if the propositions involved are properly fleshed out with the 
relevant implicit information.  First, Sally wins the lottery and is evaluated as lucky in the normal 
way.  Second, Sally falls into ruin; being precise, she is not actually unlucky that she won the 
lottery, she is only unlucky that she won the lottery and fell into ruin.  'She won the lottery' still 
describes possible worlds that do not involve the disadvantage of falling into ruin for Sally, but 
the possible worlds described by 'She won the lottery and fell into ruin' do involve this 
disadvantage.  Finally, Sally discovers a robust and meaningful spiritual life, so she is evaluated 
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as lucky that she won the lottery (which is still true), but more precisely, she is lucky that she 
won the lottery and fell into ruin and discovered a robust and meaningful spiritual life. 
 I am working off a rather strong meta-ethical assumption that subjects can have 
advantages even if the advantage is part of a larger complex  that does not turn out to be all-
things-considered good for the subject.  If  a reader does not accept this assumption, then I 
propose understanding the accuracy of a luck claim by evaluating significance from the point of 
view of someone who only has access to the information contained in the proposition.  In this 
way, we can preserve the intuition that a Suffering Lottery Winner is still really lucky to win the 
lottery, even if winning the lottery leads to a greater disadvantage than advantage.  Then, when 
considering the more specific proposition 'she won the lottery and fell into ruin,' one might have 
to appeal to a larger framework of ethical and meta-ethical understanding to determine whether 
or not the subject can be rightly said to have any advantage at all; in other words, if you believe 
that advantages and disadvantages can cancel each other out or override each other, that system 
of cancelling or overriding will need to be built into your understanding of the luckiness of a 
proposition for a subject.  This would also mean a new understanding of what it means for a 
proposition to involve an advantage for a subject; rather than the advantage being something 
present in all possible worlds describe by the proposition, we should say that a proposition 
involves an advantage for a subject if and only if the subject has an advantage that is, in some 
sense, not undermined
155
 by any other part of the proposition. 
 Nicholas Rescher's approach moves in this direction when he describes a distinction 
between unconditional and conditional luck.  He writes: 
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how advantages and disadvantages might cancel or override each other. 
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One is unconditionally lucky (or unlucky) when something intrinsically good (or bad) 
happens fortuitously.  Finding a treasure trove is a piece of unconditional good luck; 
stumbling and breaking one's arm is a piece of unconditional bad luck.  By contrast, one 
is conditionally lucky (or unlucky) if that bit of good or bad fortune is good or bad only 
on the basis of some extraneous considerations.  Good luck can occur within bad luck or 




It can be difficult to piece together exactly how Rescher wants to identify what is intrinsically 
good (or bad) for a subject, but he offers some illustration with the following examples: 
Steve was involved in a major train wreck but by a fluke escaped unhurt.  Jane won the 
raffle and won an all-expenses-paid vacation in a tropical paradise, but she was bruised 
when caught up in a political demonstration there.  Missing the bus is bad as such, but 
would be a good thing if the bus later plunged over a precipice.  Winning the girl is all 





Rescher's suggestion is that we differentiate cases where something is good or bad for a subject 
directly (unconditional luck) from cases where the initial goodness or badness is undermined by 
some additional fact (conditional luck).  What he identifies as conditional luck is what I would 
identify as a case where the relevant proposition involves a combination of advantages and 
disadvantages.  In a more elaborate version of the Cab Breakdown example, Rescher explains 
that while there is some bad luck for the subject involved (such as the cab breaking down in the 
first place), this is clearly outweighed
158
 by the good luck of narrowly avoiding boarding the 
wrecked train.  On my approach, I do not think that the good luck will outweigh bad luck in this 
way; instead the good luck and bad luck simply coexist.  On my account, there is no need to 
evaluate whether the subject is lucky or unlucky overall, because, in complex cases, a subject is 
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 In reference to his more complicated example, Recher writes, "This one piece of good luck clearly outweighs all 
the rest and serves to make you lucky overall.  In a complex transaction of this sort, it is ultimately the size of the 
biggest piece of luck involved that determines the subject's overall condition of lucky versus unlucky." Rescher, 
1995, p. 83. 
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simply lucky in light of the advantages involved in the proposition and unlucky in light of the 
disadvantages also involved in the proposition. 
 I think that my approach of having advantages and disadvantages not cancel or override 
each other, agrees well with pre-reflective intuitions about cases such as Sally the Suffering 
Lottery Winner.  If we exclude the facts about how Sally's newfound fortune leads to disaster in 
her personal relationships and growth, this is a paradigmatic example of a luck.  My hypothetical 
opponent would probably claim that Sally is not, in this case, actually lucky to win the lottery; 
she merely appears lucky to win the lottery until we are availed of the facts of the destructive 
results this lottery win has on her life.  This seems too strong a claim.  If someone unaware of the 
destructive results that winning the lottery would bring to Sally witnessed her win and 
proclaimed her to be lucky, then we would not want to say that this evaluation is actually 
incorrect. It seems more plausible to say that although Sally is lucky to win the lottery, she is 
also unlucky to win the lottery (and may be more severely unlucky to win that she was lucky to 
win).  I think that this is the best way to account for the complexity of these luck claims without 
allowing for deeply unintuitive possibilities, such as subjects who turn out to not actually be 
lucky to win the lottery.   
 A persistent opponent might continue to protest; the exact difficulty that we have with 
cases like Sally's is that we do not know how to think about the event of her winning the lottery.  
The claim is that my account does not do anything to alleviate the confusion about how we 
should evaluate whether the event of winning the lottery was good or bad for Sally, apart from 
how we fold that event into one or more propositions.  I reply that Sally's case is complicated, 
and it is fitting that the way we ought to evaluate the event of her winning the lottery is 
complicated in the way I've just described (the event is a combination of good for Sally and bad 
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for Sally).  It does not seem necessary to me that every event is clearly evaluable as only good or 
only bad for a subject. 
 Yet, there is a tempting distinction that could be made at this point.  There is a certain all-
things-considered perspective we might want to appeal to in making our luck evaluations; we 
may want to distinguish between the more myopic propositions which exclude one or more of 
the connected advantages and disadvantages (such as Sally's merely winning the lottery in the 
Suffering Lottery Winner example) and the more detailed propositions that include all the 
associated advantages and disadvantages (such as Sally's winning the lottery and consequently 
losing her personal relationships and productivity, from the same example).  There is some 
temptation to use this distinction to evaluate whether or not a subject is really lucky and to give 
the luck evaluations based on the more detailed propositions priority over narrower ones.  After 
all, in many contexts, we think that having access to more information, so long as it is not 
misleading, leads not only to different evaluations, but to better ones.  In the Cab breakdown 
example, Cecile will bemoan her bad luck until she is informed of the train wreck, at which point 
she would likely celebrate her good luck instead. 
 I must admit to some ambivalence on the role this distinction plays for luck evaluation.  
On one hand, the rough argument just given is intuitively compelling.  After all, finding what 
best serves our entire network of interests is often more important to us than what serves one 
particular interest from a narrowed point of view.  On the other hand, I want to resist the 
temptation to only use the luck evaluations from the all-things-considered perspective to fix 
which features of the world are really lucky.  Earlier, I made a distinction between merely 
apparent luck, (where a subject believes she is lucky either accurately, in which case it is also 
real luck, or erroneously, due to a misleading information, irrationality, or a psychological 
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defect), and real luck.  The case of the confident lottery player
159
 was given as the clearest 
example of how a subject might make a mistake in her evaluation of her own luckiness.  The 
merely apparent luck that results from misleading information, irrationality, or a psychological 
defect seems very different from the luck we correctly identify by evaluating things from a less 
than all-things-considered point of view.  It seems mistaken to say that Sally is not actually lucky 
to win the lottery because her win leads to her losing her personal relationships and productivity.  
It seems more accurate to say that she is both lucky to win the lottery and also unlucky to win the 
lottery and subsequently suffers.   
 Additionally, from an all-things-considered point of view, many central examples of luck 
diminish to unimportance.  Winning a game of Monopoly may be completely insignificant in the 
long run, but rolling exactly a twelve on a pair of dice to win (when all other rolls would result in 
a loss) is a paradigmatic case of luck.  Further, we often make luck evaluations without 
knowledge of the future advantages and disadvantages that might be involved.  The fact that a 
subject is lucky that she won the lottery or found buried treasure seems unaffected by 
consequences of this win or discovery; if the original luck can be neutralized or cancelled out, 
then we would have to accept that we are almost always mistaken in the luck evaluations we 
make in everyday situations due to their diminished significance over the long run or due to our 
lack of knowledge of adverse consequences.     
 Another, more serious meta-ethical objection to my approach might run as follows: 
someone might argue the deeper position that there is no way to distinguish what is actually 
good for a subject.  Suppose, for example, that what is evaluated as good for a subject can be 
done from a number of different perspectives, with no perspective being more legitimate than or 
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  In response to this objection, I am inclined to bite the bullet and 
acknowledge that my account is incompatible with a range of non-cognitivist meta-ethical 
theories.  I am content with this concession because, although I will not argue for my position 
here, I think that if a metaethical theory does not distinguish between what appears good for a 
person from various vantage points and what is actually or really good for that person, then that 
is a flaw of the meta-ethical theory itself. 
4. Impersonal and Personal Luck 
 Another pressing concern raised by the lead examples in this chapter concerns how to 
deal with cases where the gain or loss is trivial to the subject, but the subject is still intuitively 
lucky.  This question is highlighted by the Trivial Game Player example and is also central to the 
cases of the Apathetic Lottery Winner and the Wealthy Gambler.  To address this, I propose 
making the following distinction: 
IL: If a subject, S, is impersonally lucky that P, then P involves an advantage for S, and P 
would involve the same advantage for any subject, ceteris paribus. 
PL: If a subject, S, is personally lucky that P, then P involves an advantage for S, and P would 
not involve an advantage for some subjects, ceteris paribus. 
Note that these are presented roughly and as merely necessary conditions; more detailed 
definitions will be presented in Chapter V.  On my account, there are two kinds of advantages a 
subject can have, and this naturally distinguishes two different kinds of luck.  A subject is 
impersonally lucky when a proposition involves an advantage that is established as an advantage 
without any consideration of the particular subject involved.  For example, winning the lottery is 
impersonally lucky because winning is established as an advantage from the rules of the lottery 
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alone.  It does not matter who is playing the lottery or what the player's characteristics are.  This 
is also clear in examples of playing games or sports.  In these contexts, not only do the rules 
often establish what is treated as an advantage (points, faux currency, or some other resource), 
but also the rules of the game can establish what counts as a desirable or undesirable 
intermediate position in the game.  However, impersonal luck is not restricted to these small, 
well-defined cases.  Depending on our ethical commitments, there may be more or fewer cases 
of impersonal luck in ordinary life.  If something is an advantage for every subject that possesses 
it (some candidates that might come to mind are survival, strong health, and the avoidance of 
pain), then it is impersonally so. 
 The second kind of luck, personal luck, can be defined in opposition to impersonal luck.  
If a proposition that is lucky for a subject involves an advantage that is established as an 
advantage only with reference to the involved subject's particular interests then the subject is 
personally lucky.  The best example of this may be Latus's example of the bottle collector.  If the 
subject who finds the particular bottles is the only one who actually values them, then finding the 
bottles is only established as an advantage when we consider the particular subject involved and 
his desire to collect this particular kind of bottle.  It is advantageous for this subject to find the 
beer bottles to the extent that this promotes his happiness and success in his hobby.  For any 
other subject, finding the beer bottles would be, presumably, insignificant. 
 This distinction will be helpful for analyzing cases where there is a point of view, often 
the affected subject's own, from which a seemingly clear case of luck does not seem significant.  
By separating impersonal luck from personal luck, we can distinguish between cases where a 
subject is lucky because they receive an advantage that is good for people generally, independent 
of what they personally think of it (see the Unwilling Lottery Winner and the Wealthy Gambler), 
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and cases where the subject is lucky because it serves their particular interests (such as Latus's 
bottle collector).  When a subject is impersonally lucky, they receive something that is an 
advantage independent of their personal characteristics.  When a subject is personally lucky, they 
receive something that is an advantage that depends on their personal characteristics; something 
is advantageous for the subject (either due to the idiosyncrasies of the subject's preferences or 
due to some other personal characteristics that make it advantageous for this particular subject), 
so possessing it is an advantage for this subject but not for all other subjects.  This distinction 
also helps with cases such as the Trivial Game Player; even though the game, in a sense, does not 
really matter to the subject, the rules of the game establish certain things as advantages and 
disadvantages for players of the game. 
 Interestingly, this distinction allows me to further account for another complication; in 
certain cases of luck, a person can be any combination of personally lucky, impersonally lucky, 
personally unlucky, and impersonally unlucky at the same time.  Since a single proposition can 
involve many advantages and disadvantages for a subject, we can imagine cases of the following 
kind: suppose that Betsy finds a crate of rare bottles and gold abandoned on the side of the road.  
Betsy is impersonally lucky that she found the gold.  Additionally, Betsy is an avid bottle 
collector who recognizes and appreciates the value of the rare bottles in the crate.  So, she is 
personally lucky that she found the bottles.  However, if we add that the bottles and gold are 
irradiated and will make Betsy ill, then she is impersonally unlucky that she found the bottles 
and gold.  Finally, we can add that Betsy has a petty family who will resent her finding the gold 
and treat her poorly because of it.  So, Betsy is also personally unlucky that she found the gold.  
An account of how I ultimately want to define impersonal and personal advantages and the 
network of propositions involving these advantages will be reserved for Chapter V. 
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5. Revisiting the Examples 
 Now, I would like to revisit the leading examples in this chapter to show how my 
approach leads to answers to the problematic questions raised in each: 
1.  Unwilling Lottery Winner: Due to certain religious, moral, or philosophical 
commitments, Ursula is opposed to possessing a large amount of money.  For some 
reason, she is entered into a fair lottery with a substantial monetary prize, and she wins.  
Because of these commitments, she is at best indifferent to winning this money, and at 
worst bothered that she now has to dispose of it. She considers herself unlucky. 
In the case of the Unwilling Lottery Winner, the main tension is between the intuition that Ursula 
is lucky that she won the lottery (lottery wins are, after all, perhaps the most paradigmatic 
examples of good luck) and the premise that Ursula is either indifferent or opposed to the 
monetary gain associated with it.  We will set aside the obvious question of why Ursula is 
entered into the lottery in the first place.  On my account, the question of whether it is good or 
bad for Ursula can be addressed simply by considering the distinction between impersonal and 
personal luck.  Given the context of the lottery, Ursula is impersonally lucky to win, but given 
her commitments opposing the possession of her lottery winnings, she is personally unlucky or 
non-lucky to win (depending on the strength of her commitment to not receiving the money).  
She is both impersonally lucky in light of the impersonal advantage involved in having won the 
lottery and personally unlucky in light of the disadvantage involved in gaining a large sum of 
money that she would (strongly) prefer not to have.  
2. Wealthy Gambler: Wallace is a multi-billionaire, who does not consider a gain or loss of 
$50 to make any difference to him, whatsoever.  Wallace bets $50 on the roll of a six-
sided die.  The terms of the bet are that Wallace will win unless the die roll comes up as a 
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six, leaving him to win on any roll from one to five.  When the die is rolled, it does in fact 
comes up as a six, so Wallace loses the bet and the $50.  Because he is indifferent to the 
loss, Wallace does not consider himself unlucky. 
The case of the Wealthy Gambler is similar to the case of the Unwilling Lottery Winner.  In this 
example, Wallace is clearly impersonally unlucky to lose the die roll.  Unlike in the case of the 
Unwilling Lottery Winner, there is no competing good luck to compete with the bad luck; this is 
a simpler case where the interested subject simply gets the evaluation wrong.  Wallace is 
impersonally unlucky, even if he does not think that he is.  This example is useful to emphasize 
an important feature of my approach.  Even if Wallace were to think he was unlucky, this would 
not then make him personally unlucky (in addition to his being impersonally unlucky).  Rather, 
he would simply be getting the evaluation of his case correct.  Personal luck is not a matter of 
how the affected subject thinks or feels about their situation (unless we build in an ethical 
commitment to such subjective feelings always being good for subjects), it is a matter of whether 
or not the affected subject possess particular features such that a proposition involves an 
advantage or disadvantage for them that it would not involve for someone else.  Whatever 
Wallace thinks about it, losing $50 would be a disadvantage for any subject. 
 Another consideration this example brings up is that luckiness, on my account, will be 
fixed by the appropriateness of adopting luck attitudes (i.e. the appropriateness of adjusting 
certain attitudes) not the actual adoption of those attitudes.  So, Wallace might, rightly, recognize 
that he is unlucky in this case, but still not feel unlucky in the sense that he chooses not to adopt 
luck attitudes toward himself and his disadvantage while nevertheless being aware that it would 
be appropriate if he were to adopt luck attitudes.  I will discuss how we should understand this 
appropriateness in more detail in Chapter V. 
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3. Beneficial Breakup: Barry is involved in an emotionally destructive romantic 
relationship.  Nonetheless, he is deeply committed to the relationship, and does not notice 
anything out of the ordinary between him and his partner when his partner suddenly 
breaks up with him.  Barry sees the ending of this relationship as a significant loss, but all 
of Barry's friends think that he doesn't know how lucky he is. 
There may be some temptation to treat the case of the Beneficial Breakup similarly to the 
Unwilling Lottery Winner.  However, this case is meant to consider a disagreement over what is 
actually an advantage or disadvantage for a particular subject, not a prima facie conflict of good 
luck versus bad luck.  Hopefully, the stipulations make it clear that it is not advantageous for 
Barry to continue in his destructive relationship; it is, in fact, disadvantageous.  In this case, 
Barry is wrong about what is advantageous for him, so he is not actually  (personally or 
impersonally) unlucky that this relationship ends.  He is, in fact, lucky, as his friends believe. 
4. Cab Breakdown: Cecile is on her way to the train station when her cab breaks down, 
costing her several minutes and causing her to miss her train.  She is upset, and forced to 
board a later train.  Unknown to Cecile, her original train is wrecked and several 
passengers are injured while she is waiting for the next train.  Cecile believes she is 
unlucky to miss her train. 
The Cab Breakdown example has already been discussed at some length in the previous section.  
In short, Cecile is unlucky that her cab breaks down as this involves the disadvantage of  missing 
her train; in every possible world where her cab breaks down, she is delayed.  But what about 
whether Cecile is lucky or unlucky that her cab breaks down and her original train gets into a 
wreck?  In every possible world where her cab breaks down and her original train is wrecked, 
Cecile has both an advantage and a disadvantage; she has the advantage of avoiding the train 
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wreck, and she has the disadvantage of being delayed.  So, Cecile is lucky that her cab breaks 
down and her original train gets into a wreck, in light of the advantage involved, and Cecile is 
unlucky that her cab breaks down and her original train gets into a wreck, in light of the 
disadvantage involved. 
5. Suffering Lottery Winner: Sally is a normal lottery player who buys a ticket hoping to 
win.  When she does in fact win, she does not fare very well.  As a result of winning the 
lottery, she loses friends, succumbs to destructive excess, and become lethargic and 
unproductive.  
The case of the Suffering Lottery Winner has already been discussed in previous sections and 
can receive the same treatment as the Cab breakdown example.  Nothing in my approach hinges 
on whether the advantage (from the lottery win) and disadvantage (falling into destructive 
excess) are causally related. 
6. Trivial Game Player: Ty is playing a game of Monopoly, recreationally.  The game is not 
being played for any particular stakes, and Ty's interest in the game is mild at best.  He 
does not consider the game very skill testing and does not attach any value to winning or 
losing.  At one point, Ty is sure to lose unless he rolls exactly two ones on the dice.  He 
does, and he goes on to win the game. 
The example of the Trivial Game Player can now be dealt with simply.  Ty is impersonally lucky 
to roll a pair of ones at just the right time, and he is impersonally lucky to win the game of 
Monopoly, since the rules of the game establish winning as an advantage for Ty.  Even though 
the game is ultimately inconsequential to Ty's life, he is still lucky that he won. 
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7. Failed Suicide: Faris is deeply depressed and jumps off of a tall building in an effort to 
kill himself.  He lands on a hay cart that is driving past the building that he jumped off of.  
The cart breaks his falls and saves his life. 
The last example in this chapter is the most difficult to give a clear decision on.  First of all, it is 
not clear whether or not it is actually advantageous or disadvantageous for Faris to survive his 
suicide attempt.  This may depend on background ethical commitments, for those who have 
strong beliefs on the moral permissibility of suicide.  For most, I think, Faris is at least 
impersonally lucky that his suicide attempt fails, as survival seems to be an impersonal 
advantage.  Whether or not Faris is also personally unlucky that his suicide attempt failed will 
depend on answers to particular ethical questions.  In substantial matters like this, any account of 
luck ought to defer to an ethical and meta-ethical analysis. 
6. Conclusion 
 As we've seen from other luck theorists, the significance criterion is sometimes added to 
accounts as an afterthought, or, less harshly, set aside as a less interesting or uninteresting side 
issue.  However, the examples raised in this chapter hopefully show a range of interesting 
questions surrounding the significance involved in many cases of luck.  The approach I presented 
allows for diagnoses of the leading examples that return intuitive results while providing a way 
of identifying the relevant considerations that make luck evaluations difficult in unclear cases 
(such as Failed Suicide).  Some disagreements about luck result directly from disagreements 
about what is actually good for a particular subject.  Laying out exactly what counts as good or 
bad for a subject is a matter that lays beyond the scope of a theory of luck.  But, fluidity with our 
ethical and metaethical commitments is a virtue of an account of luck; it would be very strange if 
different ethical and metaethical commitments never led to different luck evaluations.  
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Chapter IV: Approaching a Theory of Luck 
 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I described one major way that my approach to theorizing about 
luck diverges from traditional accounts, by placing the significance criterion at the center of my 
discussion.  Rather than using the significance criterion to filter abnormal states of affairs into 
mere matters of luck and actual cases of luck, I suggest that we first look at the way that a state 
of affairs is significant for a subject and then consider under which circumstances that state of 
affairs is abnormal.  So far, I have addressed one way that luckiness appears to be a subjective 
property; in short, what is actually advantageous or disadvantageous
161
 for a particular subject 
will depend on certain ethical and metaethical commitments beyond the scope of this project, but 
we can distinguish between impersonal and personal advantages and disadvantages
162
 based on 
whether a state of affairs is lucky for any subject in the same circumstances or only for a 
particular subject. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to finish motivating the account of luck I will present in 
Chapter V by directly addressing the question of whether (and in what way) luck is subjective.  
The second major way my approach to theorizing about luck diverges from traditional accounts 
is that, by treating luckiness (the property, 'lucky that p') as a dependent property that exists only 
in light of certain established practices and attitudes, cases of luck will be identified by the 
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appropriateness of adopting luck attitudes
163
 in those cases.  In contrast to some contemporary 
thought about luck, my account does not allow for widespread error in our pre-reflective use of 
the luck concept since the practices surrounding the use of the concept play the central role of 
establishing when we are using the concept correctly. 
 In this chapter, I start by looking at ordinary language luck claims.  In order to devise a 
useful paraphrase from ordinary language luck claims to luck propositions, I discuss Searle's 
distinctions between intrinsic and observer-relative properties, and his distinction between 
institutional and personally-subjective properties.  I conclude this section by arguing that 'lucky 
that p' is a dependent property.  I then contrast this to more traditional approaches to theorizing 
about luck in order to highlight the differences in my approach. 
2. Searlean Distinctions: Intrinsic, Social, and Personally-Subjective Properties 
 One way to start developing a theory of luck is to look at the kind of property luck is, and 
one place to begin this investigation is by considering the way that luck appears prima facie in 
common language luck claims.  Here, luck appears as a predicate in a few different ways.  For 
example, luck appears as a simple predicate of several things including subjects (e.g. 'John is so 
lucky'), actions (e.g. 'That was a lucky shot'), events (e.g. 'Winning that lottery was lucky'), and 
states of affairs (e.g. 'That he won the lottery is lucky').  Sometimes, luck also appears as a 
relation between (or as a property of the relation between) subjects and other entities.  For 
example, in the claims 'Winning the lottery was lucky for John,' 'John is lucky that he won the 
lottery,' and 'John is lucky to be so tall,' luck appears to relate a subject (John) and an event, a 
state of affairs, and a personal trait, respectively.
164
  As we may recall from Chapter I, I take the 
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form 'S is lucky that P,' where S is a subject and P is a proposition to be the canonical form
165
 
that all common language luck claims express. 
 Common language luck claims are diverse and opaque, and making any general 
observations is going to be difficult.  Nevertheless, observing the ways in which luck is 
commonly invoked may be instructive in a limited way.  The task at hand is to find a useful 
paraphrase from common language luck claims to the luck propositions expressed by those 
claims and a further paraphrase from those luck propositions to reduced propositions that do not 
invoke a concept of luck or luckiness.  Luck is a non-primitive concept, so a luck proposition 
ought to be reducible to a proposition with the same truth conditions that does not invoke the 
concept of luck or luckiness.  I consider it a virtue of a theory of luck that all reduced luck 
propositions share a similar structure, as this supports the idea that all common language luck 
claims are invoking a singular shared concept, rather than a collection of distinct, loosely-related 
concepts under the same name.  At the end of Chapter V, after introducing my account of luck, I 
will offer an analysis of everyday luck claims to show how this can be done. 
 The first step in my effort to discover and describe the structure and content of reduced 
luck propositions is to question whether luckiness as an objective or subjective property.  
However, since the language of objectivity and subjectivity pervades so many philosophical 
subjects with varying degrees of clarity, I want to explore some more specific language for this 
discussion.  Borrowing from Searle,
166
 we can call a property 'intrinsic' if an object
167
 can have 
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that property "independent of any observers or users,"
168
  and we can call a property 'observer-
relative' if that property "only exists relative to the intentionality of subjects."
169
  As Searle 
writes: 
1. The sheer existence of the physical object in front of me does not depend on any 
attitudes we may take toward it. 
 
2. It has many features that are intrinsic in the sense that they do not depend on any 
attitudes of observers or users.  For example, it has a certain mass and a certain chemical 
composition. 
 
3. It has other features that exist only relative to the intentionality of subjects.  For 





To take another example, that an event has a certain spatio-temporal location is intrinsic, but that 
it is a baseball game is observer-relative.  An interesting consequence of Searle's distinction is 
that, "for any observer-relative feature F, seeming to be F is logically prior to being F, because -- 
appropriately understood -- seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F."
171
  Here, 'seems 
to be F' may be better understood as 'is treated or used as F' rather than 'is believed to be F.'  
Beliefs about the object in question at some specific moment in time do not generally determine 
its F-ness, unless having those temporally-anchored beliefs about the object is part of what 
constitutes treating the object as an F (see my example of baseball games in section 3 of this 
chapter).  For example, for an object to be of a kind that is treated as a screwdriver by a 
community of users does require at any particular moment that someone actually has the belief 
of it that it is a screwdriver.  If it falls behind a piece of furniture or is buried underground, it is 
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still the kind of thing that is treated and used as a screwdriver; this is the sense in which it seems 
to be a screwdriver. 
 For whom the property must seem to exist will depend on another distinction.  For Searle, 
observer-relative properties can be further divided between social, institutional, and personally 
subjective properties.
172
  Social properties (and institutional properties, a sub-set of social 
properties)
173
 exist independent of any individual person's opinion or evaluation, while 
personally-subjective properties do depend on the opinion or evaluation of an individual 
observer.
174
  A necessary condition of an object's having a social or institutional property is that 
the object seems to have the property to a community of observers or users, while a necessary 
condition of an object's having a personally subjective property is that the object seems to have 
the property to an individual observer.  For example, that a particular garment in my closet is my 
favorite shirt is personally subjective; in order for it to actually be my favorite shirt, it is 
necessary that it seems to me to be my favorite shirt, in the sense that it is the object treated by 
me as my favorite shirt.  On the other hand, that a particular object in my pocket is a five dollar 
bill is a social fact; in order for it to actually be a five dollar bill a community of observers or 
users
175
 must relate to it as a five dollar bill.  Whether or not the object seems to be a five dollar 
bill to me as an individual has no decisive bearing on whether or not the object is, in fact, a five 
dollar bill. 
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 I am skeptical of whether the distinction that  Searle makes between institutional facts 
and non-institutional social facts can be made cleanly.  He uses the examples of hyenas hunting a 
lion and Congress passing legislation to illustrate this distinction: "for example, hyenas hunting a 
lion and Congress passing legislation are both cases of social facts.  Institutional facts, it will turn 
out, are a special subclass of social facts.  Congress passing legislation is an institutional fact; 
hyenas hunting a lion is not."
176
  Since this distinction will have no bearing on my proposal, I 
will avoid talking about it at length here.  Further, I will call the class of properties I am 
interested in 'dependent properties,' to avoid confusion with the Searlean categories of 
institutional and non-institutional social properties. 
 Dependent properties are partially constituted by the way observers relate to them.  Searle 
proposes 'X counts as Y in C'
177
 as the characteristic form of the rules that establish social facts, 
where C is the relevant context.  For example, whether a particular object (X) is a screwdriver 
(Y) is established by certain contextual facts (C), such as the object's history of creation and 
function.  Likewise, a gathering of people will count as a baseball game or a wedding only in the 
presence of certain contextual factors; in the case of the baseball game, a certain kind of 
participation and intention from the people present will be required, and in the case of the 
wedding additional legal or religious sanctioning may also be required.  Luck follows a similar 
structure.  Whether or not a person counts as lucky with reference to a particular state-of-affairs 
depends on contextual facts.  The canonical form of luck claims that I have been using, 'S is 
lucky that P,' mirrors the beginning of this form; whether some subject (X) counts as 'lucky that 
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P' (Y) will depend on certain contextual facts.  In Chapter V,
178
 I will explain the relevant 
contextual factors (C) in terms of whether advantages and disadvantages involved in the 
proposition P are ordinarily or extraordinarily acquired by the putatively lucky subject. 
3. Codification of Social Properties 
 Searle raises a further issue when we consider whether the logical necessity of 'seeming 
to be F' to actually be F applies to types or to tokens of social facts: 
Where money is concerned a particular token could be money even if no one thought it 
was money, but where cocktail parties are concerned if no one thinks of a particular event 
that it is a cocktail party, it is not a cocktail party.  I think the reason we treat cocktail 
parties differently from money in this regard has to do with codification.  In general, if 
the institution in question is codified in an 'official' form, such as in the laws concerning 
money, then the self-referentiality
179
 in question is a feature of the type.  If it is informal, 
uncodified, then the self-referentiality applies to each token.  Codification specifies the 




I think that Searle is mistaken here. The differences between money (and other objects like tools) 
and cocktail parties (or other events like baseball games or wars) is better explained by the 
difference between dependent properties that exist merely in virtue of their history of creation, 
function, and surrounding practices, and those that exist also in virtue of some kind of active 
subjective participation.  An object may be a piece of money or a tool merely in virtue of its 
history of being produced and used in the appropriate way.  Even if it is never explicitly codified, 
a forgotten piece of money or a tool still seems to be what it is without any existing subject 
believing of it that it is what it is.  On the other hand, cocktail parties, baseball games, and 
similar events require active participants that believe of the token event that it is the kind of 
event that it is.  To play right field, the player must believe that he is playing a baseball game; he 
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cannot merely stand in a certain place and behave in certain ways.  A man standing in the 
outfield of a baseball stadium with a compulsion to catch flying objects is not 'playing right field' 
the way that a baseball player consciously trying to help his team win is.  We do not need to 
appeal to the idea of codification to distinguish when seeming to be φ is a necessary condition of 
being φ for each token or only for the type. 
 The idea of codification does play another, more important role, however.  Searle points 
out that, for any "genuine institutional facts,"
181
 we could codify the rules explicitly.
182
  This 
seems evident enough, so long as we allow vagueness into our codification.  However, explicit 
codification comes at the cost of "the flexibility, spontaneity, and informality that the practice 
has in its uncodified form."
183
  Having the status of instantiating a dependent property carries 
with it additional status beyond the intrinsic features of the object, relation, or event, most clearly 
in the form of motivating and justifying certain attitudes toward the object or event.  In the case 
of friendships, dates, and cocktail parties, "this is shown by the fact that the people involved have 
certain sorts of justified expectations from a friendship/date/cocktail party, which they do not 
have from an identical set of arrangements about which they do not believe that it is a 
friendship/date/cocktail party."
184
  This endowment of additional status is what distinguishes a 
codified dependent property from a rigorous description of an intrinsic property.   
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4. Luck as an Uncodified, Dependent Property 
 With the landscape carved up in this way, I can now turn to the question of what kind of 
property luckiness (the property of being 'lucky that P') is.  As was addressed briefly in Chapter 
I,
185
 the notion that luck is personally subjective is something of a non-starter.  However, even 
though luck is not personally subjective, it is subject sensitive; it is not necessary for any 
particular individual to believe that something is lucky for it to actually be lucky, but it is subject 
sensitive to the extent that whether or not a state of affairs is lucky for a subject may depend on 
the subject's individual characteristics, including their epistemic position.  For example, the 
subject may lack a critical piece of information, or might value something in an unusual way that 
makes a state of affairs specially lucky for that individual.
186
  Therefore, the pressing question is, 
why should we think that luck is dependent rather than intrinsic?  There are two steps to how I 
want to address this question.  First, I will make some short comments on whether moral facts 
are dependent and how this relates to the idea that luckiness is a dependent property.  Second, I 
want to argue that luck is a dependent property in a way that does not depend on whether or in 
what way moral facts are dependent. 
 Are moral facts dependent facts?  One reason to think so is given by Searle's "rough and 
ready" test for observer-relativity: "ask yourself, Could the feature exist if there had never been 
any human beings or other sorts of sentient beings?"
187
  The answer in the case of most moral 
facts seems to be 'no.'  However, if we consider the more precise distinction (after all, the rough 
and ready test really is rough), and ask whether or not moral features of the world depend on our 
collective intentionality, the answer is not as clear.  On a number of distinct, substantial meta-
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ethical theories, moral facts may be considered intrinsic, or dependent, or personally subjective.  
Giving a definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of my project.  However, I do 
want to make the point that I am not proposing that luckiness is a dependent property only 
because moral facts about what is or is not good for a subject are dependent. 
 So, in what way is luckiness a dependent property?  For the purposes of this discussion, it 
might be best to start by supposing that the facts about what is or is not good for a subject are 
intrinsic features of the world.  Working under this supposition, I propose that we should treat 
luckiness as a dependent property based on the attitudes seemingly motivated and justified by the 
characterization of a person or situation as lucky.  As described in Chapter I,
188
 common pre-
reflective luck attributions seem to treat luckiness as a property of persons as much as a property 
of the state of affairs in light of which a person is lucky.  Towards lucky persons we feel 
jealously and envy, we expect that they will express humility and gratitude for their advantages, 
and we avoid praising them for their lucky victories.  Towards the unlucky, we feel pity and 
sympathy, we expect ourselves or others to try to help compensate them for their disadvantage, 
and we do not hold them fully responsible or blame them for their disadvantages.  We feel that 
we should not expect or count on luck.  This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the attitudes 
motivated and justified through our collective intentionality toward lucky people and states of 
affairs, but a truly exhaustive list is probably neither possible nor desirable.  Absent these 
practices and attitudes, then, no one would be lucky. 
 A couple of the consequences of thinking of luck in this way are: 1) the attitudes 
motivated and justified by what we currently classify as lucky could be different by our having a 
different collective intentionality, and 2) we could (collectively) classify a different group of 
people and situations as lucky without changing the attitudes motivated and justified by this 
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classification.  To illustrate these consequences, consider the following: i) a society could easily 
develop with different attitudes toward lucky people and states of affairs.  For an easy example, 
we could simply consider a community that believes that luck does not undermine desert.  This 
community might not feel any desire to help the unlucky or to treat lucky victories any 
differently from those resulting more clearly from effort and choice alone.  In such a community, 
lucky victors might interpret their win as evidence of innate superiority, rather than expressing 
gratitude or humility.  ii) Consider a pious community that believes that every uncertain venture 
should begin with an offering to the gods.  In this community, if a person succeeds despite not 
making the appropriate offering, then they would probably be considered lucky to have 
succeeded.  Even if an Olympic sprinter races against a novice, if the sprinter does not make the 
usual offering, in this community, she could be treated as lucky to win. 
 Additionally, returning to my earlier distinction regarding types and tokens of dependent 
properties above, I would like to point out that being lucky is a dependent property more like 
being money than being a cocktail party or baseball game; a five dollar bill is a five dollar bill 
without any particular person recognizing that fact at the time, but cocktail parties and baseball 
games require intentional participation.  Even though the rules of what counts as lucky, unlucky, 
or non-lucky are not codified, whether a person is lucky or a state of affairs is lucky for someone 
seems to be true whether or not any particular person recognizes it.  Unlike cocktail parties or 
baseball games, token lucky states of affairs do not require any specific kind of participation or 
recognition by any particular person for them to be lucky.  For example, if a person is narrowly 
missed by a lightning bolt, we would intuitively think that she is lucky even if neither she nor 
anyone else were aware of the narrow miss. 
127 
 
 So, if luck is a dependent property, as I claim, what does this mean for the truth 
conditions of luck propositions?  If luckiness is a dependent property, then luck claims are claims 
that a person and state of affairs belongs in a category toward which there is a special collective 
intention in addition to any attitudes we hold toward the person and state of affairs in light of 
their intrinsic properties.  This intention is one that modifies credit-giving, praising and blaming, 
and notions of desert; it is loosely identified with the luck attitudes in Chapter I.
189
 The truth of a 
luck proposition will not hinge on whether or not any particular person adopts luck attitudes 
toward a person or state of affairs.  A full luck claim that specifies that a particular subject is 
lucky that a specific state of affairs obtains has a definite truth value; however, luck claims are 
subject-sensitive in the sense that it may be true that a particular state of affairs is lucky for one 
subject while it is false that that state of affairs is lucky for another subject. 
 Since luckiness is not explicitly codified, I argue that a luck proposition will be true if 
and only if adopting the luck attitudes toward the target person and state of affairs is appropriate.  
The exact kind of 'appropriateness' at play will be explained in the next chapter; for now, I will 
just say that while there is a distinctly moral element to whether or not it is appropriate to adopt 
the luck attitudes toward a person and state of affairs, it is not only a matter of whether or not the 
person deserves to have our attitudes about them adjusted; it must be appropriate to adjust our 
attitudes specifically because of their relationship to a state of affairs that lines up with a 
particular established (but uncodified) practice of modifying our attitudes in light of a person's 
luckiness or unluckiness.  As I spell out in the next chapter, for a luck proposition to be true, the 
target person and state of affairs needs to actually exemplify a type (the token person and state of 
affairs do not need to seem to be lucky, since no active participation is required) that seems to be 
lucky (that is, the person and state of affairs need to match an existing practice of adopting luck 
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attitudes) without other features (I will call these conditions for ordinariness) of the person and 
state of affairs undermining the appropriateness of adopting luck attitudes toward the person and 
state of affairs. 
 In summary, the approach I am suggesting runs as follows: first, we should treat luck as a 
dependent property which applies primarily to persons in light of their relationship to a particular 
state of affairs.  Being classified as lucky carries additional status beyond the status that is 
supported by the intrinsic properties of the person or state of affairs; namely, being classified as 
lucky motivates and justifies certain luck attitudes toward the lucky person.  Therefore, the 
account of luck I will propose will focus on a structured way of identifying those persons toward 
which (and the states of affairs in light of which) it is appropriate to hold these luck attitudes.  
Before presenting my account, however, I will briefly discuss the alternative approach which I 
believe is dominant in contemporary philosophical literature on luck, the matter of luck 
approach. 
5. The Matter of Luck Approach 
 Often, philosophers writing about luck do not explicitly engage with the question of 
whether or not luck is an intrinsic feature of the world.  My treatment of luck as a dependent 
property leads me to identify cases of luck according to their agreement with an established 
practice of modifying attitudes.  This is a departure from what I see as the most dominant 
approach to theorizing about luck, which I am calling the matter of luck approach (MOL).  As 
we may recall from Chapter II, many discussions of luck try to pick out luck with reference to 
other only roughly-defined concepts, such as accident or control.  These, along with accounts 
based on probability and some of the more developed accounts (like those proposed by Pritchard, 
Riggs and Rescher) seem to approach theorizing about luck in a common way.  MOL can be 
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roughly characterized as follows: 'matters of luck' picks out a certain type of state of affairs.  
These states of affairs can be identified without knowledge of the state of affairs being 
advantageous or disadvantageous for any subject.  Following MOL, luckiness is primarily a 
property of states of affairs (in contrast to my account, which will treat luckiness primarily as a 
property of persons); if a person is lucky it is only because they are the beneficiary of a state of 
affairs of the appropriate type, and if a person is unlucky it is only because they are a maleficiary 
of a state of affairs of that same type.  On the most radical reading, luck appears as a property of 
persons only in a derivative sense; more moderately, the MOL theorist looks to do the bulk of the 
work of identifying luck cases by identifying states of affairs of the appropriate type, and 
declares each an actual case of good luck if a person benefits from it and a case of bad luck if a 
person suffers from it.  Even if these accounts are able to identify the correct set of people and 
situations as lucky, I believe that this kind of account cuts at the wrong level.  At best, these 
accounts merely provide conceptual shorthand for identifying lucky states of affairs.  At worst, 
these accounts prescribe a confused landscape of luck that does not align with existing practices 
(of modifying our attitudes) surrounding luck claims.   
 An MOL theorist might begin her inquiry by noticing similarities between seemingly 
simple luck cases.  Perhaps they notice something common to situations influenced by coin flips, 
die rolls, and lotteries.  The MOL theorist then makes an effort to characterize those situations, 
perhaps in terms of low probability, indeterminacy, or something more complicated and 
developed like Pritchard's modal account.
190
  Finally, supposing a moderate MOL theorist, she 
will then use this characterization to circumscribe a group of matters of luck and identify actual 
cases of luck only when a subject benefits or suffers from a matter of luck. This approach is 
appealing because characterizing matters of luck based on probability, indeterminacy, et cetera at 
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least prima facie explains the basic intuitive connection between these concepts and luck.  
Further, in many intuitive cases of luck (such as those involving die rolls, flipped coins, or 
lotteries) we do seem able to anticipate that it would be lucky if someone were to benefit from 
the situation (perhaps by placing a bet on it). 
 On the surface, the MOL theorist is going to have difficulty defending why certain cases 
of luck are canonical and therefore have features that can be generalized to identify the type 
'matters of luck,' while other cases only arise as potential luck cases due to someone's conceptual 
confusion.  To take just a few examples, consider what characterization might capture the 
following three intuitively simple luck claims: 
1.  John is lucky to win the lottery. 
2.  I am lucky to have such a loving family. 
3.  Mary is lucky to be so beautiful. 
The challenge for the MOL theorist is to characterize the type 'matters of luck' in a way that 
captures all and only intuitive cases of luck.  Alternatively, the MOL theorist can argue that 
many of our intuitive judgments are error-laden.  Often, MOL theorists will end up dismissing 
those intuitive examples that do not match their characterization of 'matters of luck' as a case of 
conceptual confusion.  Most famously, perhaps, Rescher makes a sharp distinction between cases 
of luck and cases were a subject is "merely fortunate,"
191
 but the distinction is not based on 
intuitive conceptual differences between luckiness and fortunateness.  Instead, the category of 
"merely fortunate" cases, which includes cases of constitutive luck,
192
 for example, is simply 
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identified as those cases where we might intuitively make luck claims, but that do not fit into his 
prescribed category of 'matters of luck,' defined in terms of impredictability.
 
 
 To take an example, consider the following states of affairs where, intuitively, a subject 
could benefit in either a lucky or non-lucky way.  Imagine that an explorer is captured by a tribe 
of superstitious headhunters.  And suppose that a solar eclipse happens at just the right moment 
to frighten the explorer's captors, allowing him to escape.
193
 The MOL theorist is compelled to 
decide whether the situation of a solar eclipse frightening a group of headhunters counts as a 
matter of luck, and then, the case will emerge clearly as a case of luck or non-luck for the 
explorer as he has clearly benefitted from it.  In this case, it is not clear to me whether we would 
intuitively want to characterize the eclipse as a matter of luck, but for the sake of argument I will 
suppose that we do.  However, what if we consider two possible explorers that might find 
themselves in this situation.  New Jersey Smith is something of a bungler and is rescued by the 
eclipse unexpectedly.  In contrast, Indiana Jones carefully planned his expedition and only 
entered the jungle at this particular time because he knew that an eclipse would occur and that 
the superstitious headhunters would be frightened enough for him to make an escape in the event 
that he were captured.  Intuitively, at least, Indiana Jones is not lucky to be rescued, but New 
Jersey Smith is.  As I will describe in the next chapter, this is because being rescued from 
superstitious headhunters by a timely eclipse is extraordinary (and therefore lucky) when it is not 
planned for but ordinary (and therefore non-lucky) when it is planned for. 
 To illustrate how MOL accounts 'cut at the wrong level,' let's explore how one might try 
to accommodate prima facie counterexamples into a typical low-probability based account of 
luck.  Suppose that we start with roughly the following: 'A state of affairs is lucky for a person if 
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it is significant for that person and the state of affairs is the result of a low probability event.'  
The immediate prima facie counter examples that come to mind are:
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1.   Even odds: Adam is lucky to win a flip of a fair coin. 
2.  Constitutive luck: Betsy is lucky to be a citizen of a affluent democratic country. 
3.  High probability luck: Carl is lucky to survive his turn at Russian Roulette. 
4. High probability constitutive luck: Dana is lucky to not have been born blind. 
5.  No clear probability: Eric is lucky to make it home safely, even though he was driving 
while drunk. 
For each of these cases, the proponent of the probability account (hereafter, 'probability theorist') 
might offer reinterpretations along the following lines: 
1.  Even odds: Although it is not clear that 50% is, intuitively, a low probability, and 
drawing a hard line somewhere between 50% and 51% might seem to lead to a sorites 
paradox, the probability theorist can simply bite the bullet and accept the vagueness of 
'luck' and 'low probability' as concepts.  It may be a virtue that the vagueness of one is 
reflected in the other. 
2.  Constitutive luck: Although it may not appear, on the surface, that Betsy's being a citizen 
of an affluent democratic country is the result of a low probability event, we can offer an 
interpretation in terms of low probability along the following lines: since more people are 
not citizens of affluent-and-democratic countries than are citizens of affluent-and-
democratic countries, there is a low probability that a single randomly selected person is 
a citizen of a affluent-and-democratic country.  In this sense, there is a low probability of 
any particular person (Betsy included) being a citizen of a affluent-and-democratic 
country. 
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3.  High probability luck: Although Carl is intuitively lucky to survive a round of Russian 
Roulette, this may not actually be in light of the probability of his pulling the trigger on 
an unloaded chamber.  Instead, the probability theorist may argue that the luck involved 
in inherited from the comparative probability of surviving if he engages in a game of 
Russian Roulette versus the probability of surviving if he does not engage is the game.  
Carl appears lucky because he has engaged in a course of action that causes the 
probability of the advantageous outcome (not dying suddenly) to be dramatically lower 
than otherwise. 
4. High probability constitutive luck:  Dana's case, I think, is the most difficult kind of case 
for the probability theorist to explain.  They can start by comparing Dana to the entire 
global population, as in the case of Betsy's constitutive luck, but most people are not born 
blind.  The explanation offered for Carl's high probability luck will not work here, since 
Dana hasn't done anything to make herself more likely to be born blind.  However, this is 
also the kind of case where I think the probability theorist has the strongest reasons for 
claiming that our intuitive, pre-reflective use of 'luck' is simply in error.  Since not being 
born blind really is the normal case (and doesn't seem to satisfy the unreliability 
criterion),
195
 the probability theorist is probably happy claiming that Dana is not, in fact, 
lucky, and the claim that she is lucky involves confusing 'luckiness' with mere 
'fortunateness' or another similar concept. 
5.  No clear probability: In cases of recklessness where we do not have an intuitive sense of 
the probabilities involved (or how we might go about measuring them), the probability 
theorist can respond in a similar manner as the case of high probability luck.  Eric 
appears lucky because he has engaged in a course of action that causes the probability of 
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the advantageous outcome (driving home safely), whatever that probability might be, to 
be dramatically lower than otherwise. 
There are two ways in which I find the probability theorist's responses to these kinds of examples 
unsatisfying.  First, it is not always clear when to employ this machinery to make intuitive cases 
of luck fit the proposed account.  Why is it that 'high probability' cases like 3 above should be 
reinterpreted as cases of low comparative probability, while cases like a master archer shooting 
against a novice without warming up
196
 do not get this treatment?  Second, and more 
importantly, employing this kind of conceptual machinery does not seem to get at what I am 
most concerned about when looking for a unified account of luck.  While accommodating all 
cases of luck under the heading 'low probability' might be useful conceptual shorthand, it does 
not capture what it is about these cases that motivates, and typically justifies, the luck attitudes 
we hold toward them.   
6. Conclusion 
 The account of luck that I will offer in the next chapter deviates from contemporary ways 
of theorizing about luck in a few ways.  First, in light of my discussion earlier in this chapter 
regarding luckiness as a dependent property, my account is motivated by a desire to treat the 
existing practices and attitudes surrounding luck as instructive; in all cases of luck, it must be, in 
a certain sense, appropriate for observers to adopt a set of luck attitudes.  As far as possible, I 
want to avoid offering an account on which most or too many everyday luck claims turn out to 
be erroneous or cases of conceptual confusion.  Second, as I discussed at length in Chapter III, 
my preferred approach to theorizing about luck focuses first on the kind of advantages gained (or 
disadvantages suffered) by lucky subjects.  So, unlike MOL, rather than starting with a space of 
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all states of affairs and trying to identify the luck-apt ones, I want to start by looking at subjects' 
advantages and disadvantages and ask, under what conditions are they considered lucky to have 
those advantages or unlucky to have those disadvantages?  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
what counts as good for a subject may vary according to a person's ethical and metaethical 
commitments, and it is certainly preferable to have one's ethics inform his theory of luck rather 
than the other way around.  The advantage-based approach is desirable because, on the surface at 
least, it seems to do justice to wide variety of luck claims and cases that we intuitively accept.  
Finally, motivated by the observation that luckiness involves abnormality, as described in the 
unreliability criterion, the account I offer will seek to define luckiness negatively; that is, I will 
identify what counts as a normal way of obtaining an advantage and identify luck in those cases 




Chapter V: The Advantage-Based Account 
 
1. Introduction 
 The goal of this chapter is to present my original account of luck motivated by my 
discussions of impersonal and personal advantages and the limitations of the MOL approach 
addressed in previous chapters.  My account is advantage-based; that is, I propose an account on 
which we cannot determine whether or not a person or state of affairs is lucky or unlucky 
without referring to the particular kind and degree of advantage or disadvantage that the person 
has gained.  On my account, advantages and disadvantages admit of a certain kind of 
justification; roughly, there are certain conditions that justify advantages and disadvantages for 
particular subjects in the sense that, if those conditions are met, we react to their having that 
advantage or disadvantage in the ordinary way.  If these conditions are met, I'll say that the 
subject's having that advantage or disadvantage is ordinary; a subject's having an advantage or 
disadvantage will be extraordinary only if none of the conditions for ordinariness are met.  A 
subject will be lucky if and only if it is extraordinary that they have an advantage.  Before I lay 
out my proposal, I want to reintroduce some main findings from earlier chapters to show the 
motivations for the ways my account diverges from traditional accounts of luck. 
 In my previous chapters, I argued for the following constraints on a plausible account of 
luck. 
I. Ordinary Usage Constraint: An account of luck must capture the significance and 
unreliability of lucky and unlucky states of affairs. 




On my account, significance is understood in terms of moral facts about the advantages and 
disadvantages possessed by the subjects of a luck claim.  These facts will be the starting point of 
my account, which is a considerably different approach than some other accounts already 
discussed. 
III.  Kind of Significance Constraint: An account of luck should provide a way of 
distinguishing between benefits that apply generally to all subjects and benefits that apply 
only to particular subjects, idiosyncratically. 
In giving the significance criterion a central role in developing my account, I make a distinction 
between impersonal luck (roughly, states of affairs that are advantageous for any subject) and 
personal luck (roughly, states of affairs that are advantageous only in light of particular subjects' 
characteristics).  In section 2 of this chapter, I will present a more careful treatment of this 
distinction. 
IV.  Unreliability Criterion: Luck is unreliable; luck always involves the idea that something 
is unusual, abnormal, or unexpected. 
The unreliability criterion suggests that one facet of luck should (or at least, can) be defined 
negatively; I will do this by presenting an account of what it is for an advantage or disadvantage 
to be ordinarily acquired and then claim that all lucky advantages or unlucky disadvantages are 
extraordinarily acquired.   
V.  Metaphysical Constraint: An account of luck must characterize the kind of property 
‘lucky’ is. 
On my account, 'lucky' is a uncodified, dependent property; that is, luckiness is a property that 
only emerges in light of certain social and institutional practices (in contrast to being an intrinsic 
property or a personally subjective one), but it is not explicitly defined by any authority. 
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VI.  Attitudinal Constraint: An account of luck must provide some explanation for the 
attitudes that are typically involved in evaluating things as lucky or unlucky. 
The luck attitudes are special attitudes we tend to adopt toward ourselves and others when we 
believe that we or they are lucky or unlucky. These involve modification to the attitudes we 
would adopt if we did not believe that the relevant subject was lucky or unlucky.  In light of my 
treatment of the metaphysical constraint, the luck attitudes will play a central role in my account.  
Since I treat luckiness as a dependent property, the relevant practice that I think should be used 
to define luck is the practice of adopting these luck attitudes. The account I now introduce is 
focused on describing when people tend to (and, in an attenuated way, prescribing when people 
ought to) adopt the luck attitudes by connecting this practice to the distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary advantages. 
2. Introducing the Advantage-Based Approach 
 As was frequently addressed in previous chapters, my preferred approach to theorizing 
about luck seeks to avoid the matter of luck approach (MOL) by focusing mainly on the 
advantages and disadvantages gained by lucky subjects before considering the states of affairs 
that involve these advantages or disadvantages.  So, unlike MOL, rather than starting with a 
space of all states of affairs and trying to identify the luck-apt ones, I want to start by looking at 
all the advantages and disadvantages subjects are privy to, and ask under what conditions are 
they considered lucky or unlucky to have those advantages or disadvantages.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, what counts as an advantage for a subject may vary according to a person's ethical 
and metaethical commitments, and it is certainly preferable to have one's ethics inform his or her 
theory of luck, rather than the other way around.  This is a desirable approach because, on the 
surface at least, it seems to do justice to wide variety of luck claims and cases that we intuitively 
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accept.  I also find the advantage-based approach preferable to MOL because I believe that MOL 
theorists are making an error when they try to identify cases of luck without reference to the 
practices (luck attitudes) that characterize them.   
 As described in Chapter I,
197
 luck attributions most often matter to us when they lead us 
to adopt modified attitudes that I have been calling luck attitudes.  This includes praising and 
blaming in situations where we otherwise would not, expecting graciousness and generosity from 
lucky winners, and offering support and condolences to unlucky sufferers.  Also included are 
similar attitudes such as resentment at having lost to a lucky winner in a competition or 
embarrassment at one's own succeeding through luck.  Another interesting space to explore is 
found in everyday disagreements about luck claims.  I have in mind situations were two parties 
disagree on whether one of them (or a third party) is lucky.  What kind of reasons are proposed 
to bolster or undermine someone's claim that a subject is lucky?  In games and sports, it is 
common for one party to make a luck claim that the other rejects.  Presumably, this is because 
the luck claim, if true,
198
 would somehow undermine the successful party's achievement in the 
game or sport.  So what kind of reasons do the two parties offer for or against the luck claim?  
The victorious party might point to his careful positioning or the effort he expended, while the 
accusatory party makes observations about the improbability of the result, the insufficiency of 
the victorious party's efforts to ensure that result, or unusual environmental factors that might 
have affected the outcome.  As we will see a little later in this chapter, I take these kinds of 
reasons as instructive, and the kinds of reasons often offered and accepted during disagreements 
about luck will be reflected in the conditions for ordinariness I describe. 
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3. Developing the Advantage-Based Approach: Subjects, Propositions, and Advantages 
 In this section, I want to propose a detailed account of luck following the advantage-
based approach, incorporating the material from the preceding chapters.  I start roughly here: 
(L) S is lucky that P if and only if  P involves an advantage, A, for S, and S's having A is 
extraordinary. 
Certainly more explanation is needed.  What it means for some proposition to involve an 
advantage for a subject was introduced briefly in Chapter III.  As established there, I use 'A is 
good for S' and 'S has (or possesses) advantage, A,' interchangeably for the sake of grammatical 
ease.  In short, P involves an advantage for S whenever P involves something that can be rightly 
said to be good for S. Of course, what counts as good for a subject will vary according to the 
reader's ethical and metaethical commitments.   
 If we let W be the set of possible worlds described by P, then we can move to: 
(ADV) P involves an advantage, A, for S if and only if in all members of W, S has A. 
As in previous chapters, I will describe my account in terms of possible worlds, but nothing of 
substance will hinge on any metaphysical commitments regarding the reality of possible worlds.  
To be more precise in considering identity across possible worlds, some might prefer that I write 
in terms of S’s counterparts (i.e. 'P involves an advantage, A, for S if and only if in all members 
of W, S’s counterpart has A'), but I think that this language would be unnecessarily cumbersome 
and ultimately unimportant for my purposes; I will treat individual subjects as if they 
simultaneously exist in multiple possible worlds.  Similarly, I will treat advantages as if a subject 
can possess the very same advantage in different possible worlds. 
 From ADV we can immediately see that, for P to involve an advantage for S, P must be 
in some way about S.  Even if P describes something that S benefits from in the actual world, if 
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P is not about S, then there will be possible worlds described by P where S does not benefit.  For 
example, suppose that Sally has purchased a lottery ticket with the numbers 2, 11, 17, 35 and 39.  
The proposition ‘the numbers 2, 11, 17, 35, and 39 were drawn for the lottery’ would then 
describe part of the actual world that is beneficial for Sally; Sally has the advantage of having a 
lottery ticket that matches those winning numbers.  However, this proposition does not involve 
an advantage for Sally because there are possible worlds where the numbers 2, 11, 17, 35, and 39 
were drawn for the lottery where Sally does not have the advantage of having a lottery ticket that 
matches the winning numbers.  However, the more specific proposition ‘the numbers 2, 11, 17, 
35, and 39 were drawn for the lottery and Sally has purchased a lottery ticket with the numbers 
2, 11, 17, 35 and 39’ does involve an advantage for Sally.  Similarly, the propositions ‘the lottery 
numbers drawn match the numbers on Sally’s ticket’ or ‘Sally won the lottery’ each also involve 
an advantage for Sally.  I think that this restriction on the kind of propositions that can involve 
advantages does justice to the idea that luck claims typically involve implicit information about 
the relationship between a state of affairs and a subject’s interests.
199
 
 Next, as we saw in Chapter III,
200
 I make a distinction between impersonal and personal 
luck.  We start with a proposition, P, that involves an advantage for a subject, S. Then, let P` be 
the proposition we get if we substitute a subject, S`, for S in P.  This substitution should be 
clearly possible since, as just discussed, P must be a proposition that is, in some way, about S. 
For example, if P is ‘S won the lottery,’ then P` will be ‘ S` won the lottery.’  Then, if we let S = 
{S1, S2, … Sn …} be the set of all subjects of the same kind as S, and let PS = {P1, P2, … Pn … } 
be the set of propositions generated by substituting the corresponding members of S for S in P, 
then: 
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(IA) P involves an impersonal advantage, A, for S if and only if for some S of which S is a 
member, Pn involves A for Sn, for every member, Sn, of S. 
(PA) P involves a personal advantage, A, for S if and only if for some S of which S is a 
member, Pn does not involve A for Sn, for some member, Sn, of S. 
So, I will branch L into: 
(LI) S is impersonally lucky that P if and only if P involves an impersonal advantage, A, for S, 
and S's having A is extraordinary. 
(LP)  S is personally lucky that P if and only if P involves a personal advantage, A, for S, and 
S's having A is extraordinary. 
Additionally, although I take the form 'S is lucky that P' to be canonical, I also offer two 
common derivative notions.  First, we get an immediate treatment of how to understand claims 
that a person is lucky. 
(L') S is lucky if and only if there is a relevant P such that S is lucky that P. 
Next, we want to address statements such as "winning the lottery is lucky," or "finding buried 
treasure is lucky" that ascribe luckiness to a kind of action or process.  Prima facie, many of 
these claims should turn out to be true on any account of luck.  However, since my account 
defines luck in terms of propositions, subjects, and advantages, I need to take a indirect approach 
to accommodating them.  I propose that these claims characterize a certain predicate as lucky 
(for example, "winning the lottery is lucky" characterizes the predicate 'won the lottery' as 
lucky).  Further, for every subject, we can generate a proposition by saturating the predicate with 
the subject (for example, we can saturate the predicate 'won the lottery' with the subject 'Alan' to 




 Q is a kind of action or process, and 
 q(x) is the predicate characterized by Q, then 
(L'') Q is lucky if and only if for any S, S is impersonally lucky that q(S). 
Finally, to cover cases of bad luck:  
(U) S is unlucky that P if and only if P involves a disadvantage, D, for S, and S's having D is 
 extraordinary. 
The remaining definitions for bad luck will follow directly from U by substituting 'unlucky' for 
'lucky' and ‘disadvantage’ for ‘advantage’ in everything covered so far. 
 These definitions do justice to observations made in Chapter III; it is possible for a 
person to be any combination of personally lucky, impersonally lucky, personally unlucky, and 
impersonally unlucky at the same time (assuming accommodating meta-ethical commitments).  
So long as we suppose, as I do, that it is possible for some things to be good or bad for a subject 
without being all-things-considered good or all-things considered bad for that subject, then 
combinations of the following kind are possible.  Suppose that Betsy finds a crate of rare bottles 
and gold abandoned on the side of the road.  Betsy is impersonally lucky that she found the gold.  
Additionally, Betsy is an avid bottle collector who recognizes and appreciates the value of the 
rare bottles in the crate.  So, she is personally lucky that she found the bottles.  However, if we 
add that the bottles and gold are irradiated and will make Betsy ill, then she is impersonally 
unlucky that she found the bottles and gold.  Finally, we can add that Betsy has a petty family 
who will resent her finding the gold and treat her poorly because of it.  So, Betsy is also 
personally unlucky that she found the gold. 
 One might worry that my account leads to an unintuitive result, arguing that a subject 
cannot be impersonally and personally lucky relative to the same proposition, since IA specifies 
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that the proposition involves an advantage that would be an advantage for any subject and PA 
specifies that the proposition involves an advantage that would not be an advantage for at least 
one other subject.  However, if we consider ADV carefully, we can see that my account is open 
to a proposition involving multiple advantages.  It is possible that there is more than one 
advantage that a subject has in every possible world described by a proposition.  In the example 
just given, Betsy is impersonally lucky and personally lucky that she found that crate of gold and 
bottles because, in every possible worlds described by 'Betsy found that crate of gold and bottles' 
she has two advantages, the impersonal advantage of possessing the gold and the personal 
advantage of possessing the bottles. 
 The definitions I have proposed also have some interesting implication for the logic of 
luck statements, which I think line up nicely with common intuitions.  Suppose that 'xLy' is the 
relation 'x is lucky that y.'  Let's consider the following: 
1.  sL(p ∧ q) ⊨ sLp ∧ sLq 
2.  sLp ∧ sLq ⊨ sL(p ∧ q) 
3.  sLp ⊨ sL(p ∧ q) 
Intuitively, we can see problems with sL(p ∧ q) ⊨ sLp ∧ sLq.  If a subject is lucky that two 
things are true, she may be so in light of their combination and not in light of one alone.  For 
example, Cara might be lucky that she has a lottery ticket with particular numbers on it and that 
those numbers were drawn, but she is not lucky merely to have a ticket with those particular 
numbers, and she is not lucky merely that particular numbers were drawn.  It is only the 
combination of the two that is advantageous for her.  This is supported by the definition I have 
given; the set of possible worlds described by p ∧ q will be smaller than the union of the set of 
possible worlds described by p and the set of possible worlds described by q, so it is possible for 
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someone to possess an extraordinary advantage in all the worlds described by p ∧ q without 
possessing that advantage in all the worlds described by p (or in all the worlds described by q). 
 In contrast, sLp ∧ sLq ⊨ sL(p ∧ q) seems intuitively correct.  If a subject is lucky in light 
of two different propositions, that is, if two different propositions involve an advantage for the 
same subject, then the (third) proposition that is a conjunction of those two propositions will also 
involve those advantages for the subject.  If Dan is lucky that he won the lottery, and Dan is 
lucky that his risky investments paid off, then Dan will certainly be lucky that he won the lottery 
and his lucky investments paid off.  This is supported by my definitions by the same reasoning as 
above; the set of possible worlds described by p ∧ q will be smaller than the union of the set of 
possible worlds described by p and the set of possible worlds described by q. 
 Even more strongly, sLp ⊨ sL(p ∧ q) will hold up intuitively and using my definitions so 
long as your metaethics allows for advantages that are not all-things-considered advantages.  If a 
subject is lucky to gain an advantage, the advantage cannot be cancelled out.  Rather, the 
advantage could be accompanied by a disadvantage, such that the subject is both lucky and 
unlucky.  For example, if Erica wins the lottery and falls into a destructive lifestyle, then she is 
lucky that she won the lottery, unlucky that she fell into a destructive lifestyle, and both lucky 
and unlucky that she won the lottery and fell into a destructive lifestyle.  This is supported by my 
definitions again because of the same observation that the set of possible worlds described by     
p ∧ q will be smaller than the union of the set of possible worlds described by p and the set of 
possible worlds described by q.  Thus, if Erica possesses an advantage in all the possible worlds 
described by p, then she will also possess that advantage in all the worlds described by p ∧ q.  
More could be said on this subject involving the luck relation and other logical connectives, but I 
will save that discussion for a later project. 
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4. Distinguishing Ordinary and Extraordinary  
 In my presentation of my account so far, I have not addressed what it is that makes 
having an advantage or disadvantage ordinary or extraordinary.  At first, it might seem odd that I 
am using the language of ordinary and extraordinary rather than a more familiar notion such as 
desert or justification.  I am introducing this language in an effort to clearly distance this idea 
from other kinds of justification that emerge in discussions of other philosophical topics.  I want 
to avoid confusion with other concepts such as deserved,
 
earned, or merited, which will overlap 
with some but not all of the conditions for ordinariness that I have in mind.  Specifically, I want 
it to be clear that whether having an advantage or disadvantage is ordinary is a matter of social 
practice; it is not a purely moral matter.  Whether or not a subject is deserving of a certain 
advantage or disadvantage is not what I am interested in.  To take a simple example, in gambling 
situations, switching in a weighted die or rigged deck might be enough to make a win ordinary 
for the cheater, but the cheater certainly does not therefore deserve to win. Being in certain 
advantageous circumstances might be underserved or unmerited if this is achieved through 
cheating or deception, but this does not mean that being in those circumstances is necessarily 
extraordinary.    
 Similarly, I avoid using a term like warrant that may be familiar from discussions in 
epistemology (roughly, in the sense of whether a belief is justified by the evidence).  The 
conditions under which we adopt normal attitudes toward a subject's advantage or disadvantage 
do not neatly coincide with the conditions under which we would rationally expect them to have 
the advantage or disadvantage.  There are moral and pragmatic considerations that can lead us to 
adopt ordinary attitudes toward an advantage that we would not rationally expect someone to 
have or to adopt modified attitudes toward an advantage that we should rationally expect 
147 
 
someone to have.  These divergences will be highlighted as I explain the conditions for 
ordinariness in detail. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, since luck is a dependent property, a society could 
easily have developed practices that count different states of affairs as lucky than ours does; that 
is, a society could easily develop practices that lead to different conditions for ordinariness.  So, 
what does it mean for a subject's having some advantage or disadvantage in certain 
circumstances to be extraordinary?  Roughly, the basic intuition is that there are certain ordinary 
ways of acquiring each advantage and disadvantage, and the conditions for ordinariness for that 
advantage or disadvantage identify those ordinary ways of acquiring them.  Conventionally, a 
subject's ordinary acquisition of an advantage is cause for celebration or praise, while the 
extraordinary acquisition of an advantage engenders some amount of jealousy or incredulity.
201
  
On the other hand, a subject's ordinary acquisition of a disadvantage may lead to feelings of 
Schadenfreude or that justice has been served, while an extraordinary acquisition of a 
disadvantage is usually cause for sympathy or, in some cases, compensation.  If no conditions for 
ordinariness are met, then it is extraordinary for the subject to have an advantage or 
disadvantage.   
 For example, if I meet someone who has a large sum of money, an ordinary way for them 
to acquire that money is through their own hard work and cleverness; I might praise and admire 
their industriousness.  However, if I discovered that they were wealthy only because they won 
the money in a lottery, I would modify these attitudes and maybe even resent their fortune.  
Similarly, if I learn of someone who has recently been incarcerated, the ordinary case would be 
one where he or she had actually committed a crime, and I might feel a sense of satisfaction and 
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safety to know that they are no longer free.  However, if I learned that they were wrongly 
arrested because of a striking similarity to the real culprit, I would modify these attitudes and 
instead feel sympathy and outrage on behalf of the wrongly incarcerated person.  My approach to 
capturing this simple intuition is to offer five ways that an advantage can be ordinarily acquired 
by a subject, broken into two broad categories: 1) conditions satisfied by the subject's efforts and 
characteristics, and 2) conditions satisfied by comparison to another set of advantages or 
disadvantages.  I propose that an advantage or disadvantage is extraordinarily acquired if and 
only if it is not acquired in any of those ways. 
 Before presenting my proposed conditions for ordinariness directly, I want to add a note 
about the benefits of treating luck as an uncodified, dependent property.  As Searle has pointed 
out, there are some benefits to forgoing codification, namely, "the flexibility, spontaneity, and 
informality that the practice has in its uncodified form."
202
 For different communities, there 
might be additional or different conditions for ordinariness than the ones I am proposing.  For 
example, in an extremely pious community, it might be the case that the level of a subject's piety 
is a significant condition that always overrides other considerations.  I will not be trying, at this 
point, to specify the exact quantities needed to satisfy any of the following conditions for specific 
advantages and disadvantages, although I do believe those quantities should be sensitive to the 
degree and kind of advantage or disadvantage.  I believe that exact quantities needed  is an 
matter of empirical fact that would need to be answered experimentally if it can be precisely 
answered at all.  However, what I hope is enduring about my account is the framework that I 
have introduced; while specific conditions for ordinariness and luck attitudes might be flexible 
and vary between communities and time periods, my account of luck involves seeing certain 
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advantages and disadvantages as ordinarily acquired, and , when advantages or disadvantages are 
extraordinarily acquired, this motivates a particular set of modified attitudes. 
 Now, the first three ways an advantage
203
 or disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired by a 
subject can be categorized together as conditions that can be satisfied by the subject's efforts to 
produce the advantage or to avoid the disadvantage.  Clearly, what constitutes sufficient effort to 
ordinarily secure an advantage will vary according to the specific advantage.  In general, the 
greater the advantage, the greater effort needed to ordinarily secure it.  The amount of effort that 
ordinarily leads to receiving an average day's pay at work is much lower than the amount of 
effort that ordinarily leads to a payday of millions of dollars.  Disadvantages will ordinarily be 
acquired due to an absence of sufficient effort to avoid the disadvantage.  The prudential 
concerns that appear in discussions on moral luck enter here; normally, we expect others to go to 
certain lengths to avoid certain disadvantages (such as hitting pedestrians while driving), and 
those disadvantages are ordinarily acquired due to a subject's failure to take the appropriate 
precautions.  Importantly, the minimum amount of effort that is sufficient to ordinarily secure an 
advantage will often not be enough effort to guarantee the advantage.  It is enough that the 
subject exerts the efforts that are sufficient to produce the advantage under normal conditions.  
For example, a superior athlete may exert herself enough to ordinarily win a race against a 
novice, but it is certainly still possible (perhaps through some coincidence of strange events) that 
the novice will win. 
 This first way that an advantage or disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired through a 
subject's efforts appears in disagreements about luck when a person protests that they are not 
lucky because they have taken specific precautions to ensure their advantage.  These precautions 
can be strategic plays or preparations, or even information gathering.  To recall an example from 
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 Indiana Jones's escape from the headhunters is ordinary in a way that Smith's 
escape is not, because he has planned his expedition in a way to take advantage of the eclipse as 
a means of escape.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in gambling situations, switching in a 
rigged deck or a weighted die may be enough to ordinarily secure a win on the part of the 
cheater.  The analog for disadvantages, then , would be if a subject suffers because he or she has 
failed to take certain normal precautions.  For example, if I fail to put my milk back in the fridge 
in a timely fashion, ordinarily, my milk spoils. 
 The second way that an advantage or disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired through a 
subject's efforts is through the subject's past efforts to cultivate a skill or talent that produces the 
advantage.  A superior athlete's win over a novice is ordinarily acquired because of the athlete's 
efforts to improve the physical and mental abilities relevant to their sport.
 205
  Accomplished 
poker players' wins at the tournament level are ordinarily acquired by the experience they've 
cultivated that allows them to make strong plays throughout the entire tournament.  They might 
not employ skills that are strong enough to make winning any individual hand ordinary (such as 
rigging the deck), but their winning over the course of hundreds of hands is ordinary because of 
their efforts to cultivate the skills needed to continue making strong plays over an extended 
period of time.  Here, the analog for disadvantages is fairly simple.  A disadvantage of this kind 
would ordinarily be acquired due to weak skill or due to lack of practice.  My frequently missing 
free throws is ordinary because of my complete lack of practice playing basketball.  A 
disadvantage of this kind would be extraordinary if I failed despite having properly developed 
the appropriate skill. 
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 As I will discuss a little later, it is possible for an athlete's victories to be ordinary while her having the talent or 
skill that produces the victories is not. 
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 The third way that an advantage can be ordinarily acquired due to the subject's efforts is 
by the advantage being of a kind that requires minimal or no effort.  As mentioned above, the 
amount of effort needed to ordinarily acquire an advantage scales with the degree of the 
advantage; some advantages can ordinarily be acquired simply by being so small that little or no 
effort is normally required to secure them.  Finding money on the street is intuitively lucky for 
any moderate sum; finding one hundred dollars certainly seems lucky.  However, finding a dime 
or a nickel is not as clearly lucky; the effort needed to lean over and pick up a dime seems like 
sufficient effort to ordinarily lead to a gain of ten cents.   
 There is also a sense in which the effort needed to ordinarily acquire an advantage scales 
with the probability of obtaining an advantage in outcome luck situations.  If an advantageous 
outcome is probable enough, it may be ordinarily acquired through little or no effort on the part 
of the subject.  When a gambler claims that her win is not lucky because she made a smart bet 
with odds squarely in her favor, she is arguing that no effort beyond identifying and placing that 
bet is required to ordinarily lead to her winning.  Disadvantages can be ordinarily acquired in the 
same fashion when the effort needed to avoid the disadvantage is unachievably high.  For 
example, the natural death of a pet might be ordinary simply because it is unavoidable (barring 
the unlikely invention of an immortality serum).  We may recall Rescher's formula for measuring 
luck from Chapter II: 
λ (E) = Δ (E) ⨯ [1-pr(E)] = Δ (E) ⨯ pr(not-E)206 
For Rescher, E represents some outcome event, Δ (E) represents the significance of that outcome 
for the relevant subject, and pr(E) represents the probability of E's occurring.  The λ measure is 
given as a measure of the degree of luck, for Rescher, with positive values being lucky and 
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negative values unlucky.  While I do not think that this measure is useful for comparing the 
degree of any two cases of luck,
207
 if we imagine the λ measure as a measurement of the effort 
that ordinarily leads to E, I think this equation can help illustrate how some advantages can be 
ordinarily acquired by little or no effort as the λ measure approaches zero and how some 
disadvantages can be ordinarily acquired when the λ measure gets sufficiently high. 
 In addition to the conditions based on the advantaged or disadvantaged subject's effort, 
there are two ways that a subject can ordinarily acquire an advantage or disadvantage relative to 
a set of other advantages or disadvantages.  First, a subject's advantage or disadvantage can be 
ordinary based on the subject's history in similar circumstances.  For example, in a board game, a 
player's advantage from a very specific roll of the dice can be ordinary because of a history of 
extremely disadvantageous rolls or a disadvantageous roll can be ordinary because of a history of 
very advantageous rolls.  This is the point where the terminology of ordinary and extraordinary 
acquisition of advantages and disadvantages is least intuitive; we should keep in mind that what 
is relevantly ordinary are the attitudes that are appropriate to take toward the advantage gained in 
these situations.  This is also perhaps the clearest example of where I think the rules governing 
luck attributions and rational expectation do and should come apart.  Although my history of 
failing in similar board game situations should not lead me to believe that 'I am due' or that I am 
more likely to succeed now, that history does and should affect the attitudes that I and others take 
towards my succeeding. 
 My claim that a subject's history can influence whether or not they are lucky may, 
rightfully, seem reminiscent of a classic gambler's fallacy; so, why would I endorse this view?  
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Since I am treating luck as a dependent property, the pressing question for me is, for a given 
situation, does it make sense to adopt the additional attitudes that come with characterizing it as 
lucky?  When I consider the kinds of attitudes motivated and justified by the labels 'lucky' and 
'unlucky,' attitudes of jealousy or sympathy and expectations of gratitude, a person's history does 
seem relevant.  While we ought not rationally expect that a person's history of advantage or 
disadvantage will affect whether a new situation will actually be advantageous or 
disadvantageous for them, that history does affect how we ought to react when an advantage or 
disadvantage is realized. 
 The final way that a subject's advantage or disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired is 
relative to a set of other advantages or disadvantages held by competitors in a zero-sum contest.  
For example, imagine a four player board game where the rules of the game clearly establish one 
roll that is extremely disadvantageous.  If three of the four have already, improbably, made that 
exact disadvantageous roll on recent turns, we would not want to adopt modified attitudes if the 
fourth player makes that roll as well.  In this case, the fourth player would be lucky to avoid that 
roll, and not unlucky to make it, regardless of the actual probability. 
 For convenience, here are the five ways of warranting an advantage or disadvantage that I 
have identified, as a list: 
1.  An advantage is ordinarily acquired if the subject has taken specific precautions to 
produce the advantage; a disadvantage is ordinarily acquired if the subject has failed to 
take typical precautions to avoid the disadvantage. 
2.  An advantage is ordinarily acquired if the subject has made sufficient efforts to cultivate 
the skills or talents that normally lead to the advantage; a disadvantage is ordinarily 
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acquired if the subject has failed to cultivate the skills or talents that normally lead to 
avoiding the disadvantage. 
3.  An advantage can be ordinarily acquired in virtue of normally requiring no or minimal 
effort to produce it, or, in certain cases of outcome luck, an advantage or disadvantage 
can be ordinarily acquired by being extremely probable.   
4.  An advantage can be ordinarily acquired if the subject's history in similar situations is rife 
with disadvantages, and a disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired if the subject's history 
in similar situations is rife with advantages. 
5.  An advantage can be ordinarily acquired if the subject's competitors in a zero-sum contest 
have all received or all will have received a relevantly similar advantage, and a 
disadvantage can be ordinarily acquired if the subject's competitors in a zero-sum contest 
have all received or all will have received a relevantly similar disadvantage. 
An advantage or disadvantage is extraordinarily acquired if and only if it is not acquired in any 
of these five ways. 
 In order to decide whether or not a particular advantage or disadvantage is ordinarily 
acquired, we should always start by considering the kind and degree of the advantage or 
disadvantage.  Various things may be recognized as advantages and disadvantages according to 
various ethical and meta-ethical commitments, but, for most, advantages will at least include 
possession of certain commodities, gains in reputation, social or moral standing, and the 
possession of advantageous traits.  For the first two kinds, we can try to get a sense of the degree 
of the advantage.  If the advantage or disadvantage is impersonal, it will often be fairly clear how 
great of an advantage or disadvantage it is.  If the advantage or disadvantage is personal, we 
might need to consider the subject's particular values to understand the degree of the advantage 
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or disadvantage.  As discussed above, some sense of the degree of the advantage or disadvantage 
is needed to gauge the effort that is sufficient to warrant it.  Following this, we should consider 
whether the advantage or disadvantage is gained or suffered by a subject with a peculiar history 
in similar situations or by a subject involved in a zero-sum contest.   
 I also want to comment on two interesting conditions for ordinariness that I have also 
considered, but which were not included in this account.  First, we might consider the amount 
and kind of effort employed to produce an advantage relative to how much it is actually possible 
for a subject to do to secure the advantage.  This concern shows up in disagreements about luck 
when someone claims that they have done all they could to give them the best possible chance at 
an advantage.  For example, if we consider players in a card game like bridge, one player might 
win a hand due to a particularly unlikely distribution of cards in her opponents' hands.  The 
opponents might claim that she was lucky that she won the hand, and she might protest that she 
played in a non-obvious way that gave her the best possible chance to win the hand.  She was, in 
a sense, playing to her outs.  If it makes sense, in cases like this, to adopt normal attitudes toward 
the card player's win rather than the modified luck attitudes, then this suggests a plausible 
condition for ordinariness not covered in my account.  However, I do not think that it is 
appropriate to abandon the luck attitudes in cases like these; rather, I think the card player only 
has a claim that she should be seen as less lucky than someone who won a similar hand without 
playing in a way that put her in the position of having the best possible chance to win the hand.  
We should adopt less strong versions of the luck attitudes, but we should adopt them 
nonetheless. 
 The second potential condition for ordinariness that I want to comment on is that we 
might want to consider certain advantages ordinarily acquired relative to a salient subject or 
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group of subjects.  What I want to address are claims like, "You are so lucky to be able to see" 
when a healthy-sighted person is working with the blind, or "You are lucky to have enough to 
eat," when working with starving populations.  In these cases, it seems plausible to think that 
there is an additional condition for ordinariness here, or at least a constraint on conditions for 
ordinariness; if a group of subjects who have all applied the same effort to acquire an advantage 
have not all acquired that advantage, then that advantage is not ordinarily acquired by any of 
those subjects.  However, I think that this misses an important point already implicit in my 
account.  For groups like these, I think the important consideration is what amount and kind of 
effort is normally enough to secure the advantage in question.  If the amount and kind of effort 
applied by everyone in the group meets this normal level, then those who do not acquire the 
advantage are unlucky.  If the amount and kind of effort applied by everyone in the group does 
not meet this normal level, then those who do acquire the advantage are lucky.  In cases where 
two people exert the same effort but only one gains an advantage, we should not interpret one as 
lucky and one as unlucky; rather, whether the effort expended justifies the advantage should be 
decided apart from a comparison of the two subjects.  Then, we should adopt normal attitudes 
toward the subject that receives or fails to receive an advantage appropriate to the amount of 
effort, and we should adopt luck attitudes toward the one whose advantage or lack of advantage 
is not appropriate to the amount of effort. 
5. An Analysis of Everyday Luck Claims 
 I would now like to employ my account in an analysis of some of the examples presented 
in previous chapters.  I will begin by looking at what I have been calling everyday luck claims. 
We started with the following: 
1. 'John is lucky that he won the lottery.' 
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2.  'John is lucky.' 
3.  'Winning the lottery is lucky.' 
These first three have been covered directly by my account in section 3 by L, L`, and L``.  
However, depending on the context, we could also interpret claim 2 as a claim that John is a 
generally lucky person; that is, John is someone who is lucky relative to a wide range of 
propositions. 
4.  'Winning the lottery was lucky for John.' 
5. 'John is lucky to be so tall.' 
6.  'That was a lucky shot.' 
7.  'That he won the lottery is lucky.' 
Claims 4 and 5 can be paraphrased into the appropriate form without much difficulty: 
4a. 'John is lucky that he won the lottery.' 
5a. 'John is lucky that he is so tall.' 
Claims 6 and 7 simply require adding implicit information that the speaker takes for granted: 
6a. 'S is lucky that he made that shot,' where S is the implicit actor who took the shot. 
7a. 'S is lucky that he won the lottery,' where S is the referent of 'he' in the original claim. 
Having shown how we can easily translate everyday language luck claims into the standard 
form, 'S is lucky that P,' I would also like to use my account of ordinariness to offer analysis of 
some of the more complicated luck claims discussed in previous chapters. 
 For this analysis, let's begin with the following claims: 
8. 'John is lucky that he won the lottery.' 
9.  'John is lucky that he made that shot.' 
10. 'John is unlucky to have narrowly missed that shot.' 
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11.  'John is lucky to be so tall.' 
12.   'Adam is lucky to win a flip of a fair coin.' 
13.  'Carl is lucky to survive his turn at Russian Roulette.' 
14.  'Dana is lucky to make it home safely, even though she was driving while drunk.' 
Starting with claim 8, we have John winning the lottery, a pretty standard case of luck.  The 
advantage John gains is a monetary commodity and is presumably very large.  Additionally, 
lottery wins are perhaps the clearest cases of impersonal luck, as the rules of the drawing 
explicitly define what constitutes winning and characterizes it as the best possible outcome.  All 
the normal attitudes directed toward lucky persons and situations apply here; it is appropriate to 
be envious of John's prize and to expect gratitude and humility from him. 
 Next, let's move to the more interesting claim 9.  It is not clear what exactly John gains 
from having made this shot (or even what it is that he is shooting), but we can easily imagine that 
he has won some contest.  The degree of this advantage is not clear, but, if the claim is true, then 
John has won something of value, either some commodity after having bet on the contest, or just 
the social advantage (and associated pride) of having won.  However, the claim might be made 
specifically to undermine the social currency that John acquires through his victory, as this is one 
of the natural attitudes motivated and justified by characterizing his victory as lucky.  The luck 
involved is impersonal, as the rules to any contest typically define victory as the most desirable 
outcome.  If this claim is true, then i) John has not done anything significant to produce the 
desired shot, ii) he has not cultivated the appropriate skills to justify his making such a shot, and 
iii) his opponents have not each enjoyed a similar advantage in the course of the contest.  If any 
of these three things did happen, John could reasonably offer them as reasons to undermine the 
claim that he was lucky; his efforts or cultivated skills would be a reason to adopt normal 
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attitudes and to praise John, while his opponent's having a similar advantage (of making a shot 
not justified by effort or cultivated skills) would be a reason to think that John's winning as a 
consequence of this shot is not enough to motivate adopting modified attitudes toward his win. 
 In contrast, regarding claim 10, John's missing (and presumably, therefore losing) is 
extraordinary because, presumably, John has exerted the appropriate effort or developed the 
appropriate skills to have made the shot.  The nearness to his desired target is taken as evidence 
of his having developed the appropriate skills or exerted the necessary effort.  This claim might 
easily be undermined with additional information; for example, if this is the nearest shot that 
John has made all night, then perhaps we should think that this result actually is indicative of his 
skills or efforts. 
 Claim number 11 addresses what is often referred to as constitutive luck.  The specific 
claim, that John is lucky that he is tall, may be personal or impersonal (or both).  It may be an 
observation made about how being taller (at least for American men) up to a point, is socially 
advantageous.  It may also be personal, to the extent that John enjoys being tall or participates in 
hobbies (such as basketball) where his height provides an advantage.  In any case, so long as 
being tall is actually advantageous for John, it seems that there is no way that his being tall could 
be ordinarily acquired through effort, outside of some kind of radical surgery.  In cases of 
constitutive luck, there is no way John could have put forth sufficient effort to be born with the 
genes that lead to his being tall, and he cannot cultivate his genetic traits as he could a skill or 
talent.  
 The twelfth claim is particularly interesting.  Let's assume that Adam has placed a wager 
on the flip of coin that he has just won, so that the advantage gained is impersonal and a 
commodity.  Also, let's assume that the coin flipped is fair, Adam has not cultivated any special 
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talent at flipping coins, the coin flip is not part of a larger game of many flips, and Adam has no 
history of flipping coins for money.  Whether or not winning a coin flip is ordinary seems to vary 
with the stakes involved in the normal way.  However, there is an interesting absence of intuitive 
symmetry between lucky coin flips and unlucky coin flips.  For very large wagered sums, 
winning a coin flip is intuitively lucky and losing is intuitively non-lucky.  The win or loss is 
extraordinary because of the bettor's lack of prudence in risking such a great sum on the flip of a 
coin.  For very small wagered amounts, there is no luck involved in a win or a loss, as betting on 
a fifty percent chance of success seems sufficient to normally produce a gain or loss of a very 
small amount.  For middling amounts of money, intuitions and opinions may rightly vary.  In 
terms of attitudes, it may or may not seem appropriate to envy and expect gratitude from the 
winner of, let's say, twenty dollars, and it similarly may or may not be appropriate to offer 
sympathy or attempt to compensate the loser.  This is one of the cases where I think the useful 
vagueness and flexibility of practices surrounding luck becomes prominent, as these intuitions 
seem to mirror common risk-averse behavior. 
 I would like to discuss the final two claims together (numbers 13 and 14), because they 
help illustrate how my account leads us away from an understanding of luck based primarily in 
probability.  In both cases, Carl and Dana are lucky even though the advantage they gain is 
highly probable (or, at least, more probable than not).  Carl's survival of a round of Russian 
Roulette is extraordinary because the minimum amount of effort needed to secure his survival is 
merely that he not participate in the game.  Similarly, the effort Dana is expected to expend in 
getting home safely should at least cover being sober while driving or avoiding driving if she is 
drunk.  In both cases, the luck attitudes that are motivated  by Carl and Dana's advantages seem 
justified by their apparent recklessness.  It is a virtue of my account that there is room to expect 
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gratitude and humility from Carl and Dana in the same way we might expect it from John and 
Adam, even though the prima facie probability of their gaining their respective advantages are 
dramatically different. 
6. An Analysis of Challenging Cases 
 Finally, I want to return to some of the difficult cases presented in Chapter II in my 
discussion of other contemporary theories of luck.  First, let’s consider the case of the secret 
benefactor, suggested by Nicholas Rescher: 
Secret benefactor: Suppose that Seth is an eccentric, wealthy individual who intends to 
send a check for a large sum of money to his nephew, Tobias on his twenty second 
birthday.  However, Seth and Tobias have never met, and Tobias has no way of knowing 
about his wealthy uncle.  When Seth does send the money to Tobias, he does so by 




How should we approach this case using the advantage-based theory of luck?  First, we need to 
identify the relevant claim or claims up for evaluation.  So, we ask whether Tobias is lucky that 
he received this money from Seth.  The advantage involved is clear (the money) and so we next 
ask whether or not his receiving this money is extraordinary.  Tobias has not done anything to 
produce the advantage, it is not the product of his cultivated skills or talents, and the supposedly 
large sum of money is not the kind of thing that normally requires very little effort to acquire.  
There is also no relevant history or zero-sum contest to consider.  Therefore, Tobias is lucky that 
he receives the money; this is a very intuitive result. 
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 A very similar analysis will apply to Lackey’s modally robust case of finding buried 
treasure: 
Buried treasure: Sophie, knowing that she had very little time left to live, wanted to bury 
a chest filled with all of her earthly treasures on the island she inhabited. As she walked 
around trying to determine the best site for proper burial, her central criteria were, first, 
that a suitable location must be on the northwest corner of the island—where she had 
spent many of her fondest moments in life—and, second, that it had to be a spot where 
rose bushes could flourish—since these were her favorite flowers. As it happens, there 
was only one particular patch of land on the northwest corner of the island where the soil 
was rich enough for roses to thrive. Sophie, being excellent at detecting such soil, 
immediately located this patch of land and buried her treasure, along with seeds for future 
roses to bloom, in the one and only spot that fulfilled her two criteria.   One month later, 
Vincent, a distant neighbor of Sophie’s, was driving in the northwest corner of the 
island—which was also his most beloved place to visit—and was looking for a place to 
plant a rose bush in memory of his mother who had died ten years earlier—since these 
were her favorite flowers. Being excellent at detecting the proper soil for rose bushes to 
thrive, he immediately located the same patch of land that Sophie had found one month 
earlier. As he began digging a hole for the bush, he was astonished to discover a buried 




The first task is to identify the relevant claim and advantage.  So, we ask, is Vincent lucky that 
he found this buried treasure?  Again, the advantage is clear, so we turn to the question of 
whether or not his acquisition of the treasure is extraordinary.  As in the case of the secret 
benefactor, Vincent has not done anything to produce the specific advantage, it is not the product 
of his cultivated skills or talents, and the treasure is not the kind of thing that normally requires 
very little effort to acquire.  There is also no relevant history or zero-sum contest to consider.  
Therefore, Vincent is lucky that he acquires the treasure; again, it is a very intuitive result.  The 
details about Sophie and her motivation for burying the treasure do not factor into our 
evaluation; they are deliberately irrelevant.
210
 
 Another relatively clear analysis can be given for Riggs’s example of the Gentleman 
adventurers: 
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Gentleman adventurers: Consider two gentlemen adventurers, Indiana Jones and New 
Jersey Smith.  Suppose that Jones and Smith are adventuring in an exotic locale filled 
with local tribes that engage in some unfamiliar customs.  These tribes all worship the 
sun as a god, and see an eclipse as a sign of the sun god’s disfavor with whatever they are 
doing at that moment.  Jones and Smith are captured by some of these tribe members, but 
then are set free when a solar eclipse happens moments after their capture.  Jones has 
consulted his almanac before starting the expedition and planned in such a way that, if 
they were captured, the eclipse would present an opportunity for them to escape.  Smith 
has not done any such planning, and is completely surprised by the eclipse.
 211 
 
For this case, the task is to explain the difference between Jones and Smith; intuitively, it seems 
that Jones is not lucky that he escaped and Smith is lucky that he escaped.  The advantage gained 
(survival and escape) is clear and identical for both.  However, Jones has planned and prepared 
to use the eclipse to escape (in the event of their capture).  Preparing a means of escape (by 
consulting his almanac and being informed about the habits of the local tribe) seems to be 
exactly what is ordinarily required to produce an escape. Therefore, his having this advantage is 
ordinary and he is not lucky.  In contrast, Smith has not taken any such precautions and therefore 
his escape is extraordinary (as it does not satisfy any of the other conditions for ordinariness 
either); Smith is lucky that he escaped.  
Finally, I want to turn to Riggs’s example of Smarty the valedictorian and Lackey’s 
example of the Demolition worker to show how my account will handle cases of ‘double luck.’  
Unlike the previous three examples, the advantage in this case will not be as clear cut. 
Smarty the valedictorian: Smarty is the valedictorian of her high school class who is 
about to take her computer delivered college entrance exams. Despite her formidable 
intelligence, she decides to prepare for the upcoming exam by studying diligently and 
taking many practice exams. The night before the exam, she gets a good night’s sleep, 
and awakens fresh, sharp, and ready to excel. She takes the exam and scores very highly. 
Unbeknownst to Smarty, however, a fiendishly clever hacker with debilitating test 
anxiety had decided prior to the exam to wreak vengeance on all the clever students about 
to take it. Driven mad by his inability to get into a good college because of his poor test 
scores, he has vowed that all those smarty-pants test-takers will suffer just as he has had 
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to suffer. He compiles a list of all the high school valedictorians for that year, and hacks 
into the exam program. For the valedictorians, he replaces the usual questions with 
questions from an advanced college physics exam. As it happens, he accidentally skips 
Smarty’s name on the list (despite being very careful not to miss anybody), and so she 





Demolition worker: Ramona is a demolition worker, about to press a button that will 
blow up an old abandoned warehouse, thereby completing a project that she and her co-
workers have been working on for several weeks. Unbeknownst to her, however, a mouse 
had chewed through the relevant wires in the construction office an hour earlier, severing 
the connection between the button and the explosives. But as Ramona is about to press 
the button, her co-worker hangs his jacket on a nail in the precise location of the severed 
wires, which radically deviates from his usual routine of hanging his clothes in the office 
closet. As it happens, the hanger on which the jacket is hanging is made of metal, and it 
enables the electrical current to pass through the damaged wires just as Ramona presses 




The first difficulty that arises in these cases is that multiple advantages and disadvantages seem 
to be involved.  Smarty has the advantage of doing well on the exam, but she also has the 
advantage of her exam not being sabotaged and the disadvantage of her taking an exam that the 
hacker has decided to sabotage.  Similarly, Ramona has the advantage of her successfully 
demolishing the building, the disadvantage of a mouse chewing through her wire, and the 
advantage of her coworker reconnecting the wire by hanging his jacket. 
 My account is able to provide a very nuanced analysis of cases like these.  Consider the 
following claims: 
1. Smarty is lucky that she did well on her exam. 
2. Smarty is lucky that the hacker did not sabotage her exam. 
3. Smarty is unlucky that she took an exam that a hacker decided to sabotage. 
4. Ramona is lucky that she successfully demolished the building. 
5. Ramona is unlucky that a mouse chewed through her wire. 
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6. Ramona is lucky that a coworker reconnected her wire by hanging his jacket. 
Now, claims 2, 3, 5, and 6 do not need much discussion, as they are all clearly true.  The 
difficulty of these cases arises when we are asked to evaluate claims 1 and 4 in light of these 
complications.  So, starting with claim 1, we ask whether or not ‘Smarty did well on her exam’ 
involves an advantage for Smarty.  The answer seems to be clearly yes, as in every possible 
world where Smarty does well on her exam she has the advantage of doing well on her exam.  
Now, is it extraordinary that she does so?  On my account, we should say that Smarty, in light of 
her preparation and intelligence, has done what is normally required to do well on such an exam, 
and therefore her doing well is ordinary.  She is not lucky that she did well on her exam.  
However, what if we consider more specific propositions? 
7. Smarty is lucky that she did well on her exam that a hacker intended to sabotage. 
8. Smarty is lucky that she did well on her exam that a hacker intended to sabotage, but 
failed to sabotage. 
Smarty’s preparation is not sufficient to ordinarily do well on an exam that a hacker intends to 
sabotage (after all, in most cases where a hacker intends to sabotage her exam, it will in fact be 
sabotaged) so she is lucky with respect to claim 7.  But again, her preparation is sufficient to 
ordinarily do well on an exam that a hacker intends to sabotage, and yet fails to sabotage.  So she 
is not lucky with respect to claim 8!  This same treatment can be applied to the demolition 
worker case. 
 What should we think about this proliferation of evaluations of luckiness for a single 
case?  I think that it is actually a virtue of my account that it renders these different judgments.  
As the case under consideration gets a more detailed description, our judgment of the case will 
tend to be better (that is, we should prefer the judgment of claim 8 over that of claim 7 in 
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consideration of adopting and justifying luck attitudes toward Smarty).  As different features of 
the case are made salient, our judgments of the case should change; this seems to be exactly what 





Conclusion: The Moral 
1. The Moral 
 The general theory of luck that I have offered should be instructive in framing some more 
targeted philosophical discussions surrounding luck.  The framework I offer will not be very 
revisionary for these discussions; instead, I think what is offered is a cleaner way of describing 
the intuitive tensions that make these issues philosophically interesting.  Here, I will briefly 
cover how my theory might help frame the two leading discussions of luck in philosophy, anti-
luck epistemology and the paradox of moral luck. 
 I follow Pritchard in his characterization of the project of anti-luck epistemology.  He 
writes: 
Anti-luck epistemology urges a three-stage approach to the theory of knowledge that 
takes the anti-luck platitude
214
 as central to the project.  First, one offers a theory of luck.  
Second, one delineates the specific sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck.  
Finally, third, one puts these two component parts together and formulates an anti-luck 
condition on knowledge that captures the specific sense in which knowledge is 
incompatible with luck.  If the anti-luck platitude does reveal something deep and 
important about knowledge, then by undertaking the anti-luck epistemological project 




If we follow this method, then, following my theory of luck, we will want to identify the specific 
kind of luck that is intuitively incompatible with knowledge.  Presumably, this is the possibility 
of someone being lucky that her belief is true.  For example, if I overhear my roommate 
planning a surprise party for me, it is not problematic that I am lucky to get the evidence 
supporting my belief that a party will be thrown for me; it is not intuitively problematic that I am 
lucky to know about the party.  However, if I form that same belief based on a guess, then this 
does not seem to be genuine knowledge even if it turns out to be true.  So, the relevant 
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proposition (given by my theory of luck) that we should be concerned with is, "S is lucky that 
her belief is true." 
 The final step, combining the general theory of luck and the articulation of the 
incompatibility of luck and knowledge to get a condition on knowledge, can then be done as 
follows.  We start by considering what kind of advantage a person gains by her belief being true.  
If "S is lucky that her belief is true" then her belief being true involves an advantage for S, and 
S's having that advantage is extraordinary.  The condition on knowledge will emerge directly 
from the conditions for ordinarily possessing the advantage involved in having a true belief. 
 The difficulty will arise when we try to articulate how  it is good for a person that her 
beliefs are true.  Trivially, we can see that it whether or not it is advantageous to simply have a 
certain belief will be contingent on various pragmatic concerns and consequences.  However, we 
do not want to focus on the (potential) advantage of having a particular belief (or kind of belief), 
but on the (potential) advantage of one's belief being true.  In other words, we should be 
concerned with identifying and understanding a principle on which it is always better for a 
subject to have true beliefs (rather than false ones) independent of the practical consequences of 
having any particular belief.  This may be reminiscent of similar concerns brought up by 
discussions of pragmatic encroachment.
216
  If we endorse the view that conditions on knowledge 
should not be sensitive to pragmatic concerns, then my theory of luck would instruct us to 
develop our anti-luck epistemology based on a non-pragmatic advantage involved in having a 
true belief.  On my theory, the conditions for ordinariness for an advantage will be sensitive to 
the kind and type of the advantage; if the advantage identified were a practical one, then the 
condition on knowledge that would emerge from these conditions for ordinariness would 
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necessarily be sensitive to pragmatic concerns.  If it turns out that the only advantages associated 
with having true beliefs are practical ones, then we would be led to give up either the idea that 
conditions on knowledge should not be sensitive to pragmatic concerns or the project of anti-luck 
epistemology. 
 Articulating the relevant principle (that is, clearly describing what it is that is 
advantageous about one's beliefs being true) is what my theory invites the anti-luck 
epistemologist to focus on.  Carefully specifying the advantage involved in having a true belief 
should enable us to identify the conditions that would justify having such an advantage.  Under 
what conditions is it ordinary to have the advantage attached to one's belief being true?  The 
conditions for ordinariness would emerge as conditions on knowledge, as their satisfaction 
would rule out the kind of luck that is incompatible with knowledge.  I leave the development of 
such an anti-luck epistemology for another work. 
 The paradox of moral luck arises from a simple intuition about morality and an 
observation about our typical practices of moral assessment.  The rough intuition (often 
attributed to a Kantian understanding of morality) is that, in some sense, luck should not make a 
moral difference.  The observation, first articulated by Bernard Williams
217
 and Thomas 
Nagel,
218
 is that much (or even all) of what we normally take to be morally relevant is subject to 
luck.  In terms of moral responsibility, we have a tension between the idea that we are not 
morally responsible for anything that is due to luck and the observation that we usually only hold 
people responsible for things that are subject to luck.  In terms of moral assessment, the tension 
is between the idea that we ought not be assessed for things that are due to luck and the 
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observation that our normal practice of moral assessment bases all of our assessment on things 
that are due to luck. 
 I believe that the apparent problem of moral luck stems from a common error and that my 
theory offers a ready analysis of the problem.  The intuition that luck should not make a moral 
difference seems to be motivated, roughly, by the idea that those actions, events, and 
consequences that seem due to luck do not accurately reflect a person's inner character or moral 
worth.  In some way, luck interferes with my will properly expressing itself in the world, and 
moral responsibility and moral assessment should be attached to this inner character.  The 
observation that all of the normal bases for moral responsibility and moral assessment are subject 
to luck is an observation of widespread matters of luck, not widespread genuine cases of luck.  It 
seems to me that the precise difference between these mere matters of luck and cases of genuine 
luck, in the moral domain, is that the genuine cases of luck do not accurately reflect an inner 
moral character, while some of the mere matters of luck do.  If we think of luck only as matters 
of luck, then the motivation for the original intuition, that luck inhibits the accurate expression of 
an inner moral character, seems to disappear.  In fact, it seems that our normal practice of moral 
assessment is already sensitive to this distinction, as many of the luck attitudes we adopt are 
modified moral attitudes in light of observed luck.  So, on my account, perhaps there is no 
problem of moral luck after all. 
 But, what if we accepted an account of luck more like the one offered by Nagel, where 
luck is defined in terms of lack of control?  If we must make this concession, I feel we have 
discovered that the problem of moral luck is not about luck at all.  Further, the idea that we 
cannot or should not be morally assessed or held morally responsible for what is not in our 
control only strikes me as intuitive for an very narrow sense of control (that does not capture the 
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wide range of cases Nagel identifies), and I think that the worry that there is an uncomfortable 
distance between some proper, internal object of moral assessment and our normal practice of 
moral assessment is actually mitigated by the practices surrounding luck (as I understand it), not 
exaggerated by it.  I expect that the right way to address the concern raised by Williams and 
Nagel will actually track similar concerns from discussions between compatiblists and 
incompatibilists.  In those discussions, the potential truth of some form of determinism threatens 
a similar uncomfortable distance between some proper, internal source of moral responsibility 
and our practice of holding each other morally responsible.  I suspect that whatever answer we 
give to the incompatibilist that allows us to understand moral responsibility in a determined 
world will direct us to the right account for how we understand being held responsible for things 
that are, in the sense picked out by Nagel, not in our control.  
2. Limitations and Future Work 
 There are two ways in which my account of luck is intentionally incomplete.  First, on a 
descriptive level, I have not endeavored to describe the entire domain or content of the luck 
attitudes.  While I have proposed a rough description of some plausible conditions for 
ordinariness that, in my experience of contemporary American society at least, motivate luck 
attitudes, I do not mean to imply that this description is complete or exhaustive.  Establishing the 
exact content of the luck attitudes and the complete set of conditions for ordinariness endorsed in 
any particular community (contemporary or otherwise) should be reserved for a more 
anthropologically-minded project, although I have doubts that a complete descriptive account of 
either is possible or desirable.  The normative side of these questions is more philosophically 
interesting, and I have only avoided this discussion in the interest of presenting my theory of 
luck on as general a level as possible.  Coupling my theory of luck with a robust ethical and 
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meta-ethical theory would produce an account of which luck attitudes that we ought to adopt and 
provide grounds for establishing which conditions for ordinariness we ought to endorse.   
 So, in addition to expanded treatments of anti-luck epistemology and moral luck 
(addressing specific anti-luck epistemologies and specific accounts of the moral luck problem, 
rather than generalized approximations of them), the natural next step to my project is to pair my 
general theory with a robust ethical and meta-ethical account to address the normative questions 
around luck attitudes and conditions for ordinariness.  Finally, there are smaller projects that 
could follow from the theory I have presented.  First, a more detailed account of the logic of the 
luck propositions I have identified as canonical could be produced.
219
  Second, I could provide a 
taxonomy in the spirit of Nagel's distinctions
220
 between resultant luck (luck in how our actions 
turn out), circumstantial luck (luck in the kind of circumstances we act in), constitutive luck 
(luck in the traits and disposition we have), and antecedent causal luck (luck in the way our 
actions are determined by causal factors).   
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